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The catastrophic wildfires devastated British Columbia
in 2017. The Tsilhqot’in communities, their territory and
wildlife will take years to recover. Planning for the future of
impending emergencies needed to happen yesterday.

The wildfires swept through the Tsilhqot’in territory in the
summer of 2017 and illuminated the issues that plague the
inclusion of First Nation value systems in government-togovernment relationships.
In many ways the fires awakened the Tsilhqot’in people.
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The fires awakened us
A Message From Tsilhqot’in National Government
Tribal Chairman, Nitsil’in Joe Alphonse

T

he way that us as First Nations people move through the world and
experience the world is vastly different from non-First Nations. We have
come from a history of being viewed as a burden - as something that needs
to be changed and assimilated. The wildfires of 2017 demonstrated that this
outdated historical perspective is still active in the way governments and
organizations view and treat First Nations people.
Our traditional, ecological and territorial knowledge of the Tsilhqot’in territory
weaves an unbreakable thread through our generations for century upon
century. Protecting our lands, food sources and homes from wildfire is nothing
new to us. We always knew the time would come for a massive wildfire event
– it was never a matter of if, but always a matter of when. When the 2017
wildfires hit, we knew we had a long battle ahead of us. We knew that this
battle was not going to be on the land with wildfire – it was going to be in the
administration office with the financial reports, in the homes with the families
and in the boardrooms with outside organizations.
In 2010, my community of Tl’etinqox was evacuated to a centre in Williams
Lake where our people slept on cots, were provided non-traditional foods
and were at times viewed with major distrust by local staff. Traumas from
residential school resurfaced as our elders felt the effects of being forced from
their homes. Tsilhqot’in leadership did not want to put their people through
this again, nor were we going to allow our houses to burn as wildfire resources
went to other areas. We knew we had the strength and knowledge to stay and
fight the wildfires – so we stayed.
Many of our members were trained and had years of experience working
the front lines of wildfires for the provincial government. They protected our
homes and our families from what would have been sure devastation.
The report that we have produced is a mechanism to allow for a true reflection
of the experience that we as Tsilhqot’in people endured. We hope this
report can be used to improve emergency management in other First Nation
communities while also maintaining their rightful jurisdiction to their lands,
people and practices.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 wildfires broke all records in British Columbia as they burnt over 1.2 million
hectares of land, reached suppression costs of $568 million dollars and forced a remarkable
65,000 people to evacuate. Todd Stone, Minister of Transportation and Infrastructure
announced a Provincial State of Emergency that lasted 70 days. In just the first 48 hours, 176
new wildfires started.1 However, the Chilcotin region is isolated and remote. As a result, it
saw delayed and unequal wildfire protection, in part because of the Province’s prioritization
of higher-value urban areas.
In the Interior of British Columbia, the Tsilhqot’in communities were significantly impacted
by two of the largest wildfires: the Hanceville Fire and the Plateau Fire. These two fires
encompassed approximately 761,000 hectares of land, which was 63% of the total area
impacted in British Columbia.
1

Wildfire Season Summary (2017 BC Wildfires)
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/safety/wildfire-status/about-bcws/wildfire-history/wildfire-season-summary

Regional Cariboo Chilcotin Wildfire Activity Map (August 29, 2017)
Compiled by: Tsilhqot’in National Government GIS Department
Tsilhqot’in Communities Highlighted
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The Contention Over
Inherent and Colonial Authority
The Tsilhqot’in leadership asserts jurisdiction over the territory, yet continues to face
challenges reconciling its authority with the Governments of British Columbia and
Canada.
Jurisdiction in Tsilhqot’in territory is an intricate web of overlapping regional, provincial,
federal, and Tsilhqot’in authorities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises its inherent
jurisdiction to care for its land and people. This jurisdiction has been exercised since time
immemorial. However, with colonialism came the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction by
the British Crown, and its subsequent division between federal and provincial powers in
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (and later the Constitution Act, 1982).
These colonial laws mean that Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction was not only disregarded, it was
further obscured by a confounding delineation of territorial authority between federal
and provincial governments. The federal government’s legislative authority, under section
91(24) includes “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” managed under the Indian
Act. Subordinate and selective bylaw-making authority is then ‘delegated’ by the federal
government to individual Indian Band governments. Meanwhile, provincial legislative
authority under sections 92 and 92A includes powers over lands and natural resources
(excluding federal Crown land).
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in territory.
The decision, while recognizing Tsilhqot’in title over a portion of Tsilhqot’in lands,
left questions of jurisdiction untouched, and to be determined through future litigation
or negotiation. As a result of this decision, the resolution of issues of jurisdiction in
Tsilhqot’in territory is now guided by the Nenqay Deni Accord (BC and Tsilhqot’in Nation)
(NDA)2 and the Letter of Understanding (LOU)3 between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and
Canada: January 27, 2017.
2
3

“Nenqay Deni Accord” February 2016, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Nenqay_Deni_Accord.pdf
“Letter of Understanding” January 27, 2017, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2017_01_27_Tsilhqotin_Canada_LOU.pdf

Tsilhqot’in National Government & Provincial Government
Signing - Nenqay Deni Accord (February 12, 2016)
Source: Province of BC flickr.com
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Tsilhqot’in National Government & Federal Government
Signing - Letter of Understanding (Jan. 30, 2017)
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski, Williams Lake Tribune

Emergency management in Canada is also an inter-jurisdictional endeavour. Local,
regional, provincial, and federal authorities must cooperate to address major emergencies.
From a constitutional perspective, emergency management falls principally to provincial
governments and their delegates, the municipalities. However, the federal government
plays a vital coordinating and supportive role, exercising its powers under the Emergency
Management Act, SC 2007, c 15.
Since First Nation’s reserve lands fall within federal jurisdiction, they are not subject
to provincial emergency response regimes. Here again, the federal government plays a
supporting role, leaving authority over emergency management on reserves in the hands
of First Nations’ leadership. At the same time, the federal government has entered into
arrangements with the provinces and third-party organizations to provide resources
when emergencies exceed the capacity of the local community. As a result, emergency
management on reserves is known to be a complex arrangement between communities,
the provincial and federal governments, and third-party organizations.4 This jurisdictional
complexity creates unnecessary vulnerability and confusion in the face of disasters.
The discord over authority made a lasting impression on the leadership for BC, Canada
and the Tsilhqot’in Nation and exposed the expansive work still necessary to attain a
4

Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa: Auditor General of
Canada, 2013) ch 6, online: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201311_06_e_38800.html
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genuine government-to-government relationship as set out in the Accord and Letter of
Understanding.
During the 2017 wildfires, a flashpoint for these jurisdictional issues was the decision
of the Tl’etinqox Government, one of the six Tsilhqot’in communities, to not issue an
evacuation order. Instead, Tl’etinqox followed its own emergency protocols, developed to
reflect its traditional governance structures, and community members stayed to fight the
impending wildfires. Among provincial and federal authorities, there was a widespread
assumption that Tsilhqot’in leadership should simply follow their lead. The Tl’etinqox
leadership’s decision not to issue an evacuation order caused a negative reaction from
government. Attempts were made to impose an evacuation of citizens by intimidation
and persuasion by governmental authorities, and threats of child apprehension. No one
seemed to contemplate the fact that Tsilhqot’in leadership was in the best position to make
decisions in the best interests of its communities.
The emergency operations strategies that the Tsilhqot’in communities employed were
on par with, and exceeded in many ways, the work of the Emergency Operation Centres
(EOC) subsidized by the government.
Having faced multiple evacuations in previous years, the communities began prioritizing
wildfire response training across the various levels of wildfire suppression. The Tl’etinqox
were ready with a comprehensive and effective emergency plan reflective of their
traditional governance structures, modelled on Provincial operations. Tl’etinqox’s wildfire
response was directed by knowledgeable and strong leadership.

Hazard Protection Measures in the Tsilhqot’in
Still, due to the fact that the Tsilhqot’in Nation was not sufficiently funded for emergency
preparedness, they were disadvantaged by the lack of dedicated resources for continual
planning, training and testing. The magnitude of the situation forced the communities to
respond to the emergency even without adequate resources. The conflict over jurisdiction
caused numerous stumbles, which left communities, land and resources vulnerable to the
impending wildfires within the territories of the Tsilhqot’in.
Wildfires in the Tsilhqot’in are inevitable and may be intensifying as climate change
boosts the probability of wildfire.5 The BC Government predicted that climate change will
increase droughts, leaving forests more susceptible to wildfire.6
A ground-based survey of forest fuel conditions surrounding the Tsilhqot’in communities
was conducted in September 2018 to determine that forest fuel conditions are likely
to deteriorate in the future due to continued forest health issues. This means the forests
surrounding Tsilhqot’in communities are becoming increasingly more combustible and
dangerous. The diverse forested areas in the territory face increased mortality and are
highly vulnerable to attack from the epidemic population levels of spruce budworm,
mountain pine beetle and Douglas-fir beetle.7 The poor health of the forest, in addition to
deficiencies in forest fuel management and modern forestry practices, are among many of
the cumulative effects that increase the wildfire risk in the Tsilhqot’in.
5
6
7

Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5° Celsius Approved by Governments. (2018).
[online] Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warmingof-1-5c-approved-by-governments.
Abbott, George and Chapman, Maureen. “A Report for Government and British Columbians. Addressing the New Normal: 21st
Century Disaster Management in British Columbia.” April 30 2018.
Gray, Robert. “Wildfire Fuel Assessment for Tsilhqot’in Communities in the Cariboo Forest Region.” September 2018.
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On February 19, 2018, the Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Federal Government and the Province
of British Columbia entered into the first-of-its-kind Collaborative Emergency Management
Agreement8 to build upon a ground breaking platform for effective partnerships in
emergency management in a cross jurisdictional landscape.
Following this, the Tsilhqot’in Nation compiled a team of experts and collected advice
from the knowledge keepers in the territory to develop strategic recommendations that
support Indigenous peoples as true partners, experts and government authorities in
emergency management. This report reflects the culmination of that work.
8

Collaborative Management Agreement” February 19 2018, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resourcestewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/agreements/tng_collaborative_emergency_management_agreement_signed.pdf

Tsilhqot’in National Government, Federal & Provincial Governments
Signing - Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement
Jan. 30, 2017
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski, Williams Lake Tribune

Throughout this report, you will see the Tsilhqot’in flag. This flag indicates that the
report is addressing an issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction answers the question: who
has the authority to govern or decide? Jurisdiction is thus fundamental to Tsilhqot’in
authority over Tsilhqot’in people and territory. The report documents numerous
significant moments during or after the 2017 wildfires in which the answer to the
question of jurisdiction was unclear or contested. Because of the fundamental nature
of these jurisdictional issues and the significance of addressing these issues moving
forward, additional discussion of jurisdiction can be found in Recognizing Tsilhqot’in
Jurisdiction in Emergency Management (Appendix B).
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Calls to action

CORE
CHALLENGES

Infrastructure Requirements

Substandard building and water infrastructure is a common problem on First Nation
reserves. The inadequacy of the infrastructure does not meet the current basic
needs of the citizens. Even worse, the infrastructure does not adequately support
emergency situations.
During the 2017 wildfires, the residents west of Williams Lake, BC were compelled
to fight the fires for many days without external assistance since all wildfire
personnel were already deployed to other major wildfires. The aggressive wildfires
in the isolated rural Tsilhqot’in exposed the vulnerability of the communities:
community water systems lacked the volume to adequately suspend the fires
that encroached upon the community; the facilities used by the community for
services or to gather together lacked commercial-grade air filtration systems leaving
emergency personnel susceptible to prolonged smoke exposure; the volunteers did
not possess caches of wildfire equipment to efficiently support fire operations; and
communication was severely restrained.

1. Develop a centralized Indigenous-led
Emergency Centre in Tsilhqot’in territory
with satellite sites to connect isolated
or remote communities with advanced
safety and emergency equipment
2. Construct or update fire halls in each
reserve equipped with:
• Fire trucks
• Training space
• Storage for supplies (i.e. hoses,
pumps, firefighting equipment)
3. Build gathering halls/safe muster areas
with:
• Commercial kitchen
• Training area
• Sleeping quarters
• Storage space for emergency &
evacuation supplies (i.e. cots, nonperishable foods)
4. Create an immediate on-reserve housing
and infrastructure strategy fund to:
• Assemble a team to assess the
wildfire impacts to all homes in
Tsilhqot’in territory
• Build houses that are more
structurally sound and energy
efficient with air purification systems

• Upgrade all essential infrastructure
in the community with stand-by
generators
• Expand and improve water treatment
facilities and reserves for future
emergencies with back-up systems
5. Develop lodging in and around each
community to accommodate seasonal
workers that assist communities with the
four phases of emergency management:
mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery
6. Invest in public services along Highway
20 and Taseko Lake Road corridor
including:
• Installing cell phone towers
• Connecting Fiber Optics in some
areas
• Commencing a major powerline
upgrade on Highway 20
7. Establish highway signage to clearly
identify community locations to ensure
rapid emergency response where
necessary
8. Widen and maintain roads to
communities and egress routes

13
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CORE
CHALLENGES

Pre-Disaster Agreements
The Tsilhqot’in faced a multitude of set-backs while trying to govern their
communities and work with the governmental wildfire protocols. Respect for the
decisions that Chief and Council make for the benefit of their citizens is paramount.
The Tsilhqot’in people who are knowledgeable about the land should be recognized
for their skillsets and the Nation should be supported as government.
The Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement (2018) is a crucial first step
in recognizing Tsilhqot’in leadership in emergency management. However, further
detailed agreements are necessary to ensure all parties understand the roles and
responsibilities of all orders of legitimate government in a way that allows for a fullycoordinated, multiple-agency, real-time emergency response.

9. Establish an advanced protocol
agreement that establishes an active
and collaborative leadership role for the
Tsilhqot’in Nation with:
• Recognition of Tsilhqot’in adaptable
emergency measures, orders and
culturally-appropriate relocation
protocols that differ in form and
substance from regional, provincial
and federal actions
• Re-entry protocols for a staged
approach to returning to the
community providing continual
service throughout
• Protocols for child protection during
emergencies
• Tsilhqot’in access pass lists
authorized by leadership and
recognized by the Cariboo Fire
Centre
• Procedures on geographic
coordination of wildfire response
that reflect Tsilhqot’in fire crew
knowledge of the land
• Revision of protocols to ensure
that land, resource and wildlife
recovery and mitigation decisions
are based on Tsilhqot’in cumulative
impact assessments and value-based
approaches are incorporated into a
territorial management plan
10. Ratify Nation-to-Nation evacuation
location agreements with First Nation
partners to ensure that there is adequate

capacity, resources and protocols in
place prior to relocating citizens to
these venues
11. Enter into a Service Agency/Tsilhqot’in
agreement built upon respect and
recognition of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction
that:
• Fosters consistent, ongoing
relationship and communication
networks with government service
bodies beyond the fire season
• Outlines community protocols for
entering into the community or
working within the community
• Mandates cultural awareness and
sensitivity training for all Emergency
Agencies providing services to the
community
12. Develop inter-agency Tsilhqot’in
Nation service provider agreements
in the event of an emergency with
Denisiqi Services Society, Nenqayni
Wellness Centre Society, Cariboo
Friendship Society and Punky Lake
Wilderness Camp Society to provide
services to citizens during and after an
emergency event

14
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CORE
CHALLENGES

Prominent Tsilhqot’in Role & Capacity Development
Long-term hazard mitigation measures reduce and eliminate risk, and are proven
to protect communities and create cost-efficiencies for government. Enhancing
the Nation’s capability to respond to and recover from disasters, coupled with
the abundance of knowledge that the Tsilhqot’in have about the lands in which
they reside, will improve emergency management. First Nation citizens merit a
prominent role in training, employment and contracting opportunities locally.
First Nation mental and physical health were disproportionately impacted in the
2017 wildfires. Due to the rurality and uniqueness of the Tsilhqot’in, health needs
cannot be adequately addressed through conventional services.

13. Develop a contract with British
Columbia establishing a progressive
framework for on-the-ground
emergency response within Tsilhqot’in
territory that ensures:
• Tsilhqot’in crews are properly
trained and resourced to become
level 1 contract crews
• Tsilhqot’in and First Nation crews
are prioritized in deployment before
other jurisdictions
• Local Tsilhqot’in citizens receive
priority for work within the territory
in the event of an emergency
including formal Community
Liaison positions in each Tsilhqot’in
community
• A requirement for yearly Tsilhqot’in
wildfire service agreements
committing to economic
opportunities for citizens,
community and privately held
businesses to ensure they are placed
as stand-by primary contractors
• Investment in training and
employment of First Nation first
responders and wildfire emergency
management positions to ensure
local First Nation knowledge is
retained.
• A process for experienced
community crew members
embedded within the broader fire
centre structure, i.e. as incident
commanders
• A provision for sufficient staff,
supplies, and transportation to feed
and support crews on the reserve
14. Establish government-subsidized,
direct, ongoing, and dependable
funding for training and certification

that promotes Tsilhqot’in expertise
(train-the-trainer) including:
• Emergency responder training
in various roles adapted to the
Tsilhqot’in mandated role in
emergency response (i.e. first aid,
critical incident trauma training)
• Essentials of operating and
maintaining emergency equipment
(i.e. fire truck, structural
infrastructure unit)
• Development of Tsilhqot’in Wildfire
Teams with year round conditioning
and fire suppression training at all
levels (i.e. S100, S185)
• Evacuation centre personnel
processes
• Forest fuel mitigation management
15. Establish government-subsidized,
direct, continual funding for planning,
including:
• The development of and
improvements to comprehensive
community and Nation emergency
management operational plans
that are suitable to the unique
requirements of each community
while at the same time, sync with
the entire Nation. The plans may
include:
• Adding mechanisms for periodic
review, practice scenarios, and
clear protocols for community
members
• Immediate emergency operation
action plans
• Citizen information packages (i.e.
personal emergency kit checklist,
relocation “go-bag” essentials,
contact information for service
agencies, muster/relocation areas,

15
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

relocation steps, emergency
preparedness information)
A 72-hour plan
Emergency contacts
Crisis communication speaking
notes
Relocation procedures,
Community roles and
responsibilities
Community-based risk
assessments, and
Evacuation routes

•
•

•

communication protocols for
the entire community and
Nation during emergencies with
Tsilhqot’in language speakers for
general information and updates
Create door-to-door policies and
procedures for on reserve check-ins
Generate Tsilhqot’in culturally
focused plans and procedures for
relocation, launching and managing
evacuation centre camps
Develop a transportation system for
each community including securing
the appropriate means to transport
citizens
Launch alcohol and drug support
program with integrated policies
in all aspects of Emergency
Management

16. Establish government-subsidized direct
funding for personnel, including:
•
• Full-time Community & Nation
Emergency Managers (yearly)
• Full-time Recovery Managers
and Implementation Managers
to complete recovery funding
applications & manage the recovery 18. Provide direct funding for Tsilhqot’inprojects (until complete)
led targeted skills and employment
• A part/full-time Fire Chief for each
training and reduction of barriers to
community fire station with a budget
employment initiatives (i.e. driving
to recruit and train stand-by Fire
lessons, programs to get driver’s license
Fighters
back, upgrading)
17. Establish a subsidized Tsilhqot’in
19. Establish a holistic health support
Association of Emergency Responders
system that includes:
with the responsibility to:
Short
to Mid-term
• Coordinate and inventory individual
•
Integrating
mental health supports
community resources for improved
in
daycares,
schools, band offices
Nation-level response and develop a
and
health
departments
for staff and
labor force survey
citizens
• Deliver fire safety programs and
• Hosting traditional healing
workshops to communities
ceremonies
• Advance the mapping and
•
Conducting addictions counselling
identification of dwellings and
and programs
streets
•
Offering Tsilhqot’in focused
• Develop policies that support Fireindividualized men, women and
Smart community principles (i.e.
youth empowerment groups
debris management)
Long-term
• Establish an advanced
• Emergency Medical Service Team
communication structure and
contracts for each community
process that:
that include, but are not limited
• Performs a mass call service for
to remote nurses, mental health
Tsilhqot’in members
counselors and/or psychologists,
• Connects via alternate modes
addictions counselors, etc.
of communication (i.e. cellular,
•
Medical supply lists & emergency
WIFI, radio, satellite networks)
medicine supplies
• Provides GPS coordinates and
•
Ongoing year round expanded
check-in options for on-themental health supports at the
ground emergency personnel
community level
• Standardizes mandatory contact
•
The compilation of an emergency
record keeping
management planning group, which
• Establishes an alert siren and
hosts quarterly planning meetings &
speaker system to connect with
reports on discussions to community
citizens without access to phones
staff and citizens
• Establishes regular
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CORE
CHALLENGES

Land-Based and Economic Stabilization Measures
Long-term mitigation measures and rehabilitation efforts will occur over several
years and will require specialists in the various facets of forest ecology and planning.
Tsilhqot’in involvement with resolving the balance to the delicate ecosystems in which
they rely upon and live within is imperative.
The Tsilhqot’in have been disproportionately impacted by the wildfires and the impacts
to their traditional way of life is intensifying. Compensation measures should be jointly
developed to satisfactorily address the actual impact. The wildfires burnt hectares of
Tsilhqot’in forest resources therefore investments focused on diversification strategies
for First Nation communities are required.

20. Perform test area forest fuel reduction
practices with training through
Indigenous-led fuel mitigation measures
(i.e. prescribed burns)
21. Conduct a Tsilhqot’in-managed
comprehensive study on the Cariboo
Chilcotin forest ecosystem affected by
the wildfires including conservation
recommendations
22. Separate the Tsilhqot’in territory from
the Williams Lake Timber Supply Area
and apply joint management methods
23. Engage in rehabilitation planning at
the territorial level with Tsilhqot’in
communities playing an active
leadership role
24. Create a mechanism for tracking and
compensating ongoing cultural and
cumulative impacts

25. Perform geotechnical work to stabilize
banks and roads, as well as install
culverts where wildfires threatened
the vegetation of the steep slopes
that surround and are within the
communities
26. Conduct a damage assessment
to archeological sites and create/
implement mitigation and protection
measure for sensitive sites
27. Develop a Tsilhqot’in Economic
Diversification report in anticipation
of the decrease of forestry-related
economics
28. Strengthen and expand collaborative
enforcement efforts on Tsilhqot’in
territory to promote cultural, economic
and ecological values as the land
recovers from wildfire
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After the Fires

Photograph By: Monica Lamb-Yorski
Williams Lake Tribune

CORE
CHALLENGES

Dedicated Financial Resources
Throughout All Stages of Emergency Management
Core funding for emergency management and preparedness has been dedicated to
government operated emergency operation centres. First Nation communities lack
access to financial reserves and face barriers to obtaining credit extensions when
they require them for emergency situations. The lack of funding is an impediment to
preparedness and in the event that the community has suffered an emergency, the
financial recovery processes are significantly demanding on operations rather than
building up First Nations’ capacity.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation provides autonomous governance for their citizens and
communities. The most vital duty of the Nation is to protect the Tsilhqot’in citizens,
property, and territory. With dedicated financial resources Tsilhqot’in emergency
management could be enhanced with community-level planning, coordination and
training based upon Tsilhqot’in values and needs.

29. Start a pilot project that implements a
one-stop reimbursement process for First
Nations governments
30. Reimburse communities in accordance
with the principle of building back
better to mitigate future disaster risk
31. Advance Tsilhqot’in recovery requests
for financial assistance towards
community rebuilding as soon as
possible
32. Establish clear financial arrangements
and compensation measures developed
together between Tsilhqot’in, regional,
provincial, and federal authorities in

advance of an emergency through:
• A reserve fund for Tsilhqot’in
emergency response and a
commitment to the timely advance
of Federal reserve funds for
emergency situations
• Proportionate compensation and
restitution processes’ that accurately
reflects the community’s reliance on
land-based sustenance
33. Apply Jordan’s Principle to emergency
management on reserve to require a
single government partner to provide
immediate payment responsibility for
response and recovery costs
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community specific needs
Tl’etinqox Government Office Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Replace freezers ruined in 2017 power
outages
• Replace fencing and cattle guards damaged
by installing fuel breaks
• Hay for livestock & to replace losses
• Repair Anaham Creek to its natural state
• Remove debris from other creeks, roads and
trails caused by wildfires
• Repair damages to homes and public
buildings
Emergency Infrastructure
• Emergency Operations Centre
• Traditional Community Long-House Gathering
Centre with kitchen and lodging
• Training facility with storage
• Traditional Arbor & Camping Area for
evacuees

•

Expansion to Health Centre & Services

Health & Wellbeing
• Conduct an immediate community mental
health wellness assessment to determine
appropriate service needs
• Facilitated healing circle for staff
• Holistic health team with comprehensive
health services
• Land-based equine recovery, healing and
leadership program
• Safe House
• End of Life, Palliative Care/Hospice Society –
to support amplified stress from 2017 wildfires
on Elders
Emergency Equipment Needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs
assessment and procurement

Yunesit’in Government Office Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Replace fencing and cattle guards damaged
by fires and fuel breaks
• Hay for livestock & to replace losses
• Remove debris from other creeks, roads and
trails caused by wildfires
• Repair damages to homes and public
buildings
Emergency Infrastructure
• Satellite Operations Centre (preferably an
updated fire hall) with response equipment,
medical equipment, a training room, and
kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential
infrastructure
• Gas Station
• Upgrade water reservoir, treatment plant and
hydrants
• Back-up systems including generators for
community essential infrastructure
• Community Hall (for safe gathering site)
• Radio Tower or Mobile Satellite
• Helicopter Pad
• Renovate and replace derelict housing
• Access to water for the dual process of fire
suppression and irrigation
Health & Wellbeing
• Immediate community mental health wellness
assessment to determine appropriate and

•

ongoing service needs
Ongoing cultural programming on the land as
part of community healing

Emergency Equipment Needs
• Needs assessment and procurement of heavyduty equipment emergency
• Two Skidders (Damaged in wildfires)
• Fleet truck
• Fire truck
Community Capacity Needs
• Assess emergency staffing needs and existing
capacity
• Ongoing training for fire crews
• Simplified emergency management plan for
community members, including Elders
• Access to reserve funds or expanded credit
limit
• Indigenous Fire Management methods, such
as prescribed burning
Research
• Needs assessment of medical equipment and
supplies
• Assess impacts on rights, wildlife, hunting,
fishing, plant and medicine areas
• Map remaining hunting, fishing, and
culturally-significant locations for future
protection
• Develop holistic, territorial, and long-term
rehabilitation and land-use plan
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Tl’esqox First Nation Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Remove debris from other creeks, roads and
trails caused by wildfires
• Repair damages to homes and public
buildings
Emergency Infrastructure
• Toosey Old School Expansion
• Upgraded water reservoir to handle additional
capacity
• Back-up systems for community essential
infrastructure
• Structural protection installed on essential
infrastructure
• Create pump hose caches with adequate line
to reach homes
• Rebuild hose cleaning station (burnt in 2017)
• Community gathering/muster centre with
kitchen, lodging and storage
• Camping area for evacuees
• Food & Provision storage
Health & Wellbeing
• Conduct an immediate community mental
health wellness assessment to determine
appropriate service needs
• Host cultural events to ensure appropriate

transfer of knowledge to youth (i.e. sweat
lodge, Tsilhqot’in language and traditions,
equine healing)
Emergency Equipment Needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs
assessment and procurement
• Water vehicles
• First Aid vehicles
Self-reliance Community Projects
• Establish gardens & greenhouses
• Raise livestock
• Host community canning and drying
workshops to foster food preservation
techniques within community
Community Capacity Needs
• Industry trades
• Commercial licenses & transportation
certificates
Internal Policies
• Relocation Order travel policies – to prevent
people from attempting re-entry after a signed
evacuation order
• Emergency Response communication
measures

Tsi Deldel First Nation Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Refund expenses towards food, general and
emergency supplies
• Wildfire crew expenses (i.e. wages, fuel)
Emergency Infrastructure
• Band office (new)
• Health Clinic (new)
• Satellite Operations Centre with response
equipment, medical equipment, a training
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential
infrastructure
• Back-up systems for community essential
infrastructure
• Community hall and lodging capacity for
evacuees with kitchen, showers and storage
• Camping area for evacuees
Health & Wellbeing
• Immediate health supports for community
(i.e. traditional healing ceremonies, men’s
and women’s support groups, addictions
counselling programs, individual and group
counselling)
• Conduct a community mental health wellness
assessment to determine appropriate service
needs

Emergency Equipment Needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs
assessment and procurement
• Trailers
• Community vehicles
• Water trucks
• Ambulance & medical transfer vehicle
• Mapping plotter
Community Capacity Needs
• Medical training (i.e. nurse, first aid
responders, search & rescue)
Research
• Needs assessment on medical equipment
demands
• Conduct a damage assessment to
archeological sites
• Develop mitigation & protection measures to
protect the sites
Internal Policies
• Access through road blocks designated by
Chief & Council
Emergency Preparation
• Develop fire guards around community &
Punky Lake Wilderness Camp Society
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?Esdilagh First Nation Government Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Refund expenses towards food, general and
emergency supplies
• Emergency response staff expenses (i.e.
wages, fuel)
• Community living-out expenses (i.e. lodging,
essential needs)
Emergency Infrastructure
• Band office (new)
• Satellite Operations Centre with response
equipment, medical equipment, a training
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential
infrastructure
• Back-up systems for community essential
infrastructure
• Multi-use community centre with gymnasium,
additional separated rooms, kitchen, storage
• Camping area for evacuees
• Gas station
• Upgraded water reservoir to handle additional
capacity with potable water
• Accessibility:
• Create an Egress route – safety bridge to
connect to Highway 20

•

• Upgrade the West Fraser Road washout
Signage to mark ?Esdilagh territory

Health & Wellbeing
• Immediate health supports for community
(i.e. traditional healing ceremonies, men’s
and women’s support groups, addictions
counselling and programs, individual and
group counselling)
• Conduct a community mental health wellness
assessment to determine appropriate service
needs
• Host cultural healing events and provide
Tsilhqot’in courses
• Emphasis on youth programs & events (i.e.
additional resources for mountain bike trial &
riding gear, movies in the community, support
for recreational activities)
Emergency Equipment Needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs
assessment and procurement
• Trailers
• Emergency response vehicles
• Hoses to reach each home
• Install fire hydrants throughout the community

Xeni Gwet’in First Nation Government Specific Needs
Fast Track Expenses Incurred During 2017
Wildfires
• Refund expenses towards food, general and
emergency supplies
• Emergency response staff expenses (i.e.
wages, fuel)
• Community living out expenses (i.e. lodging,
essential needs)
Emergency Infrastructure
• Satellite Operations Centre with response
equipment, medical equipment, a training
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential
infrastructure
• Upgraded water reservoir, treatment plant &
hydrants
• Back-up systems for community essential
infrastructure
• Band office with community gathering space
• Multi-media building for training and
employment
• Community Hall
• Accessibility:
• Create an Egress route – Secondary
passage to leave Nemiah Valley
• Complete air strip
• Upgrade Nemiah Valley Road

Health & Wellbeing
• Conduct an immediate community mental
health wellness assessment to determine
appropriate service needs
• Support for additional essential health staff
Emergency Equipment Needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs
assessment and procurement
• Water transportation vehicles
• Water vehicles
Community Capacity Needs
• Remote and isolated community emergency
response capacity
Internal Policies
• Development of roles, duties and hours of
emergency staff
Emergency Preparation
• Expansive forest fuel management plan and
mitigation measures
• Forest prescription project
• Debris clearing along the road and powerline
corridors
• Identify and develop safety zones
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THE NATION EXPERIENCE
Preparedness

As a consequence of the 2003 wildfires in the Cariboo Chilcotin, later that winter the
Tsilhqot’in leadership were invited to meet the Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review Team9
to discuss their overall experience. The largest issue was and still is that the wealth of
Tsilhqot’in skills and expertise is dismissed by government. The Tsilhqot’in recommended
true involvement of their people who possess extensive knowledge of the territories and
that they should be included in the fuel mitigation, fire suppression, and recovery efforts.
In both 2009 and 2010, some of the Tsilhqot’in communities were evacuated due
to wildfires and the knowledge of how to better prepare the Nation grew stronger.
Nevertheless, emergency planning financial resources were scarce. Each community
created an Emergency Preparedness Plan, but many of these plans were shelved for years
because the communities could not afford to employ an emergency manager position to
maintain and manage emergency practices.
The Nation consistently sought financial resources for the day that a wildfire would
undoubtedly threaten the communities again, but they were unable to secure sufficient
funds to prepare adequately. The expansive and distinct composition of the Tsilhqot’in
territory requires planning at a Nation level, while still recognizing and addressing the
strengths and challenges of each community.
The 2017 wildfires finally publicly exposed the inadequacy of provincial emergency
readiness within the Tsilhqot’in territory. In the heat of the emergency response, the failure
to properly integrate Tsilhqot’in knowledge and expertise into emergency preparedness
was on full display. Sometimes inadequate knowledge was as simple as basic local
geography, as in the mistaken attempt by the RCMP to evacuate the Tsilhqot’in community
of Tsi Deldel (also known as Redstone or the Alexis Creek First Nation) because of
confusion with the nearby municipalities of Redstone and Alexis Creek. This lack of
geographic knowledge is clearly problematic from a logistical emergency management
perspective.
More fundamentally, provincial and federal roles in emergency preparedness did not
adequately support the Tsilhqot’in Nation in playing a leadership role in emergency
management within their territory. Planning and preparation to support the Tsilhqot’in
and nearby residents’ safety and security are paramount. The Tsilhqot’in are inherently
responsible for the livelihood of their citizens, and are responsible to protect their land,
resources, and traditional wellbeing, which is combined into an intricate value-based
9

Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review . Province of British Columbia, 15 Feb. 2004, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/
farming-natural-resources-and-industry/forestry/wildfire-management/governance/bcws_firestormreport_2003.pdf.

key points
• Previous experience with wildfires enabled the Tsilhqot’in to provide recommendations to
government grounded in expertise, however they were unheeded.
• The 2017 wildfires revealed inadequate recognition and support of Tsilhqot’in leadership in
wildfire management.
• Sufficient financial support towards emergency preparation was not available to First Nation
communities.
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decision-making process. The provincial and federal
government have not reconciled their governance
orders with the inherent responsibilities and value
systems that drive First Nations governance, leading
inevitably to conflict.

Response

When the wildfires of 2017 swept through Tsilhqot’in
territory, the communities were left to their own
devices for many days since wildfires were burning
out of control across the Province of British
Columbia. Resources were allocated to the numerous
interface fires. The highways to the communities were
desolate because of the roadblocks, and residents
throughout the territory felt they were abandoned
and had no choice but to stay and fight the fires
themselves.
Tl’etinqox leadership made the
choice to not sign and authorize an
evacuation order for their citizens,
which aggravated interactions with
RCMP. There was a general perception
that the Tsilhqot’in were disobeying
the evacuation order, when in fact the provincial
evacuation order was not applicable to the Reserve
lands. In the days to follow, hordes of RCMP and
Canadian Armed Forces personnel flooded the
territory. The Nation remained determined to operate
independently and make the best decisions for its
citizens and local neighbours. Where possible, they
sought external supports to ease the burdens while
combating wildfires.
The lack of understanding of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction
was on display most prominently in the conflict at
Tl’etinqox, when the RCMP attempted to enforce a
provincial evacuation order. Chief Alphonse informed
the RCMP that the order was not enforceable unless
the Chief and Council consented to it, which they
had not. The fact that a Band Council Resolution or
bylaw is legally required for an evacuation on reserve
is easily accessible information contained in the
province’s Evacuation Operational Guidelines (2009).
A similar lack of understanding was experienced
in Yunesit’in, which was subject to a community
evacuation order. Chief Myers Ross and Council
members issued a Band Council Resolution
declaring a local state of emergency and ordering
that Yunesit’in Government and employees “work
in collaboration with the primary response agency
to perform all acts and implement all procedures
that are considered necessary…”. However, RCMP
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Tsilhqot’in Caretaker Area Map

Source: Tsilhqot’in National Government Stewardship Department

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

24

SUMMARY OF LEGAL AUTHORITY TO DECLARE
STATES OF EMERGENCY AND TO ISSUE
EVACUATION ORDERS
Emergency response measures on reserves are governed by Band Council Resolutions or
bylaws. Provincial and regional authorities cannot impose emergency measures on reserve
lands.
In British Columbia, emergencies are governed by the Emergency Program Act, RSBC
1996, c 111. This legislation empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) to
declare a provincial state of emergency (s 9) and it empowers the Minister to implement
emergency measures (e.g. evacuation orders, roadblocks) (s 10). During a state of
emergency, the LGIC or Attorney General can assume jurisdiction over the police
forces and firefighting services (Emergency Program Management Regulation, s 9).
The Emergency Program Act also empowers local authorities to declare local states of
emergency (s 12) and to take emergency measures (s 13). However, if a provincial state of
emergency is declared, local emergency powers cease to have any effect (s 14(3)).
The Emergency Program Act does not apply to reserve lands. Reserve lands are federal
jurisdiction under s 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Federal Parliament has not legislated
specifically on emergency management on reserve lands. Emergency management is
therefore governed by the Indian Act.
Emergency measures on reserve lands are governed by s 81(1)(a) of the Indian Act, which
authorizes the council of a band to make by-laws “to provide for the health of residents
on the reserve…”. Validly enacted by-laws have the force of law; they are binding on
individuals. During the 2017 wildfires, Tsilhqot’in leadership exercised their inherent
jurisdiction to protect their communities. They also implemented emergency responses in
their communities through Band Council Resolutions, issued under the authority of s 81(1)
(a) of the Indian Act.
did not follow this requirement for collaboration to ensure a “soft” evacuation in the
community.
Nation-wide, Tsilhqot’in communities also experienced financial uncertainty resulting
from a lack of coordination between provincial and local authorities. With the wildfire
bearing down on Tl’etinqox, and no assurance that provincial wildfire response
authorization was forthcoming for many days, Chief and Council in Tl’etinqox directed
crews to begin fighting fire. This decision meant that the community had to assume
liability and the financial risk of deploying these crews.
Throughout the territory fire-fighting efforts began without authorization since buildings,
homes and full communities were at risk. In each community there were many
recollections of immediate wildfire response activities. Notably, these early firefighting
efforts are credited with protecting the communities from fire.
Leadership requires adequate consultation and dialogue with both the provincial and
federal governments well in advance of declaring an evacuation. Merging the local First
Nations knowledge, local resident knowledge and government processes together would
create an enhanced emergency response process that would better attend to the particular

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

25

challenges and needs of First Nations communities. Access to basic resources that are
common for many Canadians, such as vehicles and relatives who live in evacuation
cities to lodge with, is often lacking for Tsilhqot’in citizens. Due to financial constraints,
Tsilhqot’in citizens may not own vehicles, and even if they do, they may not have
insurance or even fuel. Vehicles may not be road worthy or reliable, thus elevating their
risk. Emergency management must account for these additional and significant barriers to
safe emergency response within First Nations communities.
Each community has varying risk thresholds for agreeing to evacuations, but at the very
least, all had a safety plan, a support team for the citizens to rely on, and a trained fire
fighting presence. The media heavily publicized the wildfires and portrayed the Nation as
acting recklessly for exercising its own emergency response systems instead of heeding the
evacuations. Tl’etinqox Chief Joe Alphonse was interviewed in the subsequent days and
described the extensive preparation and planning by his community for wildfire response
and the importance of First Nations’ autonomy in the case of evacuation procedures.

key points
• Emergency response authorities lacked a basic understanding of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction and
governance, which caused unnecessary confusion and conflict.
• Proper coordination between the governments of BC, Canada and Tsilhqot’in Nation that
integrates the knowledge and expertise of all three governments will create enhanced
emergency management that makes communities safer.
• The Tsilhqot’in communities established emergency management systems to instinctively
protect their lands and resources.
• Early firefighting efforts decreased the wildfire footprint.

Fires Burning Across Roads in the Chilcotin
Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
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Support Through First-Hand Observations
Dignitaries from across British Columbia began to seek travel to the Chilcotin to personally
assess the damage and to provide support. Chuck Puchmayr, a New Westminster City
Council Member, had maintained a long-standing relationship with the Tsilhqot’in starting
in his previous role as MLA for New Westminster, and was one of the first to connect with
Tl’etinqox during the wildfires. Hearing about the refusal by Tl’etinqox to evacuate, and
in his role as Chair of the Emergency Advisory Committee in New Westminster, Puchmayr
worked with his riding’s fire department to gift a fire truck to the community of Tl’etinqox,
which was delivered on July 13, 2017, after his visit to the community.
Puchmayr observed that Tl’etinqox activated a well-functioning Emergency Operations
Centre. They were supported by knowledgeable and trained First Nation firefighters, local
heavy-duty equipment and operators, and the leadership’s assessment of the fires and
safety plan was accurate and sound.

City of New Westminster Donation of Fire Truck to Tl’etinqox
Chief Joe Alphonse and New Westminster City Councillor Chuck Puchmayr
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski - Williams Lake Tribune
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Visit to Tl’etinqox

(Left to Right) Chief Robert Chamberlain, Chief Joe Alphonse and Grand Chief Ed John
Photograph Provided By: Grand Chief Ed John

Grand Chief Ed John, Political Executive of the First Nation Summit (FNS) worked with
the Ministry of Forests Deputy Minister to arrange a helicopter to fly to the remote
and difficult-to-access areas of the Tsilhqot’in. Once it was safe and the skies were
clear enough to fly, Grand Chief Ed John travelled with Chief Bob Chamberlain, VicePresident of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC), and Catherine Lappe,
the Regional Director General for Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to
Tsilhqot’in territory. On the day of the visit, the fire was blazing across the river from
Tl’etinqox, in Yunesit’in’s caretaker area and they were present to witness the local fire
crews managing the fire.
Grand Chief Ed John highlighted in their meeting with government officials that in order
to make appropriate decisions, First Nation leadership require real time information that
can be provided by the Regional Districts who are equipped with emergency operation
centres. In addition, the expansive geographic area of a Regional District requires local
resident representation to advise them on the state of the land.
In a letter dated July 28, 2017, Grand Chief Ed John wrote to Canadian Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau and attached “A Proposal for a BC First Nations Emergency Management
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Fund to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from emergencies.” The proposal
called for a $200 million First Nation emergency preparedness and response fund. The
seven recommendations include:
1. Review and revise First Nation’s emergency response plans.
2. Support to develop an integrated multi-agency government and First Nation’s
emergency response action plans.
3. Support for emergency response asset acquisitions for First Nations.
4. Support for capacity development in the form of training and accreditation for First
Nations.
5. Dedicated support to the health and wellbeing of evacuees and their recovery,
financial support for restoration of the community and additional recovery of
resources expended to First Nation communities that provided safe relocation
centres.
6. Establish an Emergency Operation Centre centrally located along Highway 20
within the Tl’etinqox village.
7. Assistance for the restoration of traditional food security, relief for the impacts to
First Nation farmers’ and ranchers’ livelihoods and support for First Nation people
to develop mitigation measures to avoid further cultural and traditional loss.
During the wildfires of 2018, the BC Assembly of First Nations, First Nation Summit and
Union of BC Indian Chiefs resubmitted the seven recommendations to Prime Minister
Trudeau and Premier John Horgan.10
10

“BC First Nations Being Devastated by Wildfire Season of 2018, Immediate Resources Needed.” UBCIC Website, 22 Aug. 2018,
https://www.ubcic.bc.ca/bc_first_nations_being_devastated_by_wildfire_2018.

Fire Across Chilcotin River near Yunesit’in Community
Image Facing South From Tl’etinqox Community
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John
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Lappe had received many calls of concern
from other governmental organizations, and
traveled to the Tsilhqot’in communities with
FNS and UBCIC to meet with Tsilhqot’in
leadership. Lappe affirmed that the role
of Federal Government is to work with
communities to understand from their
leadership what types of supports they
require, rather than to assume what is
best for the community. In Tl’etinqox,
she affirmed that Chief and Council were
clearly within their own authority to issue
evacuations and alerts on their Federal
Indian Reserves.
Becky Row, Canadian Red Cross Senior
Manager for Northern and Indigenous
Engagement BC & Yukon, saw many
lightning strikes from her Prince George,
BC office on July 7, 2017, and knew that
assistance from the Society would be
required shortly because a substantial

fast-moving incident was underway. Row
connected with the First Nation Health
Authority to provide her contact information
and described that the role of the Red Cross
was to provide financial assistance to those
working towards recovery.
The Canadian Red Cross faced the barrier of
not having up-to-date contact information
for each First Nation community, which
prevented immediate service delivery. Once
contact was made, the Canadian Red Cross
proceeded with meeting the leadership
to seek culturally-respectful guidance on
working within the community. Quickly
learning that the First Nations communities
have unique needs, the Red Cross team
communicated daily with their internal
team to discuss the various experiences and
themes, and to seek methods to address
them quickly.

FAST TRACKING RECOVERY EXPENSES
In the weeks following the wildfires’ abatement, Lappe organized community tours with
additional service agencies to learn about the communities’ experiences and needs. Lappe
discovered that integrating the work of varied agencies in emergency situations requires
much more effective coordination. As such, a different approach was employed to commit
to fast track recovery funding from the Federal government to help First Nations build back
quicker after impacts from natural disasters.
In the case of the 2018 Alkali Lake wildfire that destroyed many structures in the
Telegraph Creek area of the Tahltan Nation and displaced several community members,
the Federal government was able to accelerate funding so the First Nation could cover
initial expenditures. The process still requires further refinements to reducing the extensive
paperwork requirements.

key points
• At the outset of the wildfires, there was widespread apprehension regarding the competence
of the Tsilhqot’in.
• The Tsilhqot’in accommodate BC and Canada’s jurisdiction in safety and emergency
management, but expect a similar recognition.
• In principle, support for Tsilhqot’in leadership in wildfire emergency management is existing
and widespread. Building on this foundation of support will allow the Tsilhqot’in Nation to be
true leaders in First Nation led emergency response.
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Common Wildfire Experiences
The six Tsilhqot’in Nation communities shared similar experiences and challenges. At
the forefront was the difficulty in communicating and coordinating with governmental
organizations. In general, an inordinate amount of time was spent educating external
organizations about the jurisdiction of the Tsilhqot’in. Both Tsilhqot’in citizens and nonFirst Nation residents expressed the concern that if they made the decision to stay and
protect their homes, infrastructure and livestock, they would be punished by having
services cut off to them.
Concerns about child apprehension loomed large in Tsilhqot’in
communities. RCMP had threatened to remove children from the Tl’etinqox
community in a meeting with Chief Alphonse to try to force them into
evacuation. A verbal battle between Chief Alphonse and the RCMP ensued
with each threatening duelling roadblocks. The Chief then informed them
that they needed to seek legal advice about evacuations on First Nation

SUMMARY OF PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY
TO APPREHEND CHILDREN ON RESERVE
Under provincial law, police officers and MCFD officials have the authority to remove a
child if they reasonably believe the child’s health or safety is in immediate danger, or if an
official reasonably believes that the child needs protection and no less disruptive measures
are available (Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46 ss 27, 30).
Section 88 of the Indian Act makes these powers applicable on reserve lands.
When making a decision about removing a Tsilhqot’in child, officials are to be guided by
the best interests of the child, which is elaborated in the Child, Family and Community
Services Act to include consideration of: “the child’s cultural, racial, linguistic and
religious heritage” and “[i]f the child is an aboriginal child, the importance of preserving
the child’s cultural identity must be considered in determining the child’s best interests” (s
4). In the Nenqay Deni Accord, the province committed to working with the Tsilhqot’in
Nation to provide: “adequate support for Tsilhqot’in children and families, delivered and
managed by Tsilhqot’in Communities, in accordance with Tsilhqot’in laws and values…”
(s 8).
Denisiqi Services Society (DSS) is a Delegated Aboriginal Agency affiliated with the
Tsilhqot’in National Government that works with MCFD when there is a child protection
concern. DSS does not have decision-making authority over child removal. This leaves
the decision to remove a Tsilhqot’in child in the hands of police and MCFD officials who
exercise provincial authority.
The exercise of provincial jurisdiction over child removal is part of a long colonial legacy
that includes Indian Residential Schools and the 60s scoop. Against this backdrop and
the recent class action proceedings on behalf of 60s scoop survivors, threats of child
apprehension are always grave and traumatic for Indigenous communities. The threats of
child apprehension during the 2017 wildfires perpetuate this colonial legacy. These actions
failed to reflect the spirit and intention of the guiding principles in the Nenqay Deni
Accord. They fail to reflect the goal of family preservation – achieved through prevention
services and adequate family support – that ultimately breaks the intergenerational cycles
of trauma.
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reserve since the Chief was acting within
his authority and that he felt strongly that
the children were safest where they were.
These threats were, in part, acted upon in
Tl’esqox where RCMP misled a Councillor
in order to “mark” houses with children
in case child apprehension was deemed
necessary. For families that did evacuate to
evacuation centres in the cities, they faced
increased surveillance by the Ministry of
Child and Family Development (MCFD).
Displaced from their communities and
ordinary support systems and in a highstress setting, parents were scrutinized —
not supported — by the province.
In various accounts from community
citizens, revolving enforcement personnel
at roadblock crossings were uncooperative
and inconsistent in enabling access
to designated staff — even those with
sanctioned passes — to deliver essential
food and supplies. Delivering goods to and
from the communities was a dangerous job
because the fire had crossed the highway
several times and continued to burn close
to the road. However, safety protocols were
in place to ensure that those drivers had
knowledge of the territory and some had
wildfire interface experience, which helped
to assess and mediate the risk.
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and aggressively enforced. There was no
consultation with the Tsilhqot’in Nation
about the placement and enforcement of
roadblocks in Tsilhqot’in territory during the
wildfire.
Enforcement of roadblocks depended
on the particular officials on duty. On
some days, officials would let Tsilhqot’in
citizens and employees pass through.
Other days officials would strictly enforce
the same roadblock in an aggressive,
confrontational and disrespectful manner.
The result of this arbitrariness was that
Tsilhqot’in government employees were
constantly uncertain about whether they
would be permitted to carry out their jobs
in supporting Tsilhqot’in communities.
Tsilhqot’in authorized representatives were
not uniformed. While they held positions
of authority delegated by their respective
leadership or Emergency Operations
Centres, they were not equally recognized
for their role within the Nation. Many of
these positions were essential services for
the welfare of the community emergency
response teams. Enforcement officials either
lacked a basic understanding of Tsilhqot’in
authority or understood, but refused
to respect the vital role they played in
emergency response in their communities.

The issues with roadblocks started from a
lack of communication and clarity around
permits. Even some of the Tsilhqot’in
leadership were not provided with permits
at the start. Dealing with RCMP who had
come in from elsewhere was entirely
inconsistent. For this reason, it was later
suggested that it would have been helpful
to have a community member or liaison
stationed at each roadblock.

Information about the location of
roadblocks was poorly communicated
to Tsilhqot’in communities. Moreover,
decisions about the placement of
roadblocks were made without input from
Tsilhqot’in communities and resulted
in alternate routes left accessible and
unpatrolled. This was a missed opportunity
to incorporate Tsilhqot’in knowledge of
the territory to ensure the safety of those
travelling through the fire zone.

The enforcement of roadblocks during
the provincial state of emergency was
arbitrary and often confrontational. At
times, enforcement officials — largely
RCMP— recognized the need for Tsilhqot’in
government employees to pass through
roadblocks to provide essential supplies.
Other times, roadblocks were strictly

Access passes issued by the Fire Centre
were a partial solution to the challenge
of managing roadblocks. Passes allowed
authorized individuals (such as Tsilhqot’in
National Government employees) to pass
through roadblocks. These passes were
a welcome, if belated, development.
However, for Tsilhqot’in community

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

32

members, leadership and employees, the permitting process was time consuming and
difficult to access.
Local territorial knowledge was disregarded and as a result, government-to-government
relationships were further strained. The governmental by-the-book procedures were
frustrating to experienced and senior Tsilhqot’in wildfire staff who possessed practical
experience and land-based knowledge, which could have been greatly beneficial to
wildfire suppression efforts. Without adequate consultation and dialogue, a significant
amount of the territory was decimated. Wildfire response activities, such as back burns,
resulted in excessive damage to cattle guards and fences, timber, wildlife, medicinal
plants, culturally significant sites, and even led to unearthing human remains from
important spiritual burial grounds.
A central theme that emerged in documenting the Tsilhqot’in experience
for this report is the significant knowledge that Tsilhqot’in people have of
their territory and how little of this knowledge was accessed or respected
by emergency responders and fire crews. Daily briefings occurred in the
communities, but only conveyed information on what had already been
decided by the provincial response authorities. Crucial decisions about
firefighting strategy, such as the location and extent of back burns were made without
meaningful consultation with the communities who have knowledge of the territory and
who are most impacted by the consequences.
Chiefs noted that it would take 10 days or more to develop a working relationship with an
Incident Commander, and then the 14-day shift would come to an end. There was a very
strong impression that every Incident Commander who came through approached their
work with the First Nations differently. In a few notable and laudable instances in some
communities, leadership recall that they were asked about sites to be mindful of that held
cultural significance. But after the 14-day shift, the Incident Commander was not seen
by the community again and there was no indication that this important information had
been transferred to the next Incident Commander.
Burnt power lines created communication challenges for those actively working in
communities. Within five minutes of leaving the Williams Lake city centre, travelling west
on Highway 20, cell phones do not have network coverage. The lack of communication
posed many safety concerns.

key points
• Provincial authorities attempted to undermine Tsilhqot’in leadership during the response
through threats of child apprehension and increased surveillance.
• Roadblocks were sites of confrontation, discrimination and active impediments to effective
Tsilhqot’in wildfire response.
• Communication was strained, particularly in the rural setting of the Tsilhqot’in, and Tsilhqot’in
knowledge and expertise was not incorporated into provincial wildfire response strategy.
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Fires Burning in the Tsilhqot’in

Photograph By: Jason Payne/PNG - Vancouver Sun

Evacuations and the Tsilhqot’in
For the communities that were evacuated,
their citizens were scattered into evacuation
centres in different cities. The setting added
to citizen stress and in many cases triggered
residential school trauma: memories of
being forcibly removed by authorities,
staying in unfamiliar group lodging and
many separated from family and friends. It
was the first time for many of the Tsilhqot’in
to travel to a larger urban centre. The
effects on the health of the Tsilhqot’in from
evacuations is still being understood today.
Many found being separated from family
to be extremely stressful, without the
emotional, social, and economic supports
they might be used to. Normally, within
the confines of the community, leadership
and their employees provide basic services
to their people. Band offices, daycares,
and health clinics offer a range of support
services from providing access to health
care professionals to administering
income assistance. Counselling for mental
health instabilities and addictions are
essential community services. The health

departments even provide basic toiletries to
those in need. The staff recognise if families
may require a food hamper or assistance in
some form.
Displacement eliminated access to these
types of services, and at the greatest cost to
the Nation, led to the loss of a Tsilhqot’in
Elder’s life. During the evacuations a
Tsilhqot’in Elder, identified as a vulnerable
person, was reported missing when he did
not return back to Tsi Deldel after being
evacuated to Kamloops, BC RCMP, family
and friends searched extensively, but sadly
in the spring the Elder was found and had
passed. The Canadian Red Cross assisted
the community and family to transport the
Elder back home to have a peaceful burial.
Within the Nation there are Elders who
speak only the Tsilhqot’in language. Intake
at evacuation centres was a discouraging
process for those with language barriers
and literacy challenges, which resulted
with many not receiving financial support.
In addition, the evacuation generated new
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expenses, adding financial difficulty to
impoverished citizens. Many people rely
solely on preserving fish and wildlife in the
summer to provide sustenance throughout
the year. At the same time, evacuees were
forced to spend funds on costs that they
would not have encountered at home –
i.e. laundry mat expenses, commercial
transportation, groceries, shelter for
themselves and their livestock/pets, and fuel
and insurance for vehicles.
Within communities, where possible,
facilities remained open as a central point
of contact providing services to citizens
and workers that stayed behind. Often
times, leadership and staff were required
to advocate on behalf of those in need and
were stationed at these locations. These
were gathering sites for citizens and staff.
An emergency operation site for the Nation
and a separate one for Yunesit’in were
hosted in Williams Lake in the Tsilhqot’in
National Government (TNG) offices. When
the City of Williams Lake was evacuated,
staff that remained in Williams Lake were
scattered to different cities and had to assist
to the best of their ability remotely.
The TNG staff and volunteers assisted
citizens and communities with various

needs to ensure that the operations went
as smoothly as possible; however, the
logistics were undeniably complex.
Staff worked from revolving task and
responsibility lists that were created newly
each day. The many duties they assigned
included assisting citizens with registration
at the evacuation centres, and shopping
for and delivery of large orders of food
and prescriptions. Community delegates
were helped with shopping for inventory.
Deliveries of supplies to the community
were frequent, often several times a day.
Limited supplies in BC forced staff to
procure supplies from other provinces.
TNG Geographical Information Systems
Technicians developed daily maps specific
to the territories. These maps were widely
praised for their usefulness. Neighbours
would check the TNG social media pages
for up-to-date information they could not
easily receive elsewhere.
The Nation hired a community contractor
to host Basic Fire Suppression and Safety
(S-100) training courses on the fly. When
communities required assistance, the staff
were there to help. Daily conference calls
helped communities to be connected,
receive updates, and determine outstanding
needs.

key points
• Evacuation procedures were not culturally appropriate and left Tsilhqot’in without adequate
support.
• Tsilhqot’in leadership and staff effectively managed a complex emergency response effort,
providing support to all six communities and evacuated citizens as needed.
• Basic services refined in communities were not available to Tsilhqot’in citizens when they
were evacuated.
• Due to a lack of culturally appropriate programming some citizens did not receive support
during evacuation.
• The six communities maintained a central emergency operations centre.
• The six communities continued to maintain their duties and obligations to citizens and were
available to support them.
• The Tsilhqot’in National Government provided centralized services (i.e. training, mapping and
logistical support) to each community in a regionalized manner.
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Recovery

The Cumbersome Road to Recovery
Beginning as early as August 2017, communities performed damage assessments and
began recovery planning. By the beginning of September, each community needed to
focus on daily operational programs and provide regular services to citizens. However,
recovery has been plagued by an intensive recovery-reimbursement process. Over a year
since costs were expended, some reimbursements are still being reviewed.
The current funding approach to emergency response in Canada is
structured through a reimbursement process. Communities are expected
to cover up-front response costs and then use a reimbursement process
facilitated through Emergency Management BC. First Nations in British
Columbia must also follow this provincial process, even though emergency
funding is ultimately sourced from the federal government.
Unlike municipalities, Tsilhqot’in communities do not have the capacity to maintain
emergency reserve funds to cover emergency expenditures. Multiple Tsilhqot’in
communities had to establish a line of credit with private financial institutions to cover
emergency response expenditures. Tsilhqot’in communities were required to make a
financial leap of faith to respond to the wildfires, hoping that costs would eventually be
recouped, placing significant financial strain and uncertainty on the communities in the
interim. In the absence of loans from financial institutions, Tsilhqot’in leadership would
have been in the untenable position of having to lay-off essential front-line staff in their
communities.
This leap of faith has not fully borne out. Communities are still waiting, well over one year
after the 2017 wildfires, for full reimbursement for their emergency expenses. Tsilhqot’in
communities already face a significant financial strain in the day-to-day operations of their
organizations. This forces the communities to provide services to their citizens without the
appropriate financial support until they can recover from the financial impact.
Each community varies in size, but most needs are common amongst them all.
Documenting losses is an extensive process resulting in databases of information, but to
actually perform the recovery requires financial resources and human capacity.
Although funding has been available through various sources, the
communities have had difficulty handling the extra administrative burden
of applying for, and reporting on funding. Funding should flow directly to
each community to ease financial risks. Navigating a disjointed and nontransparent web of financial and reporting requirements spread across
multiple agencies including FNESS, EMBC, Red Cross, and DISC has put
significant strain on staff.
The Tsilhqot’in National Government held a meeting for community finance managers
to provide information on the reimbursement process and to learn from one another’s
experiences. Finance managers learnt then that there are many different bodies that
provide reimbursement however it would be scrutinized by one group at a time. This
process was unsatisfactory. As a start, through the Tripartite Collaborative Emergency
Agreement senior staff representing the many bodies established a table to field the
recovery requests together. The table has not addressed all questions and reimbursements
are still outstanding.
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International standards for emergency management point to the
recovery stage as a crucial moment for rebuilding in a way that prepares
communities for the next emergency (known as ‘build back better’).11
Building back better means repairs that go beyond simply restoring
infrastructure to its previous state and improving that infrastructure so that
it is sufficiently resistant to future threats. Despite the standard emergency
management practice of building back better, Tsilhqot’in communities need significant
additional support from provincial and federal authorities for recovery that reduces
vulnerability to future wildfire.
11

United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Priority 4.

key points
• Emergency financing is premised on assumptions of financial capacity that do not match
reality.
• Reimbursement for emergency expenditures is slow, involves multiple departments and places
an excessive administrative burden on Tsilhqot’in communities.
• Recovery needs in Tsilhqot’in communities are significant and urgent. Tsilhqot’in communities
remain vulnerable to the next wildfire.

Fires Burning in the Chilcotin

Photograph By: Jason Payne/PNG - Vancouver Sun
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Helicopter with Water Bucket near ?Esdilagh, BC
Photograph By: Richard Lam/PNG - Vancouver Sun

Impacts to the Tsilhqot’in Peoples
Individually, people are deeply and emotionally impacted by the scarcity of their
traditional sustenance and medicinal plants and berries. Compensation for the loss of
them has also been elusive. The citizens put high significance on their traditional practice,
considering them invaluable. In addition to determining the impact to the community,
there is always confusion about whether to approach the federal or provincial government
for support. In the short term, these impacts have been supported financially through the
Red Cross “cultural livelihood” funding, a catch-all form through which individuals can
claim lost opportunities in hunting, fishing, and the like, and income lost from traditional
arts industries and cultural work. While these applications are pouring in, there is concern
that this may not be the appropriate restitution for longer-term losses in game, fish,
medicine, and berries. Further, this process is inadequate to capture the collective impacts,
beyond economic impacts, on Tsilhqot’in peoples’ ability to practice their rights. With so
much burned up, people are having to go further and further out into the territory to find
game and berries, beyond the areas that have been traditionally and continuously used.
This has deep social, cultural, and political implications for the exercise of Tsilhqot’in title
and rights.
Sadness and mental health concerns has plagued many families after the experience of
working on such a tumultuous fire without proper provisions. Witnessing large tracks of
traditional land, wildlife, and livestock die in the fire added an even greater emotional
burden to many.
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At the onset of the 2018 fire season and throughout the summer, anxiety increased, and
panic was triggered by helicopters, sirens, and smoke. Many of the people who worked
on or throughout the fires have had little time off as the burdens of the community are
unending.
Citizens who are personally recovering from the exhausting experience identified many
health and wellbeing issues, in addition to the effects to their livelihoods as ranchers,
trappers, farmers, and woodlot owners. The emotional, mental, and physical health of the
citizens has been negatively compounded. Asthma and depression are among the many
common physical and emotional symptoms.
Unfortunately, there is concern that the residual mental health impacts, as well as
increased disposable income, particularly among the young men on the fire crews, had
increased alcoholism and impacted family and community safety. Heavy drug and alcohol
use started or increased during people’s evacuation to urban areas, and drugs are now
coming back to the community from those cities. Incidents of drunk driving, violence,
domestic violence and familial conflict have increased from previous rates. The evidence
is plain: there is an urgent need for counselling as well as community healing, including
debriefs, community gatherings, cultural and land-based activities and traditional
ceremony.

Impacts to the Tsilhqot’in Land
As part of the effort to suppress fire mobility, firefighters destroyed fences, cattle guards,
and even historical and current trails or roads. In some areas, the machinery-built fire
guards had diverted water courses, which led to flooding. In other areas, wildfires left
hillsides barren of vegetation causing mudslides during heavy precipitation.
The wildfires not only devastated traditional sustenance, but also continue to impact the
daily life for the animals that did survive. The Tsilhqot’in Nation is a steward of the land
and prioritizes conservation for future generations, yet the Nation is consistently at odds
with political decisions that conflict with these values.
The jurisdictional division between provincial and federal crown lands
divides the territory and the rehabilitation work being done on it. While
rehabilitation work has begun on Crown land in Tsilhqot’in territory,
the lack of a comprehensive land use plan at the territorial level means
that rehabilitation work is somewhat piecemeal and lacks overarching
Tsilhqot’in authority or vision on how the work will unfold. On the one
hand, there has been a positive move towards direct awarding rehabilitation contracts
to community entities. A group of five communities including Yunesit’in, Tl’esqox, Tsi
Deldel, Tl’etinqox, and Esk’etemc have established zones in the Hanceville fire complex
and have been contracted to each of these zones. So, while it is a positive development
that the government is receptive to First Nations managing the rehabilitation program,
major decision-making has still come from the Province, undermining the community
leadership’s inherent right to plan, set priorities and make decisions on their lands. Further,
the process has been too slow, as prescriptions have been made, but much of the work
hasn’t started.

Impacts to the Homes, Properties and Livelihoods
Homes and infrastructure within the Tsilhqot’in communities are subpar to those in
non-First Nation communities. Housing on reserves is in need of major repairs, often is
infested with bats or mold and is severely overcrowded. The shortage of housing has been
a longstanding issue and forces multiple families to live within one house. Infrastructure
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housing inspectors to assess the state of
needs are significant. Many of the
each household has become a significant
communities have remained on boil water
challenge. Cleaning homes and clothing
advisories for years without any indication
to prevent the spread of bedbugs is an
of when or how their community water
arduous activity without individual washing
systems will be improved. The common
and drying machines. Existing dilapidated
buildings, often not properly constructed,
houses became
are insufficient to
“I remember going to the Cariboo
further impacted. The
handle the needs of
Regional District (CRD) Office, probably
Tsilhqot’in is in an
the communities.
even greater state of
around seven at night and then realizing
crisis facing housing
During the wildfires
they have a pretty big room, and they
existing gaps
have all their communications, have a huge shortages.
in community
tv-screen projecting all of the events taking
Patterns of animal
infrastructure became
place,
people
sitting
around
a
big
table
with
behaviour has
acute. Lack of
all their computers, laptops and phones,
changed due to
emergency structures
everyone dialed into communicating on
the landscape
such as firehalls,
emergency operation
different things and already, by that time, disturbances at
centres, large
there had been about 36 different fires that times causing a
community gathering started up, all within an hour’s time. Going safety concern for
the people. The
spaces, kitchen
facilities, and storage in there I realized that we weren’t going to be displaced animals
left the communities a priority. That is the biggest thing I got out pose a threat to daily
of that night.”
activities like walking
vulnerable. Further,
to and from school.
each community was
Chief Russell Myers-Ross
faced with issues of
Ranching is a
disrepair and limited
source of income for many citizens in the
capacity of their water reservoirs and
Tsilhqot’in. The wildfires either injured
treatment plants.
livestock or burned them to the point of
non-recovery. Communities have noted
After the wildfires, these inequalities
negative impacts on the production of hay,
worsened. Rodents had moved into
and the procurement of hay for livestock
hundreds of evacuated homes, seeking
because hay fields were either burnt or left
refuge from the fires. Resulting from group
unmanaged. The fires decimated integral
lodging and clothing donations, bedbugs
outbuildings and further continue to impact
infiltrated homes. What is a small issue
the economical bottom line of these small
to some becomes a large issue in First
businesses.
Nation communities. For instance, seeking

key points
• The 2017 wildfire has had a deep and far-reaching impact on Tsilhqot’in citizens, affecting
land-based practices, mental health and livelihood.
• Significant rehabilitation activities are ongoing in Tsilhqot’in territory.
• Economic opportunities have flowed to Tsilhqot’in-based companies in a modest and
piecemeal way, but planning and major decision-making in the region has been led by the
province in the absence of Tsilhqot’in collaboration.
• Infrastructure on reserve is inadequate to suitably support the basic needs of the citizens and
even less suitable to support their needs in an emergency situation.
• The Tsilhqot’in communities lack sophisticated emergency operations equipment and a facility,
although they are well situated to manage these operations themselves.
• Tsilhqot’in communities face greater struggles to recover from disasters than non-Indigenous
communities and face disproportionate impacts.
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Advancing and Strengthening
Relationships - A First Step
It is clear that government representatives across a number of ministries need training in
the jurisdictional authority of First Nation governments, as well as cultural competency
training in working with Indigenous communities. Given the high turnover of personnel,
this training must be frequent and ongoing. In particular, the RCMP should be prepared
to take direction from Chief and Council. Beyond simply hiring liaisons, community
members should be embedded within the larger emergency response and management
system, taking up leadership roles such as division supervisors and managers.
Training for the Tsilhqot’in communities needs to continue to ensure that more people
within the territory have tickets and certifications for wildfire suppression. In the summer
of 2018, the Province of BC contributed a mobile Community Structural Protection Unit
(SPU) to the Tsilhqot’in National Government. The SPU contains approximately 350
sprinklers and can protect between 30-35 homes. Tsilhqot’in citizens were trained to
operate this highly-valuable unit. Although this was a significant contribution the nation
requires an ongoing and comprehensive training regime along with a cache of equipment
and inventory.

key points
• Cultural competency training for service agencies that support First Nations in
emergencies is a first step.
• First Nation communities require continual and government-subsidized training.

Taking Back Inherent Jurisdiction
In May 2018, the Tsilhqot’in Nation issued permits for mushroom harvest
and declared “No Harvest Zones” within the territory.12 This exercise of
jurisdiction led to a coordinated approach with other governments and
agencies and allowed the harvest of lucrative, post-fire mushroom crops,
while also protecting culturally-sensitive areas destroyed by the 2017
wildfires.
Many non-Tsilhqot’in people—including visitors and those who live in the territory—
were exposed to, interacted with, and abided by Tsilhqot’in law and jurisdiction. In the
beginning, there was resistance from some mushroom buyers and mushroom pickers,
however this had subsided quickly once the Tsilhqot’in had explained that the measure
was taken for conservation purposes and to keep the area clean. A small fee was charged
for the pickers and buyers. The fee allowed Tsilhqot’in land rangers to monitor areas for
safety purposes, maintain outdoor bathroom facilities and empty Tsilhqot’in-provided
garbage bins.
This form of governance should be expanded to other areas of land management. This
includes seeking ways to put assessment, monitoring, and prevention roles directly into the
hands of the community, including leading in prescribed burning.
12

Tsilhqot’in National Government. “Tsilhqot’in Issue Permits for Mushroom Harvest in Territory.” 2018. http://www.tsilhqotin.
ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2018_05_18_MurshroomPermitPR.pdf
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The Tsilhqot’in mushroom harvesting permitting regime is a tremendous success story of
collaborative, inter-jurisdictional stewardship in Tsilhqot’in territory. In anticipation of a
significant influx of people onto Tsilhqot’in territory to harvest and purchase mushrooms,
the Tsilhqot’in Nation exercised its inherent jurisdiction to establish a permitting system
on Tsilhqot’in territory. Early and ongoing conversations led to an effective enforcement
collaboration between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural
Resource Operations and Rural Development, Conservation Officers, Natural Resource
Officers and the RCMP.
British Columbia has not established a regulatory regime for mushroom harvest on Crown
lands. As a result, there is, at present, no possibility for a jurisdictional conflict between
provincial law and the exercise of Tsilhqot’in law over mushroom harvesting on Tsilhqot’in
territory. Rather, the Tsilhqot’in Nation has effectively filled an existing jurisdictional gap.
The objectives of the 2018 Tsilhqot’in mushroom harvesting regulation were to manage
the influx of mushroom harvesters and purchasers, ensure their safety, protect culturallyand-biologically sensitive areas within Tsilhqot’in territory and generate economic benefits
for Tsilhqot’in communities. The regulation required mushroom pickers and buyers
to purchase permits from the Tsilhqot’in National Government. The harvesting permit
allowed harvesting only in designated areas, which excluded the Title lands and sensitive
areas within Tsilhqot’in territory.
The Tsilhqot’in permitting regime was supported by the Government of British Columbia
through a Land Act closure applicable to sensitive cultural and biological areas within
the fire perimeter. Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers led the implementation and enforcement of
the permitting system, with ongoing support from provincial and federal enforcement
agencies. In August 2018, Tsilhqot’in leadership heralded the management of the
mushroom season as success defined by a “spirit of collaboration” (Media Release Aug 8,
2018).

Riske Creek Fire

Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
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The Tsilhqot’in Nation has also exercised inherent jurisdiction over the
harvest of moose in its territory, in response to a severely-declining moose
population and the unknown effects of the 2017 wildfires. Prior to the
hunting season in September 2018, the Tsilhqot’in and Southern Dãkelh
Nation Alliance, comprised of 10 First Nation communities, declared a
joint prohibition on Limited Entry Hunt (LEH) for moose in response to
the Province’s plan to allow a LEH with a few limited restrictions. The fire guards built
in 2017 dramatically increased hunting access routes into the territory and increased
access to wetlands considered to be high value due the abundance of moose found in the
area. The burnt natural moose canopy cover had opened up sight lines for hunters and
predators, making wildlife especially vulnerable.
Management of the moose population in Tsilhqot’in territory is an example of both
jurisdictional cooperation and conflict. In 2017, both the Tsilhqot’in Nation and
British Columbia imposed moratoriums on the moose hunt, post-fire in portions of the
territory. Yet moose management is an ongoing source of conflict, with the Tsilhqot’in
Nation and Province unable to reach a consensus. The Tsilhqot’in Nation opposes the
current provincial approach to still issuing LEH authorizations and feels this approach is
incautious in light of the cumulative threats faced by the moose population, the lack of
study post-wildfire, and the failure to close all the access roads built in 2017.
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Riske Creek Fire

Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
Conflict in the 2018 hunting season culminated in a Moose Co-Management
Agreement between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Province, directed at developing and
implementing a framework before the 2019 season. Stewardship decisions about the
moose population in Tsilhqot’in Territory are guided by both the Nenqay Deni Accord and
Moose Co-Management Plan. This plan will work towards moose recovery by dealing with
habitat loss, and human and predator caused mortality.
Moose are an important traditional food source for the Tsilhqot’in and are thus, of
significant cultural value. The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises its inherent jurisdiction over the
land, guided by its stewardship obligations with respect to the land and wildlife. The right
of Tsilhqot’in citizens to hunt moose in their territory is protected in Canadian law under
s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Provincial decisions impacting the moose in Tsilhqot’in territory are subject to the Crown’s
constitutional obligation to consult and accommodate the Tsilhqot’in communities. In
addition, the Nenqay Deni Accord constitutes a bilateral Fish and Wildlife Panel, which
provides “the framework for collaborative management of Fish and Wildlife in Tsilhqot’in
Territory” (12.26). A key role of the Panel is to provide recommendations to provincial
decision-makers regarding stewardship decisions within Tsilhqot’in territory (12.28 and
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the Tsilhqot’in Stewardship Agreement). Over the course of several months, the Fish and
Wildlife Panel deliberated on a joint recommendation on the 2018 moose hunt, however,
it was unable to reach a consensus and no joint recommendation was made.
As a result of BC’s decision to move ahead with the LEH for 2018 and the Tsilhqot’in
interim moose protection law which prohibits moose hunting in Tsilhqot’in Territory, there
remains an unresolved jurisdictional conflict. It remains to be seen whether or to what
extent the work envisioned by the Moose Co-Management Agreement will address this
ongoing jurisdictional conflict.
Moose management has proven to be highly political involving numerous parties.
Nonetheless, as the stewards of their lands, the Tsilhqot’in need to be at the forefront of
making decisions, and planning for the conservation of the moose and moose habitat.
The communities have not allowed the 2017 jurisdictional battle to affect how they
continue to manage their lands. Still, they are faced with daily opposition to overcome the
barriers to self-determination.
The Tsilhqot’in, in March of 2018, also enforced conservation measures when they
announced the closure to fishing Steelhead trout on the Chilcotin River.13 The Tsilhqot’in
forwent their Aboriginal right to fish the newly acclaimed endangered species under the
Species at Risk Act. In a press release, the community called upon the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans to also eliminate the bycatch from the commercial Pacific salmon
fisheries.
The many conservation measures that the Tsilhqot’in have executed were examined
closely. The wildfire impacts have played a role in both, the reduction of fish and wildlife,
and the creation of an in activity on the land. Many of the Tsilhqot’in communities have
made the decision to not hunt or fish due to these concerns. However, at the same time,
putting restrictions on hunting and gathering impacts the food sources that the community
citizens heavily rely upon. While these decisions can be difficult for the communities to
make, Tsilhqot’in leadership upholds the traditional teachings to care for the lands on
which the people rely.
Ongoing issues with unilateral decision-making by government, even in reporting,
rehabilitation, and strategic planning, demonstrate that the jurisdictional and operational
conflicts have yet to be addressed. While some communication and relationships have
improved between Tsilhqot’in leadership and certain government partners, for others, it’s
back to the status quo.
13

Tsilhqot’in National Government. “Tsilhqot’in Nation Announces Full Closure of Steelhead Fisheries.” 2018. http://
www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/2018_03_20_SteelheadClosure.pdf

key points
• The Tsilhqot’in receive wide-spread support by local non-First Nation residents in their efforts
towards applying conservation measures to circumvent wildfire effects within their territory.
• Decisions affecting wildlife, lands and resources within Tsilhqot’in territory need to be
reconciled with Tsilhqot’in rights, culture, values and goals to achieve jurisdictional
cooperation.
• Wildfire fuel breaks created heightened access to vulnerable wildlife.
• Provincial authorizations affecting Tsilhqot’in within the Cariboo Chilcotin continue regardless
of the recommendations towards wildlife management made by the Tsilhqot’in.
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Tl’etinqox Government
Anaham First Nation

Tl’etinqox Aerial View
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John

T

he Tl’etinqox (Anaham) Government is located just over 100 kilometres west of Williams Lake,
BC on Highway 20 on the Chilcotin Plateau. The main reserve is located northeast of the
Chilcotin River and the community of Alexis Creek. Tl’etinqox have over 1600 citizens registered
and are the largest of the Tsilhqot’in communities with less than half of their population residing
on the reserve.
Tl’etinqox infrastructure on the reserve includes a band office, health centre, elders centre,
elementary school, church, and gas station. The health building and the elementary school were
the latest to be constructed. The newer buildings provide a safe, clean and healthy environment
for health care services and schooling. Tl’etinqox seeks opportunities to upgrade and replace the
facilities for the benefit of their people.
Tl’etinqox Government operates numerous subsidiaries, which include Dech’en Ventures Ltd., a
successful forestry company, and Tl’etinqox Trading, a convenience store and gas station.
Cultural camps are held in summers to nurture the transmission of traditional teachings on the
lands within the territory. Additionally, an annual ride on horse or bike embarks from Tl’etinqox
and journeys to the Williams Lake Stampede. The journey is five days, and the participants stop to
camp along the way. The event is multigenerational and is another way to foster the teachings.
Often Tl’etinqox is in the media because the leadership places an emphasis on publicizing the
disparities of treatment toward their people and First Nations in general. They have assumed the
responsibility to advocate for better services. Knowledge of such disparity is otherwise hidden
from public.
This type of publicity is exactly what Tl’etinqox leadership welcomed during the 2017 wildfire
experience.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
The Tl’etinqox main reserve is located on both sides of Highway 20 located northeast of the
Chilcotin River. Between the river and the highway lies mostly hayfields that have been irrigated
in the past but have not been active for several years. These fields could have high surface fuel
loads once the grasses have cured in late summer however the highway lies between the fields
and most structures which would act as a fire guard.
Surrounding the community the terrain slopes steeply and has scattered Douglas Fir with
moderate-to-low surface fuel loads. These steep slopes have discontinuous forest cover and
intermittent cliff bands that act as partial fuel breaks.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

The Tl’etinqox Experience
July 7, 2017 marked the first day that wildfire threatened Tl’etinqox. Tl’etinqox Chief and
Council immediately recognized that the only way to save their residences and buildings
from the intense rampant wildfire was to launch an Emergency Operations Centre,
mobilize their wildfire interface personnel, and prepare to fend off the fires themselves.
Building on previous wildfire experiences, the Chief and Council knew that an evacuation
order could not be issued without a signed resolution by the community leadership.
Chief Joe Alphonse assessed the risk for the community, knowing that if the community
evacuated, they would have no authority to defend their homes and territory. Throughout
the years, hundreds of their citizens were trained in various levels of wildfire response,
from managing an Emergency Operations Centre to front-line wildfire response, and they
were confident in handling the situation.
Leadership’s choice to not evacuate, knowing the
decision was within their full jurisdiction, was not
understood or accepted by the RCMP. The RCMP
had continued to try to force an evacuation of the
community and alerted citizens that if they did not
leave they would be forcibly moved or arrested.
Further, the RCMP threatened the apprehension
of children. At odds with enforcement personnel,
Tl’etinqox had many abrasive encounters, which
forced the leadership to act independently to
safeguard the community.

“Why is it that at just the
slightest provocation, they will
take our kids away? I would have
been willing to go to jail for that.
We’re making a stand. We want to
look after ourselves and we don’t
want to depend on anybody.”
Chief ALphonse
The Wildfire Warriors of
Tl’etinqox - The National Observer

These threats and preparations were excessive and
disrespectful. Moreover, if acted upon, they would
have undermined with the exercise of Tsilhqot’in
law. Tl’etinqox had in place a relocation order for vulnerable citizens; emergency
preparedness actions had been taken in the community to protect children during the
wildfire.

The Tl’etinqox Government 2017 Wildfire Report – A Compilation of Tl’etinqox
Residents’ Encounters with the Wildfire,14 released in September 2017, documented the
comprehensive accounts of the community’s experiences. The fire originating south of
14

Verhaeghe, Crystal.“ Tl’etinqox Government 2017 Wildfire Report – A Compilation of Tl’etinqox Residents’ Encounters with the
Wildfire.” Tsilhqot’in Territory. 2017.
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Tl’etinqox, across the Tsilhqox (Chilcotin
River) travelled north east to Tsibas (a
mountain east of the community). The
historic Lee’s Corner, a restaurant and gas
station, had burnt down and the fire was
travelling closer to the community. At the
same time a fire flanked southwest of the
community.
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begin working on the fires. Chief Alphonse
assumed the liability and financial burden
to start protecting their community.

An emergency operation centre was
established, governed by the Tl’etinqox
Emergency Operations Plan (TEOP). People
were assigned to managerial positions
of Operations, Planning, Logistics and
Finance and the Incident Commander and
The highway was closed soon after and
citizens of Tl’etinqox prepared to safeguard Emergency Operation Centre Director
were established. They assumed their
their homes and relocate, if necessary
roles and duties at set out in the TEOP.
to the neighbouring communities of Tsi
The plan was modelled after provincial
DelDel (Alexis Creek First Nation) or the
processes; however it included information
community hall in the township of Alexis
specific to the
Creek, BC.
community and
their traditional
The Tl’etinqox
“A few weeks after I left Tsilhqot’in territory,
governance and
health building,
I witnessed the fire at the Joe Rich community
processes.
band office, gas
in Kelowna, BC I refer to this as the Joe Rich
station and nearby
fire versus the Joe Alphonse fire. Firefighting
The TEOP became
fields became
response was abundant with water bombers
the governing
the gathering
flown every 20 minutes. When I was in
document,
site for hundreds
Tl’etinqox I did not see any.
the Tl’etinqox
of people to
Emergency
take refuge.
In Kelowna, they protected the highOperation Centre
Neighbouring
valued land but it was not the same in the
(TEOC) became
residents,
Tsilhqot’in. The land & territory was not
the governing
community
perceived as a high-value area however in
body and the
citizens, wildfire
wealthy communities, infrastructure could
Indian Act Chief
crews and
be replaced quicker whereas in a First Nation
and Council
equipment
community it may take several years.”
system dissolved
operators
to ensure the
gathered to await
Chuck
Puchmayr
emergency
instruction to fight
New Westminster City Council
management
the fires. Citizens
process would be
were travelling
the sole authority.
along the highway
to extinguish spot fires that could reignite
Early into the wildfires, several dignitaries
and saturate burning hydro poles. The fires
had compromised the hydro and telephone traveled to the community to get a firsthand impression on the state of the situation
lines, leaving the communities without
and to understand the community needs.
communication and electricity. The health
Representatives from the Indigenous and
building was the only building that had
Northern Affairs Canada, Union of British
a backup generator, but within hours a
Columbia Indian Chiefs, First Nations
secondary power supply was installed for
Summit and Ministry of Indigenous
the gas station.
Relations travelled to meet with Tl’etinqox
leadership, volunteers and youth.
Working from the Tl’etinqox health
Commitments were made to expedite funds
building, the community assigned staff
in the event of losses. The dignitaries left
and volunteers to cook for the mass of
with firsthand knowledge of the state of the
people. Days into the wildfires, there was
no sign of wildfire support. The community community and territory and furthered their
established firefighting crews and instructed advocacy for the Nation from a far.
un-dispatched equipment operators to

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

48

City of New Westminster representative Chuck Puchmayr, City Councillor travelled to
Tl’etinqox when the roads were clear, to meet with Chief Alphonse and learn about
emergency protection mechanisms that were in place. After the initial meeting, it was
deemed safe to transport a fire truck donated from the City of New Westminster to
Tl’etinqox. Puchmayr traveled back and forth to the community delivering supplies often.
The wildfires of 2017 strained the relationship between the First Nation
Health Authority (FNHA) and the Tl’etinqox Government office. FNHA
personnel were instructed by their superiors to stop work out of concern
for their personal safety, even though there was no local evacuation order
in force in Tl’etinqox. While FNHA staff did what they could to arrange
for prescription medicine orders, supplies and deliveries, Tl’etinqox was
stripped of essential health care services without notice. Tl’etinqox sought emergency staff
to fill the gaps in health services immediately and found health care staff with specialized
training in remote medicine willing to travel to them. The exit of FNHA staff left the
Tl’etinqox Health Clinic in an impossible position, as it had been operating as the main
assembly point of the community.
Several fires in the Tsilhqot’in territory and surrounding Tl’etinqox merged to become the
Hanceville Complex Fire and the Plateau Fire. These fires were not contained until midSeptember 2017. Tl’etinqox, united as a team, stood their ground to fight the wildfires that
continuously threatened to decimate their residences, coming within feet of the village
buildings.

Recovery, Over A Year Later
Early on the community recorded damages, and worked diligently to refine their records
to accommodate the reporting method requested by government. Tl’etinqox was the first
Tsilhqot’in community to seek recovery reimbursement and submitted their first draft of a
recovery plan in September 2017. They became an experimental subject in this difficult
and time-consuming process. This funding, over a year later, has still not been fully
reimbursed adding additional pressures to the community.
Many issues resulting from wildfires affect the basic human needs of Tl’etinqox citizens.
Many of these issues could not wait for the recovery process, and the community relied on
own-source funding to address them. Additional impacts from the fire, similar amongst all
of the communities, include smoke and water damage, melted siding and roofing, rodent,
bat and bed bug infestation, demolished fence systems, and broken cattle guards.
Tl’etinqox submitted damage reports to the government for the hay fields, houses,
public buildings, and land-based impacts from heavy duty equipment (i.e. fire guards,
creek impacts), supported by specialized maps, photos to reflect the damage, and GPS
coordinates to identify the exact location. These documents later required further details.
Tl’etinqox submitted documentation to support response costs and any identified recovery
needs. Specific to community healing, many proposals were submitted to restore the
community in a holistic manner. Activities such as equestrian healing were proposed as
the Tsilhqot’in people have a strong relationship with horses. This may be unconventional
and challenging to fund under existing government silos, but it is important to the people
and their culture.
In addition, therapists for the community developed a mental health impact assessment
that documented an increase of negative coping strategies, interpersonal violence, and
negative physical body symptoms compounded from stress (Appendix C). Heightened
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“First Nation leadership reach out to me when wildfires jeopardize their communities
and territories. We give them support and advice, but we all are impaired by
government processes and narrow-minded approaches when it comes to including us
in emergency management.
My hope is that the Tripartite Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement will
foster practical incorporations of First Nation jurisdiction in emergency management
based on the recommendations that we provided living it first hand.
When we are faced with an emergency, we need the resources and infrastructure in
place to protect people, wildlife, homes and buildings within the territory.”
Chief Joe Alphonse
anxiety was expressed in
anticipation of the next wildfire
season or with the presence of
smoke.15 The demand for both
conventional and cultural healing
supports far outweighs the current
capacity.
Over a year after the wildfires had
ended, a team provided immediate
and emergency health services to
the community. Getting through
a year without wildfires in the
community forced the workers to
settle in and reflect on their current
state of wellbeing. Many of them
had worked straight through, and
without breaks because of not
only an overwhelming backlog
of regular work, but also the vast
needs of the recovery efforts. It
is clear that emergency health
support is not a one-month
endeavor, there is a need for
continual support.

Darell Petal and Robert Elkins fighting fires
threatening the Riparian Ranch and IR #18.
Left to fight the fires themselves, they worked
for 24 hours and saved the Riparian Ranch.
Photograph By: Rebecca Rosette

In the spring of 2018, as a result
of the wildfires, Tl’etinqox had
numerous floods. The community
pursued Disaster Financial
Assistance (DFA) for the secondary
losses of hay field production and
water source debris management
due to flooding. These issues have
been flagged in the community
recovery plans for rehabilitation.
15 Hartwick, Lisa. “Tl’etinqox Community Holistic
Health Review of Effects Summer Wildfires,
2017.” Tl’etinqox Government Caretaker Lands.
2017
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Reconciliation and Preparation
In April 2018, Tl’etinqox and the RCMP participated in a relationship-building healing
circle to begin reconciliation from the 2017 wildfires. The RCMP also attended Indigenous
Awareness Training specific to the Tsilhqot’in.
In August of 2018, the New Westminster City Council and the Tl’etinqox Government
began the processes to connect the municipality of New Westminster with the First Nation
community as a sister city. This relationship is the first of its kind in Canada.
The relationship between New Westminster and Tl’etinqox has been a strong one. The
Tsilhqot’in Nation received a donation of two police department vehicles in the summer
of 2018. One was used for the Tsilhqot’in Ranger program and the other for Tl’etinqox
security program.
The community was immersed in every aspect from response to recovery, and therefore
are confident that they are equipped to handle a similar emergency. The Tl’etinqox is
prepared to deploy equipment, personnel, and set up a fire camp.
Over the year, staff have undertaken professional development training in all aspects of
operating an emergency operations centre and attended wildfire and structural interface
training. Furthermore, the knowledge they gained from seeking out the appropriate
paperwork in a haste, is now documented for ease of process in the future.

Tl’etinqox Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Focused training in firefighting and the functions of an Emergency Operation Centre since
2003.
Asserted decision to not evacuate the community even when threatened by enforcement
personnel because of the understanding of the jurisdictional authority regarding evacuation
protocols on First Nation reserves.
Assessed the community’s ability to respond to wildfires and initiated culturally-appropriate
emergency processes and safety procedures.
Adopted community direction about how to handle the emergency situation.
Accompanied Elders to annual Elders Gathering and situated them in a safe location
throughout the wildfire.
Documented a chronological report on the Wildfire experience.
Established a process to ensure that spot fires were attended to, hydro poles were
consistently saturated along the highway and an overnight crew monitored the wildfires’
proximity to the community.
Assumed governance and financial implications of responding to wildfires immediately when
there was no other support available.
Developed a single decision-making body in Emergency Operations and dissolving Indian Act
Chief and Council system to prevent duelling internal authorities.
Applied knowledge of the traditional territory in decision making.
Fostered a sister-city support system with a city that had expertise in Emergency Operations
and a long-standing relationship with leadership.
Employed remote medical support staff to assist with health care needs of the community.
Commenced recovery plan and damage assessment during the end of the wildfires.
Commissioned a mental health and wellbeing report written by the community therapist.
Initiated a healing circle jointly with the RCMP to reconcile the damage to the relationship
during the wildfires of 2017.
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yunesit’in Government
Stone First Nation

Yunesit’in Community View
Photograph By: James Smith

Y

unesit’in (Stone) is located approximately 105 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC, and 8 km
south of Hanceville, off of Highway 20 in the Chilcotin Plateau. Its original place-name, ‘Gex
Nats’inilht’ih,’ refers to where rabbits were hunted. The main reserve overlooks the Chilcotin River
on the south side. Yunesit’in has 450 registered citizens, 250 of whom reside on the reserve.
Infrastructure on the reserve includes a band office and health centre, elementary school and
gym, church, saw mill, youth centre, water reservoir and treatment plant, and three greenhouses.
While the band office, school, and greenhouses are new, some of the other infrastructure need
upgrades, including the water reservoir, and an old firehall that is no longer properly equipped.
Yunesit’in Government operates a subsidiary forestry company, Yunesit’in Development
Enterprises (YDE).
A majority of Yunesit’in’s population speaks the original language, Nenqayni Chi. Yunesit’in
embraces Tsilhqot’in values and identity in the land, expressed through central activities
including cultural camps, horseback riding, and fishing.
Together with Xeni Gwet’in, and with support from TNG, the Yunesit’in Government launched the
Dasiqox Tribal Park Initiative in 2017. In an area known as Nexwagwezʔan—“it is there for us”—
the tribal park is a proposed land, water and wildlife management area in traditional Tsilhqot’in
territory. The communities exercise Indigenous governance over about 300,000 hectares of
wilderness and wildlife habitat, bordering a number of existing parks and protected areas.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
The Hanceville Complex fire burnt within a few hundred metres of Yunesit’in. The fuel loads have
been reduced on the south side of the community due to the fire and subsequent salvage logging.
Between the burnt area and the southern side of the community is a band of deciduous trees.
Several large hayfields are to the north and west of the community. Lightly burnt Douglas
fir stands are located east of the community with an estimated mortality of these stands are
less than 30%. The forests lie outside of the immediate Yunesit’in dwelling and community
infrastructure.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

Friday July 7th, an
Indication of What Was to Come
In the late afternoon of Friday July 7th,
citizens of the Yunesit’in community
remember seeing a big plume of smoke
directly adjacent to the reserve. Those who
were travelling between the reserve and
Williams Lake at this time, report seeing
at least ten or eleven lightning strikes. As
one citizen remembers, “we were at home
and first I… heard the thunder coming and
the lightning and I was excited because
in our tradition when there’s lightning it
means the salmon is coming up the river.”
However, within a matter of 30 minutes,
the magnitude of what was about to unfold
started to become clear.
When the fires began, Yunesit’in staff and
leadership were scattered throughout the
province—a challenge in coordination,
governance, and communication that
would persist throughout the wildfires.
Most staff were travelling from north of
Prince George, BC, where they had been
on a work retreat. The Band Manager,
with the few staff and summer students
who remained at the band office, took
immediate action. Very quickly, the band
office became its own “little ops centre,”
which oversaw the provision of essential
resources and services that were neglected
by the Cariboo Regional District Emergency
Operations Centre (EOC) in Williams Lake.
Meanwhile, two of four band councillors
were in Vancouver, where they had just

completed a training with the First Nations
Education Steering Committee. The Chief
and another councillor were in Williams
Lake. Nevertheless, by about 5:30 p.m.,
Chief and Council came to a consensus
to issue a Band Council Resolution (BCR)
to evacuate the reserve. However, it was
intentionally decided that it should be
implemented in a moderate and culturallyappropriate way, rather than forcing people
to leave—an approach that both the
Province and the RCMP would fail to grasp.
Almost right away, existing gaps in
community infrastructure became acute.
The fire truck, which had fallen into
disrepair, had been sold the previous year.
Since then, the fire hall had been used
primarily for storage. The first night, Lee’s
Corner, an historic store and gas station
burnt down. As the power went down, in
an area already without cell phone service,
communication was cut off. A dearth of
backup generators and no community
freezer meant that each household’s deepfreeze—containing the yearly supply of
hunted game, fish, and other essential
foods—began to thaw. Further, the limited
capacity of the reserve’s water reservoir
and treatment plant, already in need of
upgrades, became an urgent source of
stress. However, when the Chief walked in
to the EOC that night, it was clear that his
community and their infrastructure needs
were not going to rise the top of their list. It
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was clear that the majority of response operations would have to be taken on by the band
itself.
At the same time, community fire crews were quickly assembled. Under the Yunesit’in
Development Enterprise, forestry crews became wildfire crews. However, YDE’s Forestry
Manager was out of town and the community’s most experienced fire fighter was stuck
in Williams Lake. With approximately 20 personnel on standby, they were guided by the
Forest Manager from a distance. By the time they were sent to their first post that night,
the fire was already of out control, and they were told by the Fire Centre to stand down.
Meanwhile, others from the community were ready to join crews, but they required fire
training and certification first.
If the chaos of that first few hours revealed anything, it was that inconsistent coordination
and inter-jurisdictional ambiguity with provincial and federal authorities would continue
to pose operational and governance challenges which needed constant troubleshooting,
generated instances of undermining the community leadership, created financial
uncertainty, and delayed wildfire response and access to necessary resources on the
reserve. Nevertheless, community strengths were also revealed: unity among band
council, staff, and membership; a willingness to share responsibilities; and a strong
commitment to advancing and acting on community authority. Despite many complex
challenges, showing great resilience, Yunesit’in was able to respond to and recover from
the 2017 wildfires in a way that prioritized community wellbeing.

Wildfire Response

Firefighting By Yunesit’in Crews
Although the community started with inadequate infrastructure, patchy certification, and
dispersed leadership, by the time the last of the community fire crews were taken off the
line in the first week of November, much had been accomplished.
Starting with about 20 crew members from Yunesit’in, by the end of fires, the Response
Coordinator (normally the YDE Forestry Manager) was managing about 50 personnel,

Yunesit’in Wildfire Crews and Canadian Armed Forces
Photograph By: Rebecca Rosette
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including Yunesit’in crews, those sent from
Tl’etinqox, and Emergency Fire Fighter
(EFF) crews employed by the Province.
While EFF are meant to be a separate
entity—provincial employees outside of
the Ministry—the Response Coordinator
would meet them every morning at 6
a.m. to determine who was going where.
While coordination was more efficient this
way, it was difficult to manage these extra
crews and their food and transportation
needs when band resources were already
stretched to their limit.
The need to put experienced and
inexperienced crew on the line together
put a strain on the only two veteran crew
leads. Without knowing where the funding
was going to come from, one of the
band councillors set up certification for
emergency crew members within the first
couple of weeks.
Many reported that Yunesit’in’s
infrastructure, food, and equipment needs
were not taken seriously at the EOC or
the Fire Centre in Alexis Creek. The band
office stepped in. As one staff reported,
“we were kind of like an EOC here.” Due
to an issue with the generators, they did
this without power for the first few days.
Band staff and Council members—and
sometimes their family members—were
enlisted to buy essential equipment on their
own credit cards, or float expenses through
YDE. This included two trucks, thousands
of feet of hose, cat loops, radios, sprinklers,
shovels, etc. When Williams Lake ran out
of supplies, equipment was “coming from
all over the place,” including Kamloops,
Quesnel, Prince George, and Alberta.
Sometimes, when they had no pumps, they
had to rely on the existing reservoir and
hydrants, running the water supply low,
and at one point letting out a dam in place
for irrigation. As the Response Coordinator,
Ryan Grady, recalled, “The community
received no support from the provincial
government probably for the first month.
The big struggle was getting fuel for work
trucks, fuel for the skidders, fuel for the
community and food.”
Indeed, food would become a major source
of tension. “The fire station in Alexis Creek

was being very prejudice against our
firefighters from this reserve here,” refusing
to provide them food or other supports,
despite their being contractually entitled
to those things after the first 24 hours of
an emergency. In any case, it didn’t make
sense for Yunesit’in crews to drive to Alexis
Creek for each meal at the end of a long
work day, and risk getting stopped at a
roadblock. Ultimately, the band had to
purchase, transport, prepare, and supply
food to crews and other community
members, all out of the Yunesit’in band
office. Food was either donated from Red
Cross, donated from individuals’ deep
freezes, taken from storage at the school,
or bought by leadership, staff, and family
members from other cities. Before the
generator was up and running, 10 cooks
utilized just six two-burner Coleman stoves
to prepare food for 100 people.
Despite these impediments, in the end it
was important for people to come together
to eat at the band office. It gave them the
opportunity share knowledge of the land
and wildfire.

“You know in First Nations
communities, food is a way of
gathering, food is a way of getting
knowledge from each other and
helping each other and just sharing
stuff or planning and just being
together.”
Councillor Jessica
Setah-Alphonse
There were challenging—though sometimes
positive—dynamics with the wildfire personnel brought in from outside the community. A blatant disregard of Yunesit’in
stewardship and knowledge of the land
became a theme with Ministry personnel.
Sadly, this meant that the location of cabins
used as hunting, fishing, and berry-picking
outposts were not protected and many were
lost in the fires. Meanwhile, the Yunesit’in
crews often had to advocate for themselves
so that they were not first to be relieved of
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work. One of the Ministry’s machine managers recognized this, going so far as to
acknowledge they’re “the sovereign people”
and should be in charge, not pushed out of
the way. Unfortunately, this manager was an
exception to the rule.
There grew to be a deep mistrust and suspicion of outsider crews’ seeming disregard
for the territory, fuelled by their delayed or
insufficient tree falling, and especially their
excessive prescribed burning. It seemed
they had no respect for the land.

“They are going to go home
somewhere else and they won’t
have to look at what’s left
over... the feeling of the land, the
appreciation for what was
here… they don’t have any
feeling what so ever.”
DUANE HINK
There was one crew member from a
ministry unit who bragged openly about
burning a thousand hectares, since there
weren’t enough resources to patrol that
area. As incidents like this continued,
Yunesit’in crews suspected they weren’t
abiding the proper burn-off protocol,
which the Yunesit’in community knew from
long-standing experience with prescribed
burning. Worse, some people became
suspicious that they were stoking the fires
around the reserve intentionally, or letting
them burn while they prioritized elsewhere.
Proper forest management practices should
include burning pine beetle trees in the
winter to not let forest fuels build up. As
one community member said, “our people
have always told Forestry and Ministry
people that.”
Nevertheless, outsider crews came to rely
on Yunesit’in’s strong coordination and
land-based knowledge. In addition to
coordinating with EFF and CRD crews, the
Response Coordinator would meet regularly
with the Incident Commander, who would
change every 14 days. The crews were
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invited to Alexis Creek for daily briefings
if necessary, and were invited to CRD
Incident Command before it was evacuated.
One area where there seemed to be a
universal lack of clarity was the role of
the military. Both crews, staff, and citizens
perceived that the reinforcements were a
waste of resources, capacity and specialized
equipment. While they were purportedly
trained, they tended to leave hot spots
behind, requiring community crews to
follow after them. Communication was a
challenge because only the main officers
seemed to have any authority to speak,
while the others, those on the ground,
“wouldn’t listen.” In fact, some citizens
reported feeling as though they were
under additional scrutiny by the military,
particularly in the midst of the conflict over
the Taseko Mines Ltd. proposal, to which
the community is vehemently opposed.
Yunesit’in’s experience of the 2017 wildfires
cannot be understood without mention
of July 17th, the night that the Yunesit’in
crews saved the community. They had some
warning the day before, as all indications
showed that the fire would make a push
towards their main reserve. Predicting that
the winds would shift around noon, the
crew lead advocated that the crews stay
on the line all day. As the fire neared the
reserve, all of the crews were brought to
a field down below the community burial
grounds, and told to stand down and
get ready to evacuate. At this point, the
community crews broke rank and resolved
to defend the community. Starting with 25
crew members from Yunesit’in, they were
joined by an additional 10 from Tl’etinqox,
as well as some local ranchers who came
to help. By the time they set up safety
guards, wet down houses, and made sure
everyone had left, the fire pushed towards
a subdivision on the other reserve, having
to turn their attention there. They cut a
path to lay hose towards the creek above
the reserve, set up a pump, and laid hoses
wherever needed. By the end of the night
no houses were lost.
The worst injury of the wildfire season
occurred the next evening. The firefighting
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Hanceville Fire View From Yunesit’in Residence
Photograph By: James Smith

crew members had faced overwhelming
physical and mental demands. Some of
the citizens were unequipped to manage
their stress in a healthy and supported
manner. An impaired driving accident
left one member paralysed. Without truck
insurance, and off work hours, this has been
an emotionally harrowing experience for
family and community, and it has also been
financially stressful and onerous to sort out.
This proved true for the two, much more
minor, incidents that also occurred, both
of which were made more complicated
by the bureaucratic and communication
challenges plaguing the wildfire season. In
the first, a crew member got his arm caught
in a skidder fan and had to be transported
to Kamloops, BC to get treatment, and
was off work for 10 months. In another,
the crew lead flipped a truck while driving
along roads that were soft from the fires
and broken up by the heavy machinery
constantly driving over them. While his
injuries were minor, the decision to fly him
to Prince George left him stranded there
until extended family could pick him up.
While the crews were kept mostly on
the reserve for the first couple of weeks,
without sufficient equipment they couldn’t
accomplish much. After that, they were

often deployed elsewhere, even if another
crew—often the EFF—was sent to Yunesit’in,
or close by on the Hanceville fire. Being
deployed to lower-priority areas gave the
impression that their knowledge and skills
were undervalued, causing frustration and
low morale. Holdups at the provincial level
only exacerbated this. For example, quite
a few of the crew have tree falling skills,
so the YDE submitted a standing offer for
danger tree falling. However, when the
one person in the Province who could
approve contracts went away for 10 days,
contracting came to a standstill.
A relationship that may have strengthened
as a result of the wildfires is that of
Yunesit’in and its surrounding, nonIndigenous neighbours. Yunesit’in crews
and citizens helped to protect neighbouring
ranches and have helped to rebuild those
that were lost. In turn, the crews borrowed
or repaired machinery at those ranches,
some of whom never had a relationship
with the community before. When the
community organized a clean-up of all
the debris in order to get the irrigation
flowing—which is shared among Tsilhqot’in
and non-Tsilhqot’in neighbours—quite a
few ranchers showed up.
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“That’s the first time I’ve seen
everyone coming together… I
think that’s the start of building
a relationship... Hopefully it’s a
continuous thing.”

the Chief had ordered everyone to evacuate
thus invoking the Chief’s authority without
his consultation. As one Elder reported,
RCMP officers didn’t seem to care if people
had no way of leaving. After these reports,
one Councillor ended up taking this up
with a Constable. The Councillor suggested
that, at the very least, RCMP officers should
have a community member who speaks
Tsilhqot’in accompany them door-to-door.

Councillor Jessica
Setah-Alphonse

Evacuation
Evacuation became a messy affair for
Yunesit’in. The ethic and objective behind
the BCR to evacuate was deliberate: it
should be implemented in a moderate way,
by preparing most people to evacuate,
while allowing flexibility so that citizens
had agency in deciding if and when to
leave. This seemed like a solution that
was sensitive to different cultural and
community needs. However, as would
be revealed, neither the Province nor the
RCMP would come to grasp the modest
evacuation procedure the band had laid
out, nor the authority of the band to issue
it in the first place. Without the proper
resources, understanding, or support from
government, its implementation proved
complicated.
Leadership evacuated the community to
set an example but also to look after the
needs of citizens scattered elsewhere. There
was some animosity towards this decision;
however the leadership made this choice
in hopes of putting themselves in the best
position to support the many different needs
of the community. Much of the work they
were doing to advocate for the community
and get supplies was not visible to those
who stayed. Some felt that evacuations
should have been more strongly enforced,
while others disagreed.
However, the RCMP interpreted the BCR
like a standard evacuation order, taking a
hard line and attempting to force people
to leave the reserve. There were multiple
accounts of RCMP officers showing extreme
disrespect for Elders, swearing at them and
yelling at them from outside their homes. It
was also reported that the RCMP stated that

Incentives for people not to evacuate
included: employment opportunities on
reserve such as cooking; apprehension
about evacuating to large, non-Tsilhqot’in
urban centres, where their usual support
networks fell away; the desire to protect
livestock and other animals; and the desire
to protect their homes, belongings, and
land. One staff noted that many of these
are already derelict homes that are long
overdue for renovation or replacement by
INAC. In fact, the band put in a renovation
request two years ago for $2 million, of
which they were only provided $250,000.
Given this lack of support for housing on
reserve, it can hardly be a surprise that
people were skeptical that their homes
would be protected.
Starting from the first day, a large group of
Yunesit’in citizens camped away from the
community fires at nearby Fletcher Lake—a
traditional site for healing, sweats, and trout
fishing. This posed a challenge for Yunesit’in
as it was difficult to connect with the group
to ensure their safety. They were sent food,
supplies, a satellite phone, and a fire crew
member would regularly report to them
warning them as to when they should leave.
Since there was movement to and from the
camp, mostly via backroads, eventually, a
helicopter from the CRD Fire Centre and
a group of RCMP evacuated them. While
the camp did evacuate for a time, some
returned, and others joined those staying on
the reserve.
Initially, about 60 people stayed on the
reserve, including Elders, families, and
other members, many of whom were
not properly prepared for the emergency
situation, aware of tracking protocols or
informed of the risk and responsibilities.
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Without sufficient support from provincial
and federal service agencies, there were
not enough community resources and
services to support them, and this caused
a strain on staff and essential resources
needed for the crews. Staff faced significant
difficulty transporting food, prescriptions,
diapers, medical and other supplies to
the community. While there were two
people administering first aid at the band
office, there was no regular health staff.
Gas was restricted and staff, fire crews,
and citizens were sometimes stuck on the
reserve, or had to transport gas, sometimes
dangerously, from elsewhere.
Many who remained in the community
evacuated on the day the fire encompassed
the reserve, and the total number dropped
to 35. By this time, much of the resources
and services in the evacuation centres had
been exhausted. As the Band Manager
reflected, “the system was there to provide
supports but it was only there for people
who followed the program.” This meant
that people who arrived late had a more
difficult time accessing those supports,
with the band “basically running our
own emergency social services” and
providing food vouchers. For those who had
evacuated on the first day of the fires, the
band arranged for them to spend the night
at Elks Hall in Williams Lake, and after that
the high school. But after Williams Lake
evacuated, people were strewn between
Kamloops and Prince George.
People relayed both positive and negative
experiences at the evacuation centres. On
the negative side, some felt displaced and
uncomfortable in such public and crowded
spaces, particularly those with health
issues. Some felt that the centres were
not culturally sensitive, and recall feeling
scrutinized by volunteers and government
authorities. This proved true when the
band office received three or four phone
calls from the Ministry of Children and
Family Development, who had flagged a
couple of Yunesit’in families in evacuation
centres. In each case, the family had never
had an issue in the community; as the
Band Manager explained, they were under
exceptional strain, and without their regular
child care and support systems. One family

who needed special needs support for their
autistic child found the centre was not
appropriate, and could not provide them
with the proper care.
On the positive side, people felt safe and
taken care of, particularly in Prince George,
where most of the evacuated citizens
stayed together and were accompanied
by one of the band councillors. As Elder
Charleen Brigham-Hink reflected, “it was
okay because we stuck together, we found
other people to have our beds beside, other
people from Stone, [when] we were kind
of scattered at first.” Some remember being
handed supplies as soon as they walked
in: towels, shampoo, snacks, gas vouchers,
etc. Further, there were representatives from
banks, the Red Cross, and Employment
Insurance (EI) there to help people get set
up on EI, or apply for other types of funding
and compensation.
Ultimately, what seemed to be the key
difference was the ability to stick together as
a community, and get consistent advocacy
from the band. In the end, the Chief hired a
coordinator to phone every individual and
offer to get them help, fill out paperwork,
arrange lodgings, etc. Another success
came when some Elders encountered a
volunteer in Williams Lake who spoke
Tsilhqot’in. However, it was not part of the
regular program; rather, it was lucky that the
individual was there at the right time.
Yunesit’in leadership felt the Williams Lake
evacuation order was lifted prematurely,
while it was still dangerously smoky, and
before key services were re-established.
The community took a different approach
and sought to lift its own evacuation order
incrementally until it was safe for more
vulnerable citizens to return. To varying
success, they worked with evacuation
centres to accommodate certain people
longer, including Elders and pregnant
women. However, the shift from evacuation
to alert meant that certain services and
resources, including Red Cross funds, were
suddenly cut off.

Roadblocks
Yunesit’in met numerous challenges with
roadblocks, due to a rotating cast of RCMP
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personnel who had different attitudes towards
the crews, staff, and other citizens trying to
get through. Whenever the fire crews were
held up at roadblocks, multiple people had
to be called upon to intervene. Often, the
crew members’ families would call band staff
to let them know of the situation, who would
then have to track down the right authority to
have it dealt with. The Chief, Band Manager,
the Response Coordinator had to provide
constant “double-verification” to vouch for
people to get through. At one point, the fire
crews were even turned away, preventing
them from getting to the fire line. Once, a
nearby rancher arrived and reprimanded
the RCMP for delaying the crews. And for
a time, the RCMP brought in their former
community liaison, which made things go
more smoothly. However, incidents like these
encouraged the use of back roads, the safety
of which were often unknown.

Decision-Making,
Coordination and
Communication

With so much upheaval, coordination,
communication, and decision-making within
the community itself, among Tsilhqot’in

communities, and with many different
governmental authorities—including EMBC,
CRD, INAC, FNESS, Red Cross, RCMP,
FNHA, and the Military—posed significant
challenges, exacerbating operational gaps
and jurisdictional conflicts, and delaying
information.
While the governments were making
decisions according to a certain hierarchical
order of operations, Yunesit’in uses a
participatory, consensus-based decisionmaking process. This meant that Yunesit’in
would be left out of critical decisions, or
left in the dark on decisions of which it
needed to be involved in. On the one hand,
the non-Indigenous Response Coordinator
reported mainly positive interactions with
the Ministry, whether it was the contract fire
crews, EFF, fire centres, or the permitting
process. However, the Chief reported having
to constantly educate new personnel who
arrived, and repeatedly remind PREOC
where Yunesit’in is situated. Playing gobetween between the community and
government, there were countless examples
of coordination breakdown.
Many of these challenges seemed to arise as
a result of the fact that government agencies

Overlooking Chilcotin River
Photograph By: James Smith
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weren’t receptive to talking to staff or
citizens directly; rather, the Chief was the
sole authority who had any clout. In some
cases, some Yunesit’in staff preferred to
rely on the Chief or the Band Manager for
this, as they feel uncomfortable talking to
government. Clearly, consistent and longterm trust and lines of communication need
to be cultivated, so that in an emergency
situation, those relationships are already
established. One first step was a meeting
held in September 2017, following the fire,
which included nine support agencies and
during which a lot of issues were put on the
table. Quite a few fire crew and citizens
recommended that many more of these
meetings should take place.
Due to evacuations, the band had to
disassemble and re-establish ‘satellite’
offices out of which to run emergency
operations on three different occasions.
They first established themselves at the TNG
negotiations office in Williams Lake, where
they developed an organizational chart
and order of operations. When Williams
Lake was evacuated on July 15th, they
were given a space at Thompson Rivers
University (TRU) in Kamloops. However,
after a battle with TRU’s Wi-Fi, they pulled
out and brought the equipment back to
the reserve. Each move was stressful for
staff, who were already stretched too thin.
Nevertheless, they successfully ran local
emergency operations for the community.
The Chief took on responsibility
for communication, including with
government, community members, media,
and the public. On the reserve, only one
household with access to a generator
had Wi-Fi, and this became the de facto
communications hub. Facebook played
an important role in providing updates.
However, any lapse in updates would fuel
rumours and misinformation, so posting
regularly became a priority. Local media
also began to rely on Yunesit’in’s posts for
updates on the situation, and even used
photos from members’ personal pages in
their news stories. Keeping up with media
requests proved too onerous on the Chief’s
time, and hiring a media liaison would have
been beneficial.

It became the responsibility of one
councillor to keep track of where people
were and how they were faring, relying
on scouts in Prince George, Quesnel,
and Kamloops to report back on who was
where. With people constantly moving
around, the councillor would get calls
all hours of day and night, from people
trying to track down their family members.
In addition to advocating for their needs,
wherever they may be, the band had to
make sure that those on social assistance—
about 40-50 people—were still receiving
funds.
Coordination with other Tsilhqot’in
communities was also a challenge.
Inundated with emergency burdens,
each community operated largely in
isolation from each other, and knowledge
sharing, even around the bureaucratic and
financial processes, was limited. There
were successes when the nation did come
together. TNG set up daily calls, during
which each community could check in, and
talk about any new issues they might be
facing. CRD also set up a conference call,
which would happen back-to-back with the
TNG calls, during which support needs,
weather updates, key contacts, and other
information would be shared.

Recovery

Disaster Compensation
Uncertainty as to which essential expenses
would be reimbursed and by which agency
created significant undue stress. This
had a direct impact on decision-making,
causing leadership to oscillate between
exercising extreme caution, or taking
a financial leap of faith, in hopes that
expenses would eventually be repaid. The
band and YDE had to bankroll expenses—
everything from paying fire crews’ wages, to
equipment, to food, medical supplies, and
accommodations. While they knew that at
least some expenses had to be covered by
EMBC, and that INAC holds federal reserve
funds for these situations, these were not
initially made available. After expending
YDE’s full line of credit, the band had
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to open an additional line of credit as a
backstop. As the Response Coordinator
recalls, “you can’t get paid… as fast as
you spend it, so you are having to bankroll
hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt
just to keep the ball rolling.”

much work for one finance person, who
had to resume regular duties to keep the
band’s operations running. Eventually the
Executive Assistant stepped in, but they
realized they should have hired someone to
take this on.

Despite verbal assurances given to the Chief
from the federal Minister of IndigenousCrown Relations, Carolyn Bennett, that
all expenses would be covered, in reality,
this has not borne out. The process for
reimbursement has taken much longer than
expected, while recovery plans have not
been addressed adequately or in a timely
manner. There are still major portions of
reimbursement and recovery funding that
is outstanding and under review at the
provincial and federal levels, over a year
later.

In making the transition from response
to recovery, Yunesit’in has continued to
gamble on the assumption that funding
that has been promised will eventually
come in, while going into debt in the
meantime. But, for something as simple as
rebuilding fencing, where funding approval
was supposed to expedited, these funds
still had not come through a year after the
fires. In October 2017, the community had
to apply for funding from the Provincial
government to hire a Recovery Manager.
By October 2018 the funding still had not
been provided to Yunesit’in. After going
into debt to draft a Recovery Plan, the Band
Manager had to lay off those he had hired
to help him draft that plan. Recovery work
is hugely time consuming, and the Band
Manager still spends almost 50% of his
time towards it. In large part, this is because
recovery funds are still in negotiation with
the Province. Leadership had hoped this
would be funded well before summer 2018,
so the community could begin preparations
for the next fire season. Instead, the
government continues to negotiate down
the community’s Recovery Plan—an
extensive and thorough document, which
was drafted in close consultation with
Yunesit’in leadership and membership.

Once the wildfires were better under
control, financial scrutiny tightened
up. Everything that was spent has come
under a microscope. With a new finance
representative every 12 days, each has
different expectations and a different
interpretation of the same form. The
Response Coordinator often had to resubmit
everything, or face the Wildfire Branch
unilaterally reinterpreting the timesheets he
submitted.
Conflicting instructions from FNESS, EMBC,
and INAC caused staff to re-write and resubmit reimbursement forms on multiple
occasions. After hours of wasted work and
frustration, by late September an individual
from each of the three agencies visited the
band office to guide Yunesit’in through the
forms. However, a box of invoices that had
been sent to the Province was lost in the
mail, and staff had to go down to Victoria
with the originals. Others, which INAC took
with them from the band office are still
outstanding, and it is unclear where they
are. Yunesit’in did receive a “first batch”
of reimbursement funding in December,
for emergency on-call staff, including
cooks and security. However, they haven’t
received anything for the second batch,
which includes supplies and equipment,
and still a third and fourth batch are also
outstanding. Ultimately, this was far too

Rehabilitation
Yunesit’in is participating in the
rehabilitation work that has begun on
Crown land though a joint venture
between the two communities of Yunesit’in
and Tl’esqox and a local firm, Celtic
Engineering. The company, Elhdaqox, holds
a contract to lead rehabilitation in one of
the “zones” of the Hanceville fire complex.
However, without a territorial land use plan,
leadership feels this work lacks long-term
vision, according to Tsilhqot’in authority.
In the meantime, Federal funding has
not been set up for comprehensive
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Fields Surrounding Yunesit’in
Photograph By: James Smith

rehabilitation work on reserves. While certain projects have begun, money seems to
come slower on reserves, and in bits and pieces. Not knowing whether or when funding
is coming, planning becomes impossible, and there are missed economic opportunities,
particularly now that the field season is over. Again, they had to spend YDE money or ask
the band to borrow money, paying interest on it, just to make repairs, buy hay, and cut
firewood. There is a strong desire for the community to set its own priorities and choose
the groups it collaborates with in rehabilitation work. While certain areas have been
identified and prescriptions written, there are still lots of decisions to be made, and a lack
of clear expectations from the federal government prolongs this uncertainty.

Other Community Impacts
Over a year later, the cultural impacts of the wildfires are still coming to light. The
community members rely on traditional foods, including fish and deer, and so, as one
councillor put it, “not being able to go out and practice that, so that really affected the
yearly supply of food for our people and our community members.” Compounded with
the loss of the foods they had frozen from previous seasons, many households were
driven to depend on food donations. Meanwhile, things have become more dangerous
on reserve, with more cougar, grizzly and brown bear sightings, in search of prey. While
the vast majority berry and plant bushes are gone—including those traditionally used as
medicine—the community was lucky in that the area people traditionally gather tea didn’t
burn.
Water treatment continues to be a huge concern, and the community had to implement a
boil water advisory until long after the evacuation was lifted. The fire season proved that
the need to repair the existing reservoir and water treatment plant and expand its capacity
is urgent. However, INAC has only committed to repairing the damage directly caused by
the 2017 wildfires, not to improving the facility to properly meet the community’s needs,
particularly in the case of a future fire.
There have been residual impacts on other areas of community development as well,
including delayed projects such as school and greenhouse construction, which band
leadership then has to justify to its funding agencies. Meanwhile, with so many fences
burnt and delays in the recovery programs to rebuild them, loose livestock have eaten up
the hay they people rely on for income, causing lost revenue.
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Mental Health and Community Wellbeing
cultural activities and recovery—only
In addition to the ongoing and chronic
received half the funding requested by the
physical health impacts of the wildfire
band.
smoke, residual trauma has created an
acute need for mental health supports,
Part of the work that needs to be done
addictions counselling, and community
is also to mark the
healing. There is
“If we aren’t taught these ceremonial element and
evidence of PTSD
both among those who
reflections and how to look at importance of fire in
Tsilhqot’in culture.
were working outside
things
you
might
not
have
seen
community and those
who stayed and were
some of the blessings that came Indeed, while the depth
the community’s
exposed to the wildfire,
along with it; it just seemed of
resilience was
as each experience was
like chaos.”
demonstrated, and there
traumatic for different
is a profound sense
reasons. Burn out was a
of pride in what the
Duane Hink
big issue for those who
community was able to
were working through
do
together,
some
of
the lessons, including
the fires, many of whom haven’t had a
the cultural and spiritual significance may
break since. Unfortunately, one healing
have been missed.
initiative—a horse-riding trip focused on

Mitigation and Preparedness
Infrastructure and Capacity
While there was an existing emergency
management plan going into the wildfires—
and a comprehensive one at that—the
community was not prepared for an event
of this magnitude. The existing plan needs
careful review to reveal where it did work,
where it fell short, which contacts need to
be updated and any other adjustments that
need to be made. But most importantly, it
must be made as clear as possible so that a
diversity of community members are able
to implement it, including, but not limited
to, the addition of templates for evacuation
orders and alerts and procedures for
checking on Elders.
Further, leadership, staff, and citizens all
need training and education to prepare for
the next emergency. But this needs to be
accompanied by more holistic strategic
planning and year-round capacity building
at the community level so that both
leadership and citizens feel better prepared
and more secure going into future wildfires.
The fire crews have to maintain updated

training and certifications and continually
record lessons learnt from the wildfire
experience.
In addition to capacity building, the band
has the need for an expanded credit limit,
and/or assurance that it has expedient
access to emergency reserve funds.
Preparedness should also include planning
around flooding and landslides as a result
of wildfires. Finally, the community has
identified a long list of hard infrastructure
and equipment that is needed. Staff and
leadership are unanimous in the opinion
that it would be better for the band office
to own this equipment, rather than having
to wait for Ministry to provide supplies or
approval.
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“We did all that, without a lot of help, and I think
the real pat on that back is that… disaster brings out the best
and worst, people pull together and the staff for sure pull[ed] together.”
Dwayne Emerson
Yunesit’in Band Manager

Fires Burning Behind Yunesit’in Residences
Photograph By: James Smith

Yunesit’in Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Achieved collective and consensus decision making despite leadership being strewn
throughout the Province, and despite moving offices three times.
Set out clear roles and responsibilities among Chief and Council and staff.
Established an ad hoc ‘ops centre’ out of the band office.
Initiated and managed community-led wildfire response, by drawing on strong coordination
and land-based knowledge.
Smoothly rolled forestry crews into fire crews and arranged training and certification.
Assembled fire crews with a mixture of experience, including veteran crew members who
could provide mentorship to those with less experience.
Provided essential services, support, and food to fire crews and citizens who stayed on the
reserve.
Developed a culturally-appropriate approach to evacuation and re-entry.
Communicated with, supported, and advocated for evacuated citizens in Prince George and
Kamloops, and when possible stayed together and provided accompaniment.
Bankrolled all expenses despite uncertainty as to how and when they would be reimbursed.
Provided constant, up-to-date information to citizens, media, TNG, and other levels of
government.
Liaised with all levels of government on response and recovery.
Strengthened relationships with non-Tsilhqot’in neighbours, and worked together to rebuild
ranches and clean up debris.
Effectively asserted, maintained, and practiced community leadership and authority in all
aspects of wildfire response, community services, and recovery.
Gained a network of governmental and local contacts.
Brought in key assets and services, such as FNESS, early on in the emergency.
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Tl’esqox First Nation
Toosey First Nation

Riske Creek Complex Wildfire
Photograph By: James McLure

T

l’esqox is located 40 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC Due to the proximity to Williams
Lake, BC the citizens can easily travel to the city for employment, supplies and education.

The population on and off reserve of registered citizens is over 360 people. The majority of the
citizens reside on Tl’esqox IR#1, the closest reserve to Highway 20. There are a few homes located
on IR#2, which is farther from the main reserve and also bordered by the Chilcotin Military Block
– Lot 7741. Tl’esqox has had longstanding conflicts with the Department of National Defense
and the operations that take place on the military block. There have been several documented
requests for the ordinances to be cleaned up and a complete transfer of land returned to Tl’esqox.
Two other reserves, IR#1A and 3 make up the remaining reserves identified by the Indian Act.
However, Elders’ teachings have indicated that larger parcels of lands that Tl’esqox citizens
dwelled on or used have been omitted from records and that they do not agree with lines
segregating their communities.
Tl’esqox is associated with two Nation-level organizations - the Tsilhqot’in National Government
and the Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council. Tl’esqox is not a signatory to the Aboriginal Fishing
Agreement with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and had not entered a Community
Tripartite Agreement (CTA) with Province and Federal Government for policing on the reserve.
Much work needs to be done to strengthen the relationship between Tl’esqox and the BC and
Canadian Governments.
The community’s public works, band-operated gas station and convenience store are run through
Toosey Enterprises. Chilcotin Plateau Enterprise Ltd., a forestry silviculture company, runs many
of the business operations at the Toosey Old School. The Toosey Old School, an ‘old school’
renovated in 2014 to become a multi-use building that houses trades, skills training, meeting
rental space, sawmilling operations and various business operations generates significant
employment and revenue for the community.
A new health centre and band office was constructed and has a kitchen and meeting space.
Most recently in the summer of 2018 the community opened a new multigenerational community
learning centre. The learning space will house children, youth, adults and Elders in an integrated
learning and culturally-responsive atmosphere.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
The community with the majority of dwellings in Tl’esqox lies within grasslands. There are
patches of aspen north and east of the community and some are within a few metres of
infrastructure. North east of the community Douglas fir, low-to-moderate in density, covers a
smaller area and is mostly distant from structures.
Douglas fir stands create significant forest cover approximately 1km west of the main reserve
and surround the other reserves. Although this forest partially burnt in 2017 Riske Creek
Complex fire there are still significant areas that remain heavily forested.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

The Tl’esqox Experience
a central place for gathering. The leadership
On the evening of July 7, 2017, the
established a list of citizens that would
community received an alarming call
need to travel to and from the community
from the British Columbia Wildfire Service
to provide essential services because
that Tl’esqox was under evacuation alert.
roadblocks were already underway.
The leadership met initially together
and then with staff to devise a plan.
The Toosey Old School was opened to
Overlooking the community’s outdated
provide a base location to muster and
emergency operations plan, made many
develop an approach
years previously, the
“In each community we came
to fight the fires. The
leadership addressed
together to fight
site was equipped with
the emergency in real
the wildfires and provide services basic services necessary
time.
to our people.
to operate as a pop-up
emergency operations
On that same day, a
The fire mobilized us, building
centre.
fire northeast of the
strength. We will always
Williams Lake Airport
be here to protect our land and help After mere hours, it
caused the evacuation
one another to do that.
became clear that the
of the airport and the
community and local
Cariboo Fire Centre.
The Nation has become even
residents were on their
The Cariboo Fire Centre
stronger
now.”
own. Craig Kennedy,
made an announcement
the Manager of Toosey
that they were forced
Old School, connected
to log off from their
Chief FRANCIS LACEESE
with wildfire personnel
communication
and received acknowledgement that the
channels even though multiple fires were
community would not receive support
progressing. Their last message, before the
Fire Service went dark, included instruction from them at that time and therefore
the government gave authorization to
to wildfire interface crews to do the best
implement an industry-led fire suppression
that they can and to stay safe.
strategy. Toosey, supported by local
residents and business operators equipped
Tl’esqox’s wildfire personnel were
with heavy-duty machinery and a locally
dispatched to assist in the fires surrounding
owned helicopter started by building a fire
Williams Lake, moving them away from
guard around the Riske Creek Complex
the community. Meals were not provided
Fire. After one week they finally received
to them, so support staff was sent in to
cook for them for one week. The on-reserve external assistance.
health and band office was opened to
provide supports to their citizens and act as At the Toosey Old School, they were able
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Riske Creek Residents Assisting with Moving Livestock

Photograph By: Monica Lamb-Yorski - Williams Lake Tribune
on the roofs of houses, water hoses were
to provide an extensive array of services:
hooked up and tested, and yards were
providing meals, unloading trucks with
cleared from debris.
heavy duty equipment, and connectivity
via phones and internet. The site also had
On the evening of July 11, 2017, the Chief
safe and secure storage spaces, large areas
for gathering to eat, and a backup generator and Council signed an evacuation order. A
number of police
powerful enough for
the whole school.
“To hear the last announcement from cruisers drove
to give
Staff were actively
the BC Wildfire Cariboo Fire Centre that door-to-door
citizens notice. A
working to assist
they were signing off and that we were council member
by whatever means
all on our own was striking.
had offered to assist
necessary.
by talking with each
household and
For days, Kennedy
I was really proud of our crew, they
sought a contract
really managed well. They were the first accompanying the
to host a fire camp,
to go in when the Cariboo Fire Centre RCMP to provide
translation services
but it was difficult
was
evacuated.
Throughout
the
entire
and a familiar face,
to overcome the
summer we had 30 firefighters working so as not to scare
perception that
around the clock.”
the home owners.
the community
At each house, the
was ill-equipped
council member
to administer the
craig kennedy
spoke with citizens,
services necessary.
Toosey old school manager
not knowing that
Invaluable time
at the same time
was wasted
ribbons were being placed on porches
on persuading government officials to
to represent which houses had children
understand the capabilities of staff at the
in them, for apprehension purposes if
Toosey Old School were credible.
necessary.
Meanwhile, in the community, various tasks
These acts further strained Tl’esqox’s
to safeguard buildings and dwellings were
relationship with the RCMP. A Community
being conducted. Sprinklers were placed
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Tripartite Agreement (CTA) which would
enable the RCMP to provide services
on the reserve with a memorandum of
understanding has never been signed by
the community. Reconciliation efforts
are required as well as strong protocols
need to be established before the Tl’esqox
leadership feel comfortable with these types
of agreements.

Centres in the cities of Prince George
and Kamloops to attend to citizens’
needs and keep in constant contact with
those who remained. This was a busy job
because people needed phone access,
transportation, and assistance with
completing forms.

On July 20, 2018, the Toosey Old School
was finally contracted to operate as a fire
Tl’esqox leadership has expressed that they camp. Various wildfire crews were already
using the site, which established a basis
would not sign an evacuation order again
unless it contained a recognition of Tl’esqox for the decision. Camp facilities, complete
with wash trailers, a
authority over their
kitchen, and sleeping
people and does not
“I feel very upset that
enable arrests or child
the RCMP placed ribbons on houses quarters were
to the site.
apprehension.
without my knowledge of what they delivered
The camp housed 250
were doing. The RCMP were deceitful people.
After the evacuation
to me and my people were upset with
on July 11th, a
Initially, the Toosey
smaller delegation of
me – they thought I was actively
Tl’esqox leadership
assisting the RCMP with plotting the Old School had
been threatened by
and staff stayed
apprehension of our children.
the wildfires and
behind and operated
risked evacuations.
from the government
We were there to help for our peoples’ Eventually a fire guard
and health office to
keep communication safety and it worked against us. It was was built around the
an abuse of their power.”
building area, and
lines open to field
structural protection
continual calls and
unit crews placed
emails. Immediately,
Councillor Gina Johnny
water bladders and
a community
sprinklers around the
check-in system
whole facility. The system would have saved
was established to ensure that everyone
the building from wildfires, but these were
was tracked regardless of whether they
eventually removed and placed in different
were staying or evacuating. If they chose
areas around the Tsilhqot’in territory.
to travel, the check-in system was alerted
when they arrived at their next destination.
One day, the Cariboo Fire Centre issued
an evacuation order for the Toosey Old
People were asked to refrain from posting
School. The Riske Creek Complex Fire
images of the fire on Facebook to prevent
had already travelled through the area two
spreading unintentional fear. At times,
times at this point. This time, it came back
the images could look more extreme and
and burned through both local residences
closer to the community than they were,
at Riske Creek and Tl’esqox citizen, and
and incited numerous calls from worried
outbuildings. The Toosey Old School was
evacuees who had seen these graphic
providing essential services and Kennedy
images in the media. To provide accurate
later confirmed with the Cariboo Fire
information to citizens, selected staff
Centre that they should not have had to
would travel the roads to assess the fires
frequently throughout the day. If there were evacuate and that the orders were incorrect.
any changes during the evacuation, citizens
Once the fires stabilized, Kennedy
were updated via phone or in person.
held a meeting with Tl’esqox citizens,
neighbouring residents and industryLeadership and staff who needed to
evacuate visited the Emergency Operations led wildfire personnel. Without official
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ministerial wildfire personnel, they
proceeded with a meeting based on the
available maps and the most-current
information. The ever-changing fires
encouraged a constant need to seek as
much information as possible to manage
the risk. This information was so scarce that
even enforcement staff at roadblocks often
sought an update from him.
The fire camp was thought to be both a
blessing and a curse. Once the fire camp
was established at the school, the decisionmaking power had been removed from
those who had been successfully managing
the fire in the industry-led crew.
There was an overwhelming concern that
the fire was exacerbated because new
strategies were employed and backburning
was prioritized without local input.
An additional growing fire camp was
also developed less than 10 kilometres
away. The Toosey Old School Fire Camp
soon began to dwindle in attendance,
without any notice, which became an
inconvenience for logistical planning.
Eventually, the fire protection group slowly
diminished as well. Staff, whose services
were no longer necessary, were encouraged
to apply to the other fire centres, however
they were not hired.
Some community primary functions
continued to operate, while at the same
time, additional processes put added strain
on the remaining staff. Bookkeeping was
maintained to ensure accurate tracking and
reporting.
Initially, to preserve the fuel supply,
the Toosey gas station provided fuel to
residents and workers in moderation. After
appropriate permits were secured, the local
Petro-Canada commercial station continued
regular shipments of fuel, which could be
then sold to everyone without restriction.
Supplies and food from outside of Williams
Lake were delivered to the community and
fire centre.
Tl’esqox cooks and staff were required
to travel to and from the community and
the Toosey Old School, a five-kilometre
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distance, along the highway. Since
enforcement personnel at the roadblocks
were inconsistent, many times these
delivery drivers were denied access. A
substantial amount of effort was put into
obtaining official Cariboo Fire Centre
documentation even when the Tl’esqox
leadership authorization to travel should
have sufficed. The evacuation order reduced
leadership’s ability to provide circumstantial
access to the community. As a result,
community citizens perceived that the
Tsilhqot’in leadership had lost authority,
when in fact, they never stopped providing
services to fight for the protection of their
lands and people.

The Compounded Issues
on the Land
Over fifteen years ago, Chief Francis
Laceese, with other citizens from his
community, blockaded industry at Bald
Mountain from clear cutting a large area.
The dispute ended with a court decision
that the Tl’esqox should work together
with the industry on an acceptable plan for
harvesting.
For years the community maintained its
stand to halt mass resource extraction. But
as a result of the 2017 wildfires, industry
proceeded with accelerated logging
extracting a significant amount of the
salvageable burnt timber. This is frustrating
for leadership since they have long
established their wish to work with industry
to be involved in planning for forest
management within their territory.
The citizens were not surprised that massive
wildfires came, and many expressed dismay
toward the government and industry’s past
management of the forests. Over countless
years, their advice has not been regarded.
The Chilcotin Military block, located within
Tl’esqox caretaker area, was intensively
impacted by the 2017 fires. It has long
since been a concern because the dense fir
belt was thought to be stressed by military
activity throughout the years. Tl’esqox
has had a strained relationship with the
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Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) since the
military block restricts access to significant
sites important to the community citizens.
Breakdowns in communication amplified
with the community’s’ discontent with
military activity impacting the forest and
the wildlife. This lead to a disrespectful
relationship between the CAF and Tl’esqox.
Caravans of CAF recruits would travel to
the training grounds during the evenings
without giving notice to the community
for training endeavors. Senior officials that
did speak with Tl’esqox leadership would

turnover quickly and therefore a consistent
interaction could not be maintained.
Additionally, significant amounts of
technical information would be sent to
Tl’esqox without the funding to review the
documents appropriately.
In recent years, the CAF has made attempts
to bridge their relationship with Tl’esqox.
They have rented space from the Toosey
Old School to provide simulated military
training and have offered more notice when
travelling to the military block.

“I am considered a criminal under Canadian Law because we
were in court for blockading the military protecting our territory.
The military block is on our title land and we want the ordinates
cleaned up and the land returned to us.
Our people are familiar with the military, but when I saw an army
tank travel down our main reserve road during the wildfires of
2017, it surprised me. Some of our people have bad memories of that
time.
Protocols need to be established for RCMP and military to lay out
our ground rules.”
Chief Francis LaceesE

Tl’esqox Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Established an emergency operation process through consistent Chief and Council
communication.
Established cooking team to support and travel with firefighters since they did not receive
access to meals.
Opened the band office to create a muster point and gathering point for citizens while Chief
and Council assumed roles in emergency management.
Commenced basic emergency operations at the Toosey Old School.
Launched an Industry-led fire suppression strategy with the support of the local residents.
Initiated a BC Wildfire Service Fire Camp offering meals, communication connectivity,
support staff, heavy-duty equipment, large indoor gathering areas and back-up power.
Persuaded BC Wildfire Service to accept the Toosey Old School as a fire camp through
continual advocacy as to the suitability of the infrastructure and services.
Coordinated community approach to working together through an emergency situation (i.e.
prepare houses for wildfire protection, hiring on-call cooks, etc.)
Escorted RCMP through the community when they arrived on the reserve.
Maintained constant communication networks for citizens who were evacuated.
Established a check-in system for citizens who chose to stay and those who chose to
evacuate.
Inhibited negative communication through limiting Tl’esqox citizens from posting graphic
wildfire images which would scare citizens.
Provided updates to community, local non-First Nation residents and enforcement personnel
about the state of the wildfires equipped with detailed and sophisticated maps developed by
Tsilhqot’in National Government.
Maintained fuel services.
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Tsi deldel First Nation
Redstone, Alexis Creek First Nation

Flight Over Chilcotin
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John

T

he Tsi Deldel (Redstone) community is located approximately 177 kilometres west of Williams
Lake on Highway 20. The name of the community depicts the red rocks surrounding the
community. Oral teachings account that the Alexis Creek First Nation, once governed by Chief
Alexis, was located 63 kilometres south on Highway 20 where the township of Alexis Creek, BC is
now located. Once settlers moved in they moved the First Nations peoples to farther west parcels
of land. Nevertheless, Tsi Deldel is situated amongst beautiful mountains, meadows, creeks
and rivers. Tsi Deldel is the second largest Tsilhqot’in community with around 700 people as
registered citizens as well as 38 designated reserves (Indian Act).
Tsi Deldel operates many successful businesses. The numerous economic and social ventures
include Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., Redstone Gas Bar, Crazy Horse Energy Drink, Tsi Del Del
Resources, and ?Eniyud Community Forests. The community hosts the Redstone Rodeo and
Gymkhana yearly, which is a BC Rodeo Association sanctioned event.
Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., a joint venture logging company between Alexis Creek First Nation
and partner Tolko Industries Ltd., established in 1992, has grown to be the largest logging
company in the Williams Lake area.
Tsi Deldel citizens speak their language and practice their culture regularly. Traditional gatherings
are held yearly in the summers where the people hunt, fish and gather, and language and story
teaching is shared.
Within the community, there is a band office, health building, Kindergarten to Grade 9 school,
cultural centre, daycare, gas station, and an outdated and unused fire centre. Many of the citizens
are farmers and ranchers.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
Tsi Del Del’s main inhabited reserve is located on both sides of Highway 20 in the Central
Chilcotin. The Northern part of the community has a grassland buffer for approximately 100
metres and has an open slope dominated by Douglas fir. Surface fuels are moderate-to-light in
both the grasslands and the forested slopes.
South of the highway, the forest fuel within the community is light however on the edge of the
residences forests are within metres of structures. This second growth lodgepole pine forest
has discontinuous crowns and low-to-moderate surface fuels. The many other reserves are
surrounded by older Douglas fir and lodgepole pine forests which have continuous crowns and
an abundance of ladder fuels.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

The Tsi Deldel Experience
While the fires were igniting in several areas
throughout the Central Interior of British
Columbia, the Tsi Deldel community began
to see signs of fires starting to surround their
reserves. The Chezacut fire began on July
7, 2017, approximately 50 kilometres north
east from the reserve. The Kleena Kleene
fire also started that day and was around 40
kilometres further west from the village. The
community was placed on evacuation alert.
In the first three
days, the community
members prepared
for a potential
evacuation.
Efficiencies were
created to eliminate
overlapping duties.
A community
nurse cared for the
medical needs of
the community and
ensured the delivery
of medicines.

Otis Guichon, now Chief of Tsi Deldel,
was a council member at the time and had
worked in operations and maintenance for
years in the community. Chief Guichon’s
initial steps ensured that backup generators
were functioning for the community water
treatment plant, gas bar, and band offices.
Chief Guichon became a point person
for communications with government,
the TNG, and
community members
“We did what we could with what we
at large. Tsi Deldel
had in the community and came together
connected with the
during the 2017 fires. It was a learning
experience and we hope to never go through Cariboo Emergency
Operations Centre
that again.
call-in for daily
updates, and
This past year in 2018, we have been
frequently connected
able to become more involved in
with staff at the
the wildfires. Our logging company
has a skilled workforce and we have many Tsilhqot’in National
Government.
citizens that can do the jobs.

Tsi Deldel will be recognized for
our authority over our lands.”

The Tsi Deldel
Finance Manager
immediately worked
to connect with
A team traveled doorChief OTIS GUICHON
Indigenous and
to-door frequently
Northern Affairs
through the weeks
Canada (INAC) to seek paperwork to access
to collect details of people remaining
the emergency funding from Emergency
in homes, while reinforcing the need to
Management British Columbia (EMBC).
maintain communication in the event of
leaving the area. It was important to discuss Once a State of Emergency was declared
they were able to start this process.
the many restrictions on travel with the
citizens.
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with backup equipment. TDDE manager,
Daily financial transactions were
Phil Theriault connected with the Alexis
maintained to keep the community
Creek Ministry of Forests staff for approval
operational. Financial assistance was
to assist where possible, but to proceed
provided to citizens who were caught in
safely.
between roadblocks and not able to get
to Emergency Response Centres. Supplies
The company employs over 80 staff and
and food were constantly being ordered.
contractors and therefore was able to
In haste, and with several people on
organize efficiently with experienced
the ground, it was difficult to maintain
equipment operators familiar with
all receipts and proofs of payments. At
Tsilhqot’in territory. Through their joint
times, such receipts were misplaced, and
venture partner,
resulted in a loss of
they were able
reimbursement for
“At the beginning, the Puntzi
large portions of
Fire Centre was disorganized, but it was to be to attain permits
to travel back to
expenditures during
expected. On the safety front they did make
Williams Lake
the wildfires.
some sound decisions. The fires were as tall
and for those who
as buildings in some areas. Like it or not, it is
needed it, take
The Redstone Gas
a pretty humbling experience. There would
Bar maintained
have been casualties if we had people out there wildfire training.
services full-time.
without communication or the proper equipment.
Meanwhile,
The gas bar had a
backup generator,
I can see a strong emergency response if there a community
councillor and
and therefore
was a partnership between the people that
previous Chief,
service was not
know the territory and the government – it
Percy Guichon was
interrupted by the
is a complement of skills. At the fire in Kleena
power failures.
Kleene, we built the roads that we logged and coordinating the
Fuel was limited to we should have been considered a bigger asset to wildfire crews and
registering them to
ensure that there
them.”
work on the local
was enough until
fires. This was quite
deliveries were
Phil Theriault, Manager
a process to ensure
stable.
Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd.
that the crews were
established with safety equipment and
As prepared as the community was,
reliable vehicles that were registered with
it was not prepared for an influx of
the BC Wildfire Service.
evacuees relocated from local Tsilhqot’in
communities. Supplies, food, and lodging
Within three days, the Cariboo Fire Centre
essentials were not readily available;
deployed a fire camp in Puntzi Lake,
however, the community pulled together
B.C. However, in Chezacut, the fire was
to offer a comfortable setting for everyone
smaller in comparison and had burned
at the community centre and some were
quietly with little response for one week.
placed within homes in the community.
Ervin Charleyboy, then Chief of Tsi Deldel,
traveled to Chezacut to assess the situation
Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., the largest
logging company in the region, was logging and assisted by extinguishing fire spots
along the road. When he stopped at the
at Minor Lake, BC, at the first signs of
Chezacut Ranch, he was startled to find that
wildfires on July 7, 2017, but lightning
strikes had shut down the operations for the there was no assistance for the residents.
day. The fire began to progress aggressively. He immediately sent Tsi Deldel firefighters
to help them. Heavy duty equipment and
water trucks from the logging company
Equipment had been staged for a few days
on the Tl’etinqox reserve and was available further supported the effort.
immediately when dispatched. The
Several days into the wildfires, a
company foreman with backup equipment
temporary First Nations Liaison Officer
was instructed by Chief Alphonse to create
working at the Puntzi Lake fire camp, by
a fire guard around the Tl’etinqox reserve

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

74

Sun Through the Smoke
Photograph By: TNG
happenstance ran into the Tsi Deldel crew
at the Redstone Gas Bar. His position was
going to be vacant soon and he urged Tsi
Deldel citizens to apply to fill the position.
After lengthy discussions attesting to his
qualifications, Councillor Guichon was
officially named the liaison between the fire
centre and the community.
The Fire Centre’s shift changed every two
weeks, creating a lack of continuity and
follow through. TDDE had company staff,
contractors, and equipment spread between
four fire complexes: Hanceville, Chezacut,
Kleena Kleene, and Anaham Lake. It was
difficult to maintain Safe Certification
protocols and appropriate safety measures
with such a geographical span and different
Incident Commanders at each site. On the
two-week shift turn over, Theriault pulled
the company operators together in one crew

so that he could manage the crews with
safety measures employed by the company.
Even though the company had an extensive
amount of safety gear, vehicles, and heavyduty equipment, they did not have all the
tools necessary to fight fires. The company
suppliers shipped in truckloads of pumps
and hoses. Those that were able to work on
the fires did not have access to vehicles,
but TDDE was able to provide them with
company vehicles, so they could deploy
firefighting crews.
Advice was often given to the provincial
wildfire personnel, however it was not often
not heeded. The community expressed that
they were kept in the dark. For example,
during helicopter flights for aerial views of
the land, community assessors observed
that other aircrafts were backburning in
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areas. Their requests for clarification were
often met with silence.
The fires were moving closer to the logging
site where there was still equipment and
logged wood left from the first day of
the fires. Backburning near the site had
been expressly discouraged by Tsi Deldel
because of the stored equipment, and
the differing climate and mountainous
geography of the region. However, the
request was disregarded. That evening,
the wind changed and TDDE had to work
throughout the night to move equipment
away from the fire. They managed to
move all but one piece of equipment from
harm’s way. As the fire converged on the
site, it burned all around the last piece of
equipment, but remarkably left it intact.
However, weeks’ worth of bunched wood
had burnt in the fire.
Highways were closed, and roadblocks
were set up throughout the Tsi Deldel
community and Williams Lake, yet many
of the community’s citizens had been
constantly fighting the fires and needed
provisions. Chief Ervin Charleyboy met
the RCMP at a roadblock, followed by a
convoy of travelers, and had to exercise his
authority to push through the roadblock.
Later into the wildfires, a helicopter delivery
had dropped off supplies and food.
In the community, Elders were constantly
stressed seeing the fires and the smoke,
but leadership reassured them about the
fire locations and that they were safe from
harm. The Elders community hall was
established as the main communication
hub where people could gather to receive
updated information about the fires and
share meals together.
Enforcement authorities not local to the
area, had made the mistake of issuing
evacuation orders a number of times to
the Tsi Deldel citizens because they did
not understand the difference between the
First Nation community itself and the town
of Alexis Creek, BC Redstone and Alexis
Creek are populated centres, but should
not be confused with the Tsi Deldel (Alexis

Creek/Redstone) First Nation whose Indian
Reserves (I.R.) are located farther west
on Highway 20. These mix-ups were not
simple to work through.
The band office internet was on a server
and with power outages, the staff and
leadership were unable to connect. Many of
the residents had internet through Xplornet,
which is a broadband voice and data
communication company tailored to rural
customers; it is operated through wireless
and satellite networks. The community kept
in contact additionally through Facebook
Messenger.
Tsi Del Del citizens who owned generators
were able to stay at their houses, but others
who did not have power, gathered at the
Cultural Centre so they could cook with
portable propane stoves and BBQs. The
community held gathering activities to bring
their people together.
The Tsilhqot’in National Government
mapping team sent out maps to the
community regularly to show fire
progression in relation to areas of
Tsilhqot’in significance and community
boundaries. The maps were helpful for the
Tsilhqot’in citizens because the locales
were clear, timely, and culturally relevant.

Where Experience Meets
Local Knowledge, The Next
Years
Tsi Deldel has continuously endured
wildfires in the area and has progressively
strengthened the planning and coordination
for such events. In 2018, the TDDE was
designated as a ‘strike-team,’ which
if initiated would pool personnel and
equipment resources into tactical response
for wildfires. They were initiated for eight
fires within their geographical area and had
them extinguished within 48 hours.
Tsi Deldel is confident that they are
prepared to handle the next wildfire but
require additional training, supplies,
equipment and infrastructure.
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Fire Retardant Drop on Highway 20
Photograph By: TNG

Tsi Deldel Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provided a venue for neighbouring First Nation communities when they were evacuated.
Assisted the Tl’etinqox with Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd.’s (TDDE) heavy-duty equipment
support to build fire fuel breaks.
Maintained fuel services.
Received support by TDDE’s joint venture partner to get immediate access to training,
supplies and authorizations.
Persistently advocated to BC Wildfire Service to hire a competent Tsi Deldel leader and
citizen in a First Nation Liaison role.
Assumed control of TDDE equipment and staff over BC Wildfire Service direction to
ensure that safe procedures were maintained, and the entire crew was operating from one
command.
Continued to make recommendations regardless of the fact that they were not being followed
to maintain a consistent voice.
Persisted in local wildfire suppression efforts at the onset of the wildfires while touring local
residences to identify the community and local non-Indigenous neighbours‘ vulnerability.
Advocated for wildfire support for local residents.
Honed emergency management operations within the first three days while preparing for an
evacuation.
Provided medical support and identified prescription and medical needs in the event of
evacuations or abandonment.
Frequented Tsi Deldel citizens homes to maintain communication.
Sustained emergency back-up systems on major infrastructure to ensure the continual
operation.
Appointed main contacts for government, the Nation and community citizens.
Maintained an electronic communication system for evacuated citizens and family despite
the power outages and established a community gathering site for persistent communication.
Advanced community needs through innovative methods.
Established a positive reputation through TDDE in wildfire management and were designated
as an initial ‘strike-team’ in 2018 with 100% success.
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?Esdilagh first
nations government
Alexandria First Nation

Smoke Filled Skies at Fort Alexandria, BC
Photograph By: Richard Lam/PNG - Vancouver Sun

S

ituated between Williams Lake, BC and Quesnel, B.C, ?Esdilagh (Alexandria) is separated by
the Fraser River, and the two main reserves are known as East Side or the West Side.

?Esdilagh has faced many challenges over the years. Houses have not been built on the
community for over 40 years. For many years, until 2004, the citizens could utilize the Marguerite
Ferry to travel across the river to either one of their communities. The ferry was removed,
increasing the community commute. In 2014, the band office, the only building besides the
church at the time, burnt down, losing a plenitude of important records and documentation.
Currently, the band office is located in Quesnel, BC
?Esdilagh citizens have been striving to build back the community, and in 2016 the community
constructed a new health centre. The health centre is utilized as a gathering space as well. In
2018, a youth centre, skating rink, ball diamond, and pump track were built to provide healthy
recreational infrastructure close to home. In addition, for the past two years, the community has
been advancing its agricultural rural development.
Over the past few years, the community has been seeking dependable high-speed internet
connectivity. High speed internet access is necessary to provide the broadband power to run
Telehealth technologies, which not only eliminate travel for specialized health appointments, but
also support public safety services.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
?Esdilagh is located on the east and west side of the Fraser River located between Quesnel, BC
and Williams Lake, BC Forest fuels that surround the community consist of steep and moderately
sloped forest dominated by Douglas fir, aspen and paper birch.
Areas of these forests have been harvested but generally the forests are mature & continuous,
with high crown closure, abundant ladder fuels and moderate-to-high surface fuel loads.
On the west reserve, between the community dwellings and the river, are large irrigated
hayfields on flat bench lands that are densely dominated by Douglas fir on the sloping hills.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

The ?Esdilagh Experience
volunteered to stay to keep the fires away
The ?Esdilagh Band Office, located in
from the main structures and keep the water
Quesnel, BC, fielded emergency calls on
systems operating. The irrigation pump fed
July 7, 2017, which alerted the staff and
water from the river to assist with fighting
leadership that wildfires were developing
the fires surrounding the community.
in close proximity to the west side reserve.
Local non-Indigenous residents banded
Immediately, a team of staff commuted to
together to fight
the community,
“Our priority is toward our people. I sat
the fires that
and while travelling
in
a
number
of
emergency
meetings
with
threatened their
south on West Fraser
government and did not feel that my voice was ranches and homes.
Road, the team
being heard. I would not sit there again unless I Fire personnel
passed through
knew there were protocols in place
performing aerial
many wildfires
that
take
our
leadership
input
into
account.
checks stopped
that were already
over to update
burning. Roadblocks
We have so many issues with emergency
them on the fire
were already
accessibility that I need to see some
development and in
established, and
changes.
The
road
washed
out
between
turn informed them
the team was not
Quesnel
and
the
east
reserve
adding
a
lengthy
that the abundance
permitted to travel
drive for our members. The ferry stopped
of wildfires were
through. They had
in the early 2000’s creating a separation
detrimental to
to find an alternate
between
the
two
reserves
on
them assisting
route to reach the
each
side
of
the
river.
the residents. The
community, leading
residents were on
them closer to the
We need a bridge because when the wildfires their own.
wildfires.

come back again we are at risk. “
					
Chief Victor Roy Stump

Once at the west
side community,
the team worked
diligently to identify who was still there, as
well as remove flammables from around
buildings, and to set sprinklers on and
around the homes. They assisted Elders
with packing and helped transport them
to Quesnel. A wildfire was advancing
rapidly, less than four kilometres southwest
of the reserve. Some of the team members

The band office
was opened as
an emergency
operations centre in Quesnel. Staff
remained in close and constant contact
throughout the day with the team back on
the reserve. The office became the main
communication centre for members, and
the staff turned into an emergency response
team.
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Staff were constantly busy. They
worked with the Canadian Red Cross
to register ?Esdilagh citizens. Blocks of
accommodation were booked for relocated
citizens. ?Esdilagh partnered with Red Bluff
First Nation to coordinate meals and events
at the Red Bluff Quesnel-based community
hall and they offered many activities for
the children and youth. Staff assisted with
hauling supplies, and cooking and cleaning.
The Elders were kept busy. On one occasion
they offered a health and healing day where
a local spa hosted an evacuee program and
healers specializing in trauma were invited.
The healing services were later expressed
as a need throughout the entirety of the
evacuation and after.
Days into the wildfires, the ?Esdilagh
neighbours who remained on their
properties to ward off the fires were low on
supplies for themselves and their livestock.
They were unable to cross the roadblocks to
shop, at risk that they would not be allowed
to go back to their homes. They expressed
that they were made to feel as though they
were irresponsible for staying behind to
care for their livestock and protect their
homes and businesses from the wildfires.
At the same time, ?Esdilagh leadership was
reluctantly provided with access passes to
deliver food and supplies to their citizens
that were left in the community.
After the protection systems were in place
and the wildfire threat had subsided, some
staff maintained the community garden
and carried on daily activities to look after
the homes and buildings. However, the
wildfires had threatened access points on
both sides of the community and the team
was evacuated.
Although there was some animosity towards
the RCMP from the disagreements held
at the roadblocks, the relationship still
grew strong. The RCMP would check in
with ?Esdilagh leadership daily. The RCMP
also escorted an ?Esdilagh parent from
Quesnel to Anahim Lake, BC to retrieve the
child who was visiting family, but became
stranded when the Anahim Lake area was
also evacuated. ?Esdilagh First Nation
expressed gratitude for the respect and
support that they had eventually received.
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From the outset, ?Esdilagh leadership
participated in emergency management
meetings with the local authorities. The
comments and concerns from ?Esdilagh
representatives were not acknowledged,
and suggestions were ignored. Most
notably, leadership expressed animosity
toward the senior fire marshal for this
behaviour. For five meetings, the ?Esdilagh
leadership attempted to have their voices
heard, but stopped attending when they
did not feel it was beneficial anymore. The
meetings were taking time away from the
citizens and other important duties, but
bearing no results.
?Esdilagh felt it was difficult to receive
support and information from the
government. The many bureaucratic silos
made it difficult to seek assistance. They
were met with resistance if the information
they sought was outside of the staff
members’ portfolio.
Furthermore, staff found it particularly
hard to seek financial support for expenses
that were overlooked. The ?Esdilagh First
Nation assisted evacuated citizens with the
purchase of clothing, everyday toiletries,
fuel, and various other daily expenses.
These expenses were financially impossible
for the citizens.
On August 16, 2017, the West Fraser Road
area was downgraded to an alert and
citizens were able to return home. Knowing
that the fires had subsided incredibly and
that the community was out of immediate
danger, the leadership received a permit for
the maintenance and operation manager to
prepare the community water system for the
arrivals.
Once the citizens were back at home,
numerous issues came to light. Citizens
had accumulated expenses and needed
assistance to pay back these debts. Hydro
and phone lines were at risk of being cut off
and even one year later, some Elders have
not been able to recover financially. The
burden has been felt even from the people
who were financially independent because
their employers had laid them off during the
wildfires.
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Continual Impacts From the Wildfires
The work that was put into maintaining the
community garden was highly praised since
the staff were able to provide families with
an abundance of fresh vegetables. The food
in individual freezers had spoiled during the
evacuation due to power outages.
Post-traumatic stress has impacted ?Esdilagh
citizens. The leadership are concerned for
the wellbeing of their elderly because this
type of stress could be especially dangerous
to their health. These issues seem to be
presenting themselves in different ways.
Added sicknesses and unexplained health
issues are increasing.
Since the wildfire of 2017, ?Esdilagh has
been working to conserve the impacted
resources and protect traditional areas
that are culturally significant. In October
of 2017, ?Esdilagh declared a ban on
moose harvesting within its caretaker
area. The moose populations were at
an unprecedented low level prior to the
2017 wildfires, and the wildfires further
16
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devastated the wildlife. As a community,
they encouraged their own citizens who
rely heavily on moose for the majority of
their meals to sacrifice hunting moose for
conservation purposes. Leadership was
disappointed that the government did not
recognize the efforts of the people and
support their efforts with a moratorium on
the Limited Entry Hunt.16
The challenges that the community face
regularly have been recently compounded
by the 2017 Plateau Wildfire. The
community was evacuated for over two
months and is still working to secure
recoveries for their displacement. On May
7, 2018, the West Fraser Road—connecting
?Esdilagh to Quesnel—at the Deep Creek
Hill was severely damaged by a landslide
as a result of the intense wildfire damage to
the forest floors. Recent news reports have
indicated that the road will be closed until
at least 2020.
The community now travels an hour and a

?Esdilagh First Nation Government. ?Esdilagh Declare a Ban on Moose Harvest. 2017, http://www.esdilagh.com/PDF/2017_10_16_
Esdilagh_PressRelease_BanMooseHarvest.pdf
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because of the effects of the wildfires.
half through the detour to get to Quesnel
An endangered pelican species native
– this has increased the commute by an
to the area’s habitat had been negatively
extra 30 minutes each way. Such a detour
impacted. Cultural artifacts within the
has created a significant financial and
area’s traditional burial
emotional strain on
grounds had been
?Esdilagh as they are
“As a community we surrendered
disturbed. The ban was
part of the Northern
our right to hunt moose because the
in place to allow the
Health service area
wildfires had such a negative impact
lands to regenerate.
(situated in Quesnel)
on the species. I see our people daily
While this area was
and their children
struggling from this as a consequence
are enrolled within
and meanwhile BC continued to allow off limits, the Nation
provided permits for
the Quesnel school
an LEH.
other areas within its
district. The bus
territory.17
route has increased
We brought in meat and we had food
in time and children
from the community garden. We put
are spending more
In the event of another
on meals weekly. This is extremely
time away from the
wildfire close to
important to the leadership and staff
community. ?Esdilagh
the community, the
that BC recognize the impact from
had long asked for
leadership and selected
their decisions. The decision makers
the ferry service to be
emergency staff have
in the province are not left hungry.”
reinstated for safety,
decided that they will
Councillor Chad
ease of travel and
not evacuate based
Stump
most importantly to
solely on external
once again restore
source information but
the connection between the communities.
would also consider their own assessment
Recent discussions have reinforced the need of risk before determining the best course
to develop a bridge across the river.
of action. ?Esdilagh staff and leadership feel
comfort in knowing that as a community
In April 2018, within ?Esdilagh traditional
they established a system and can work
territory, the leadership imposed a ban on
united as a team with their neighbours to
mushroom harvesting, restricting activity
handle another emergency of its kind.
within the Castle Rock-Twan Lake area
17

?Esdilagh First Nation Government. No Mushroom Harvest in ?Esdilagh: Castle Rock/Twan Lake South Wildfire Area. 2018, http://
www.esdilagh.com/PDF/Castle%20Rock_TwanLk%20_Mushroom_PSA_APRIL_11[1].pdf

?Esdilagh Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Responded quickly from Quesnel-based Band Office to immediately travel to the community
to support the on-reserve citizens with relocating.
Relocated ?Esdilagh citizens to safe and suitable lodging.
Cleared fuel generating debris away from community houses quickly and as a team.
Established an emergency centre at the Quesnel band office and transformed all staff to
emergency operations.
Partnered with Red Bluff First Nation to provide meals and events for evacuees.
Provided a health day for citizens with trauma support needs.
Established a strong working relationship with the RCMP.
Persisted with attending local authority emergency management meetings and made the
decision to spend time on community needs after advice and recommendations were not
heeded.
Provided consistent communication system with citizens.
Maintained community garden throughout evacuations and the community relied upon the
produce after they returned home.
Launched conservational efforts with restrictions to moose and mushroom harvest within
their traditional territory and enforced restrictions within the community.
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xeni gwet’in first
nations goverNment
Nemiah Valley First Nation

Ministry Firefighters Extinguishing Hot Spots
Photograph By: Jason Payne/PNG - Vancouver Sun

T

he Xeni Gwet’in First Nation is located 250 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC in the
Nemiah Valley or a mere 60 minutes by air from Vancouver, BC The caretaker area of the
Xeni Gwet’in lies between Chilko Lake and Taseko Lake.
The community of Xeni is situated in a rural valley surrounded by snow-capped mountains,
lakes, and glaciers. Public access to the area began after a road was built into the community
in the 1970’s. The community is off the grid; buildings operate with generators, houses rely on
propane, and a telephone system was only connected in 2009. The area is virtually un-touched.
The community’s traditions and culture are strongly intact, and many of the people only speak
only their traditional language. Much of their territory has been declared as a protected area,
designated under the Aboriginal Wilderness Preserve (1989), and the ?Elegesi Qayus Wild
Horse Preserve (2002).
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The Long Road to the Title Lands
The Chilko River is marked by a well-known landmark, “Henry’s Crossing”. In 1989, the “Nemiah
Trapline Action” was brought forward in the Supreme Court of BC to claim Aboriginal rights to
the community trapline in order to protect it from intended logging activities, which would clearcut the Brittany Triangle, a wild horse inhabited area. In 1992, access to the logging development
started with an attempt to build a bridge into the area, at which time Xeni Gwet’in blockaded the
road. By December 1998, the “Brittany Triangle (Tachelach’ed) Action” began with a claim to
approximately 438,000 hectares of land.
A 339-day trial commenced in 2002 and ended in 2007. The court heard the oral history traditional
evidence from the people and also considered information from many historical documents. In
2007, Justice David Vickers ruled that the Tsilhqot’in people have proven rights to the territory
claimed in court and had established Aboriginal title to a part of the land, but he stopped short
of declaring Aboriginal title. This was appealed by BC, Canada, and Tsilhqot’in Nation. In 2012,
the BC Court of Appeal upheld the Aboriginal rights to hunt, trap, and trade in their traditional
territory, but disagreed that Aboriginal title could be proven to anything more than small,
intensively used tracts of land. Therefore the Nation went back to court.
For the first time in Canadian history, on June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously granted a declaration of Aboriginal title to approximately 1900 square kilometres of
land. Aboriginal title includes the rights to control the lands and decide how it should be used.

Transition of Lands Back into the Community Control
Transitioning the land now termed the “Declared Title Area” to full Tsilhqot’in management
and control is a complex and expensive process. Through the Nenqay Deni Accord, a process
to ‘transition’ the lands back to the community is a restorative healing progression that the
community strives to do respectfully. While the transition is underway, financial resources to
manage the lands to the extent necessary are not in place.
A challenge lies in delineating the responsibilities between government and the
Xeni Gwet’in in emergency response and mitigation of risk. The community and
Nation must ensure they have the capacity (human and financial) to manage
such issues as they arise. The Declared Title Area (DTA), since it sits in a grey
area through the transfer of ownership, does not qualify for Provincial funding
to participate in fuel mitigation measures while other First Nation communities
do. This delay in funding leaves the community and its citizens extremely
vulnerable to wildfires. Without the assistance of government funding or alternatively settlement
compensation it is impossible to address suitable land management measures.
British Columbia has accepted responsibility for emergency response and wildfire liability in the
Title Area under the Emergency Response Protocol, 2015. Accordingly, it is in all parties’ interests
to take adequate and proactive measures to mitigate fire risk in the DTA.
The DTA did not burn during the 2017 wildfire season. It is known by the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the
province to be a high-fire risk forest area. While forest management is properly in the jurisdiction
of Xeni Gwet’in and supported by the Tsilhqot’in National Government, capacity issues and an
unwillingness to collaborate on the part of provincial agencies is impeding proper preventive
emergency measures. As a result, the Tsilhqot’in Nation has not had access to the support
needed to develop and implement Forest Management Planning in the DTA. The DTA therefore
continues to pose a significant fire risk within Tsilhqot’in territory and beyond.
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Wildfire Fuel Assessment
In Xeni Gwet’in fuel management is necessary surrounding Konnie Lake and within the dwellings
around Chilko Lake. The forest fuels are the highest, most extensive and continuous than any
other Tsilhqot’in community examined. They consist of high-to-moderate density lodgepole pine
with some woody debris in places.
The fuels are moderate-to-heavy on the western edge of the community centre with a number
of structures in the interface. The eastern side of the community consists of grasslands with
aspen that has some coniferous patches, however on the north and southern side the forests
are dominated with conifer. Vegetation along the valley consists of a variety of hayfields and
wetlands of both herbaceous and shrubby vegetation. The fuels in this area are patchy and
discontinuous, but a number of dwellings are located in and adjacent to the heavier timber
around this open area.
At the west end of Konni Lake, the forest fuel is mixed with low productivity aspen and pine
stands with some dense Douglas fir patches. Surface fuels are light and tree crowns are both
mixed and discontinuous. The eastern half of the north shore of lake is open with grass/
herb vegetation with a number of aspen patches. On the southern side there are continuous
coniferous forests across the entire area, which increase the fuel load.
Robert Gray, Fire Ecologist
R.W. Gray Consulting Ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment

The Xeni Gwet’in Experience
planning to establish evacuation muster
In Xeni Gwet’in, the skies were blue,
areas, prepare water trucks, and validate
and the air was clear of smoke. Because
the GPS points for emergency helicopter
the community is virtually off the grid,
landing sites; all
the power outages
“Our mandate is to protect our land. We emergency protocols
did not affect them.
Although the fires were know how long it has taken to build the were collectively
kilometres away, there communities we have. With the very little decided upon with the
was much work to do. resources we have, we need to fight for the community.

community and our resources since no one
else will.
At the meeting the Xeni

The first signs of fires
Gwet’in Elders decided
began around Williams
We
need
a
relationship
with
our
local
they still wished to
Lake, BC and in the
governments in order for them to
go to the BC Elders
Tsilhqot’in territory on
understand what our values are and
Gathering in Campbell
Friday, July 7, 2017.
support us. We cannot spend all of our River, BC They were
Xeni Gwet’in citizens
time in court, but we also cannot continue escorted through the
became increasingly
to be disrespected on our own land.”
various roadblocks to
concerned that access
Williams Lake, BC to
in and out of their
Chief Jimmy Lulua
meet their chartered
community would be
bus to begin their
obstructed via the one
journey with Elders from their neighbouring
road in. The community of Yunesit’in was
evacuated, and some of their citizens began community, Tl’etinqox First Nation.
arriving in Nemiah Valley and were placed
Xeni Gwet’in citizens still in Williams Lake
with families or in vacant homes.
assisted with transporting livestock to safety,
and shopping for supplies and food to be
Staff within the community reviewed their
delivered to remote communities. When
Emergency Management Plan at the outset
travelling to the community, enforcement
of the wildfires. In a meeting, Xeni began
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the location of Xeni Gwet’in and would
often obstruct all traffic, even those with
TNG-approved passes.
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would be reimbursable if they were
purchased in advance. Advance purchases
were necessary to prepare their teams for
fighting the fire, but they felt overall that the
government was not openly communicating
what they could expend. The community
thus limited their purchases, and in turn
were unable to send more crews out to
assist.

The band office was then transformed into
a communication centre, which would
become a safe place for people to meet. The
gas station, laundry mat, and convenience
store remained open. Because of the
A fire progressed towards the community,
geographic separation between leadership
at the 22-kilometer
and citizens, a private
distance sign along the
Facebook page was created
“I feel the fires could
Nemiah Valley Road. The
to keep the community
have been extinguished
community was told that
connected.
much quicker.
they should prepare for
an evacuation but still
Due to the intensity of the
I heard from people on
the location of the fire
situation, a handful of staff
the fires and some said
was 63 kilometres away.
assumed roles. On the first
at times they didn’t receive
Residents determined that
day, the small group of
direction until noon. They
people available to assist
said they had to sit back and the community was not at
risk. Xeni Gwet’in provided
visited the citizens going
let it burn”
their main firefighting crews
door-to-door. They created
and cooks to support the
a list of residents in each
Councillor James wildfire suppression efforts
house, and determined
Lulua Jr.
and the fire was eventually
what, if any, additional
extinguished. The citizens
rooms were available in
were surprised that wildfire personnel and
case of the need to harbor evacuees from
emergency staff did not appreciate the
other communities. Types of available
location distances and terrain to determine
transportation, vehicle reliability, and fuel
that the community was still very far from
quantities were recorded. A nurse in the
the fire.
community helped with medical support.
The Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers were sent to
assist with day and night fire watches in the Another fire began close to Teztan Biny
other communities and also were stationed (Fish Lake). The community took this
fire into their own hands and the fire
within the higher elevations of the Nemiah
was quickly suppressed. Teztan Biny has
Valley for better views.
profound cultural and spiritual significance
to the Tsilhqot’in people. Uniquely
David Setah, now a councillor for Xeni
abundant with 85,000 rainbow trout, the
Gwet’in, managed the Xeni Gwet’in
site is where Tsilhqot’in people come for
Enterprises and made assessments on the
ceremonial purposes and to hunt, trap, and
status of supplies. He was to determine
gather. The Xeni Gwet’in citizens were not
how long the vehicle fuel would last and
going to wait to see if additional support
how long the community infrastructure
would arrive before attempting to stop
generators could run for without receiving
the fire from decimating an area of such
a delivery of fuel. However, fuel was
significance.
delivered a few weeks after the fires had
started in the Tsilhqot’in.
Part of the Xeni Gwet’in leadership had
accompanied the Elders to the 41st Annual
The Xeni Gwet’in connected with the
Yunesit’in to receive S100 training for some BC Elders Gathering in Campbell River,
and while they were at the gathering, they
of their citizens, and to order supplies.
realized that the magnitude of the fires back
Xeni sought insight into which supplies
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in the Tsilhqot’in was intensifying in the
territory. After the gathering they moved the The conference calls with the Cariboo Fire
Centre were helpful for Xeni Gwet’in to
Elders to Abbotsford, BC and leadership
understand what was happening outside of
and family chaperones worked tirelessly
their caretaker area, so that they could in
to care for the needs of their Elders. When
turn determine their own level of risk.
it became evident that they would not be
able to travel home due to the Williams
The Tsilhqot’in Title Rangers visited each
Lake BC evacuations they had received
home to develop a list
immediate external
“We
have
a
large
land
base
to
of needs from each
support. The Stó:lö
manage but very few resources to
of the 62 households.
First Nation assisted
manage it with.
Provisions and supplies
the Xeni Gwet’in
were then flown into
Elders and leadership
This
is
especially
the
case
the village for the
by arranging rooming
with respect to wildfire management.
citizens. Community
and meal vouchers at
We have very high fuel loads and intact summer students
the affiliated restaurant
forests but to date it has been very
and the Title Rangers
in Abbotsford, BC
difficult
to
find
support
to
help
divided delivery
Fifty-four people were
control fire risk in the Title Lands.
tasks between them,
on the chartered bus
ensuring that everyone,
and 20 rooms were
As a result, the Xeni community and
including homes with
blocked off indefinitely
other
residents
of
the
Title
Lands
are
pets and livestock
for them.
at high risk - forests here could burn
had enough supplies
catastrophically.”
and support. Satellite
The Elders were hosted
phones were also
for dinner by the
John
Lerner,
DTA
Subdelivered in the event
Stó:lö Nation, and The
Table Manager
that other methods of
First Nation Health
communication were
Authority (FNHA)
cut off.
assisted with providing medical support
for the Elders and arranged activities such
The Nemiah Valley was not impacted as
as canning, every other day. The Canadian
significantly as the other five Tsilhqot’in
Red Cross visited the people at their
communities. Still there were wildfires
accommodations, and form filling was a
and later flooding. A growing concern
constant process.
regarding the impact on fish and wildlife
was still at the forefront of people’s minds.
In the community, staff helped people
The extent of the burnt land within the
connect with their families and the Elders
Tsilhqot’in territory will inevitably drive
that were evacuated and unable to travel
people into the declared title area. As this
back to Nemiah Valley. The community
area had not been as impacted additional
felt that it was virtually ignored at times
resources will be required to govern the
during the wildfires but understood that
lands in the title area as a conservational
the focus was on immediately impacted
measure.
communities. Certain staff and leadership
advocated on behalf of their people’s needs
to eventually receive support.

Additional Issues in the Midst of the Wildfires
On July 31, 2017, the Tsilhqot’in Nation
challenged a provincial drilling permit
issued to the Taseko Mines Ltd. on July 14,
2017, in the BC Supreme Court. The permit
would approve extensive drilling, road

clearing, the creation of hundreds of test
pits, and kilometres of seismic lines, right
near Teztan Biny, where the Government
of Canada had already twice rejected the
proposed “Prosperity Project”.

87

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

Tsilhqot’in National Government Loading Supplies for Communities
(Right to Left) Tl’etinqox Councillor Daana Gilpin, Chief Jimmy Lulua, Linda Haig-Brown
Photograph By: Jason Payne/PNG, Vancouver Sun
The proposed project has been a thorn in
the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s side for years as it
has undergone extensive environmental
assessment under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.
For the first time in Canadian history, this
project underwent two environmental
assessments and each time it was deemed
to have significant and immitigable adverse
environmental and cultural impacts that
could not be justified.
Xeni Gwet’in and Tsilhqot’in representatives
appeared in court in Victoria, BC while fires
were still threatening their livelihoods back
at home. One year later, the BC Supreme
Court upheld the permit for Taseko Mines
Ltd. to undertake the drilling program,
however the Tsilhqot’in Nation appealed
the ruling and was granted an injunction
temporarily prohibiting drilling to enable
the court to hear the case.

Shortly after the Elders, leadership, and
chaperones left the court in Victoria, the
evacuation of Williams Lake, BC was lifted.
Part of the group stayed in Abbotsford
due to health issues, to ensure that the
air was cleared from smoke and that the
community had time to prepare for their
homecoming. Various areas flooded along
the Nemiah Valley Road making safe
accessibility an issue. Upgrading the road
to ensure that the road safety has become a
priority.
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The Aftermath of the Wildfires
Campfire bans prohibited drying salmon. Traditional fishing sites were inaccessible. Longestablished medicine and berry grounds were restricted. Hunting ceased. Xeni Gwet’in
citizens feel the consequences now, but also believe that the environment needs a chance
to rest and recover.
Xeni Gwet’in was not on an evacuation order but was obstructed from travelling within
Tsilhqot’in territory or even to Williams Lake, BC due to the emergency road closures.
Virtually stranded, the community felt that they were not acknowledged as being
disadvantaged, however they were still in need of everything from food to medicine.
Workers were prevented from working for months since the wildfires ceased operations of
numerous companies in and around the Tsilhqot’in and Williams Lake, BC Consequently,
these individuals experienced financial impacts. At first it was difficult to receive Red Cross
assistance, so the community still supported their people to bridge the burden.
Before the Nemiah Valley is ever threatened by a wildfire again, extensive planning in
emergency management and fuel management is required to ensure safety. The overall
need in Xeni Gwet’in is for adequate financial resources to manage the Declared Title
Area. Financial resources have a significant impact on developing capacity and managing
the land.

Xeni Gwet’in Best Practices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reviewed emergency management plan at the outset of the wildfires.
Established duties and emergency procedures at a community meeting informed by the
citizens.
Assisted with livestock transportation.
Transported an immediate cache of food and supplies to the community.
Transformed the band office into the main community communication centre.
Created an electronic communication system to inform off-reserve or relocated citizens of
daily events.
Traveled door-to-door to all Xeni Gwet’in citizen homes to establish an inventory of
transportation ability, additional rooms and to determine who was in the community.
Stationed Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers at higher elevations to scout the distance of wildfires in
proximity to the community.
Assessed the fuel and propane supply and determined the days until the supply would run
low.
Collaborated with Yunesit’in to provide training and receive supplies.
Utilized own best judgment when determining the true location of wildfires and the
vulnerability of the community.
Worked with the Stó:lö Nation and First Nation Health Authority to provide safe
accommodation for Elders, events and services.
Assigned summer students to deliver supplies to 62 houses making use of all available staff.
Challenged Provincial drilling permit issued to Taseko Mines Ltd. despite being amid an
extreme emergency situation to advance the community citizens’ continual opposition of the
Prosperity Project.
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CONCLUSION
The 2017 wildfires continue to leave a lasting impact on the Tsilhqot’in people and lands.
Nevertheless, in the face of overwhelming odds, the communities, the Nation and their
neighbours worked together effectively and successfully, demonstrating true expertise and
leadership. Within the Nation, individual differences were set aside, and people united
to work for their common goal. The wildfire tragedy healed long-standing relationship
breakdowns. The strength and amazing capacity for resilience in these rural remote
communities can never be forgotten.
Despite all of the challenges laid out in this report, the wildfires also revealed the strength
of Tsilhqot’in stewardship and exposed important traditional knowledge that can support
the Tsilhqot’in in its goal of playing a central role in land management and long-term
planning at the territorial level. Tsilhqot’in people noted that the forests are their foods
that sustain them. Their traditional structures support and encourage knowledge of the
land and conservational measures. The wildfires took this away. However, there have to
be structures in place that honour this knowledge, which not only make space for, but are
built around community stewardship on the land.
The archeological sites that were exposed as a result of the wildfires need protection
measures and the Tsilhqot’in need the opportunity to expand their knowledge and history
on these sites. These provide a window to learn more about Tsilhqot’in history, heritage,
rights, and title. In this way, the wildfires may provide an opportunity to strengthen
Tsilhqot’in knowledge, to better understand the full story of how Tsilhqot’in lived on the
land prior to colonization, and pass this on to future generations.
The process to recovery in the communities has been taxing on the citizens, staff and
leadership and is also negatively impacting the lands and wildlife that are within the
territory. The recovery process from emergencies is slow, however financial resources
can alleviate the stress on staff who are already significantly overburdened. In addition to
this, the communities require dedicated financial resources to properly prepare for future
emergencies.
The health and safety of the many residents in the Tsilhqot’in, Indigenous and nonIndigenous, were threatened by the 2017 wildfires. The lack of emergency operation
centres and satellite centres in the rural communities revealed the vulnerability that
could impair the entire territory. By several accounts, many areas across the expansive
territory were neglected; however, a very different scenario is possible through progressive
inclusion of local First Nations and residents.
The true strength of the Tsilhqot’in people shone through and demonstrated that the
communities can undeniably unite to take care of their homes, lands and people and they
will voluntarily. In the aftermath of the wildfires of 2017, the mental and physical tolls that
the Tsilhqot’in people have endured through historical oppressions have intensified. The
fires awakened the people marked the earth and animals—these marks have revealed the
dominant colonial practices that the Tsilhqot’in have long resisted.
It is impossible to ignore the systemic problems with a purely government-led emergency
response that was non-inclusive of local First Nations and residents. Nation-wide media
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coverage, matched with several documentaries, oral testimonies and reports have exposed
the urgent demand for a sizably restructured approach to emergency response and
management in the Tsilhqot’in territory.
Overall, management of the lands and resources does not squarely fit in provincial and
federal decision making. A united approach to decision making on the lands where the
Tsilhqot’in have lived since time immemorial is overdue and critical. To finally achieve
this level of respect and recognition would be revolutionary and a true testimony of
reconciliation.
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Executive Summary

Tsilhqot’in Nation in a State of Emergency
The Tsilhqot’in Nation is comprised of six First Nation communities – ?Esdilagh
(Alexandria), Tl’esqox (Toosey), Tl’etinqox (Anaham), Tsi Deldel (Alexis Creek/Redstone),
Xeni Gwet’in (Nemiah) and Yunesit’in (Stone). The Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Tsilhqot’in
National Government (TNG) promote the autonomy of their governance systems and
protect the interest of the Tsilhqot’in citizens’ culture and traditional life.
On July 7, 2017, lightning strikes ignited over one hundred wildfires throughout
the Province of British Columbia. That same evening, Todd Stone, BC Minister of
Transportation, declared a Provincial State of Emergency. That same afternoon citizens of
the Tsilhqot’in Nation had observed a progression of lightning strikes, which led to the
advancement of several wildfires surrounding their communities. At the early stage of the
wildfires, the Tsilhqot’in had no idea what they would have to deal with for well over two
months. At first the communities awaited provincial support, but soon realized that they
would have to take the helm in managing the emergency situation.
The Nation fought relentlessly to protect their homes and community buildings from being
engulfed by the wildfires. The citizens were overextended and endured mental, physical,
emotional and spiritual demands on their health. From the outset, the communities not
only faced the threat of the wildfires, they were met with threats of intimidation by law
enforcement officers to apprehend children from families and to forcibly evacuate or arrest
citizens that chose to not evacuate.
The fires revealed the ongoing struggle between the Tsilhqot’in and the provincial
government over the exercise of jurisdiction in Tsilhqot’in territory. Tsilhqot’in leadership
exercises inherent jurisdiction over Tsilhqot’in territory and people. During the wildfires,
leadership exercised this inherent responsibility to act in the best interest of its citizens and
to protect its traditional territory. The Tsilhqot’in communities worked with local residents
to fend off the Kleena Kleene fire and two of the largest wildfires in 2017— the Plateau
Fire and the Hanceville Complex Fire.
The Tsilhqot’in have deep traditional knowledge of their territory, which they have
inhabited since time immemorial. Their awareness of the lands and weather systems are
part of their daily teachings. Many of the people work on the lands that surround the
communities and make a livelihood because of their familiarity with the terrain. Despite
this, the Tsilhqot’in were underutilized, their jurisdiction was disrespected, and their
knowledge was disregarded and treated with disdain.

Tsilhqot’in Nation Inquiry Into Wildfires
After the 2017 wildfires had subsided and the Tsilhqot’in leadership had time to reflect on
the scope of what their Nation as a whole and their individual communities experienced,
they began their long work to recovery. On Nov. 21, 2017, the Tsilhqot’in National
Government called for a public inquiry into the wildfires stating that the government
agencies failed to acknowledge the Tsilhqot’in Nation — their authority, expertise and
capabilities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation challenged the Provincial and Federal government
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to take a hard look at developing coordinated emergency response efforts integrating
Tsilhqot’in legal authorities.
In April of 2018, the Nation signed a Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement
with both the Federal and Provincial Governments. The agreement was founded
upon establishing emergency response assistance comparable to those availed to nonIndigenous communities, providing safety and security to the First Nation communities.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation compiled a team of experts to capture the wildfire experiences
from their communities, develop a collective set of recommendations and highlight the
best practices in a Tsilhqot’in-led inquiry report — The Fire Awakened Us. The research
team consisted of a cross-section of expertise and perspectives. This included: senior level
Tsilhqot’in National Government staff experienced in negotiations, health, forestry, lands
and resources; community representatives and knowledge holders; as well as external
partners with expertise in disaster management, fire ecology, and disaster law. Over five
months, the team conducted extensive research in each of the communities through
interviews, facilitated Nation and specialized services meetings. In addition, the research
included a review and analysis on the statutory and regulatory laws governing emergency
management for First Nations in British Columbia, an extensive review of existing reports,
a scientific assessment of the wildfire forest fuel risks and community risk vulnerability
assessments.
The report highlights a series of calls to action based upon the core challenges that
the Tsilhqot’in experienced throughout the wildfires. The challenges that the Nation
encountered are a/an:
• Inadequate building and water infrastructure on reserve not at a standard to meet
basic emergency guidelines;
• Lack of respect and acknowledgement toward First Nation leadership and
decision making;
• Complete disregard to community skills, qualifications, and knowledge of the
lands;
• Widespread treatment of inferiority felt by local First Nation and non-First Nation
residents and regional industry experts;
• Tremendous shortage of emergency management financial resources devoted
to First Nation community mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
measures leaving them disproportionately susceptible to risk compared to similar
size non-First Nation communities;
• Shortfall in a collaborative approach by First Nation service agencies to provide
support to the affected communities during the wildfires; and
• Disregard for Tsilhqot’in advice and recommendations on recovery measures
within the Chilcotin provided by Tsilhqot’in.
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The 33-recommendation report outlines infrastructure requirements, pre-disaster
agreements, land-based stabilization measures and dedicated financial resources
through all stages of emergency management. The condensed recommendations are:
1. Developing a centralized
Indigenous-led Emergency Centre
in Tsilhqot’in territory with satellite
sites at each community with
advanced safety and emergency
equipment.
2. Constructing or updating equipped
fire halls in each reserve.

Nation service provider agreement in
the event of an emergency.
13. Launching a progressive framework
contract with British Columbia for
on-the-ground emergency response
within Tsilhqot’in territory.

3. Building gathering spaces and safe
muster areas.

14. Establishing subsidized direct,
ongoing, dependable funding for
training and certification promoting
Tsilhqot’in expertise.

4. Creating an immediate on-reserve
housing & infrastructure strategy
fund to address recovery and basic
needs.

15. Providing subsidized direct funding
for Tsilhqot’in communities to
plan in all areas of emergency
management.

5. Establishing lodging in and around
each community to accommodate
emergency personnel.

16. Establishing subsidized direct
funding for Tsilhqot’in emergency
management personnel.

17. Establishing a subsidized Tsilhqot’in
Association of Emergency
Responders with the responsibility
to coordinate an integrated
Nation-level response emergency
7. Establishing highway signage to
management.
clearly identify community locations.
6. Investing in basic public services
along Highway 20 and Taseko Lake
Road corridor.

8. Widening and maintaining roads to
communities and egress routes.
9. Investing in an extensive and
advanced protocol agreement
that establishes an active and
collaborative leadership role for the
Tsilhqot’in Nation.
10. Ratifying Nation-to-Nation
evacuation location agreements with
First Nation partners.
11. Entering into a Service Agency/
Tsilhqot’in agreement built upon
respect and recognition of Tsilhqot’in
jurisdiction.
12. Developing an inter-agency First

18. Providing direct funding for
Tsilhqot’in-led targeted skills and
employment training and reduction
of barriers to employment initiatives.
19. Crafting a holistic health support
system that includes short-to-mid
and long-term health support
initiatives.
20. Piloting forest fuel reduction
practices with training through
Indigenous-led fuel mitigation
measures.
21. Conducting a Tsilhqot’in-managed
comprehensive study on the Cariboo
Chilcotin forest ecosystem affected
by the wildfires.
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collaborative enforcement efforts
on Tsilhqot’in territory to promote
cultural, economic and ecological
values as the land recovers from
wildfire.

22. Applying joint management methods
to the Tsilhqot’in territory beginning
with the separation from the Williams
Lake Timber Supply Area.
23. Engaging in Tsilhqot’in-led
rehabilitation planning at the territorial
level.
24. Creating a mechanism for tracking
and compensating ongoing cultural
impacts and cumulative impacts.
25. Performing geotechnical work to
stabilize banks, roads and install
culverts in response to wildfire
vegetation damage.
26. Conducting a damage assessment
to archeological sites and creating/
implementing mitigation and
protection measure for sensitive sites.
27. Developing a Tsilhqot’in Economic
Diversification report in anticipation
of the decrease of forestry-related
economics.

29. Establishing a one-stop reimbursement
process for First Nations governments.
30. Reimbursing communities in
accordance with the principle of
building back better to mitigate future
disaster risk.
31. Advancing Tsilhqot’in recovery
requests for financial assistance
towards community rebuilding before
2019 (seventeen months after the 2017
wildfire began).
32. Developing clear financial
arrangements and compensation
measures in advance of the next
emergency.
33. Applying Jordan’s Principle to
emergency management on reserve.

28. Strengthening and expanding
The core challenges highlight a complete disregard for First Nation authority governing
their citizens and the lands on which they reside. These calls to actions are the first
steps to recognizing the role of First Nations governments in leading emergency
response in their own communities and territories.

Perseverance Despite All Odds
The Tsilhqot’in territory, while expansive and remote, is deprived of major emergency
infrastructure, leaving Tsilhqot’in citizens and non-First Nations residents vulnerable to
disasters. The First Nation communities have unsatisfactory basic infrastructure and are not
prepared with a cache of wildfire suppression equipment. Nevertheless, the Tsilhqot’in
commenced culturally-informed emergency operational processes, appointed emergency
operational staff and established wildfire crews immediately. They set up Emergency
Operation Centres, base camps, muster camps and provided food to hundreds of people at
outdoor kitchens operating without electricity.
Despite threats of child apprehension, intimidations of arrests, an overall lack of wildfire
suppression support and cooperation, the Tsilhqot’in communities knew the only way to
protect their homes, community and territory was to assume the responsibility of fighting
the fires.
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The 2017 wildfires and the provincially-led response has had devastating effects on the
Tsilhqot’in people and their lands. As advocates for their citizens and First Nation people,
the Tsilhqot’in Nation has chosen to publicly tell their story and are actively seeking
methods to instill true participation in emergency management that is respectful of their
values and traditions.
This is an opportunity to reconcile government-to-government relationships in an area
that is complex but critical. Advancements to co-management in emergency management
create fundamental building blocks that could be applied to resolving the many First
Nation jurisdictional battles. A transformation in emergency management should be led by
First Nations but supported by the Provincial and Federal Governments to make the most
appropriate and meaningful change. Recognizing First Nation values and decision making
require courage and leadership by all governments.
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Recognizing Tsilhqot’in
Jurisdiction in Emergency Management
Dr. Jocelyn Stacey & Emma Feltes

This appendix analyses the question of jurisdiction arising from the 2017 wildfires that
spread across Tsilhqot’in territory. Jurisdiction answers the question: who has the authority
to govern or decide? The attached report, Nagwedizk’an gwanes gangu ch’inidzed
ganexwilagh; The Fire Awakened Us, notes numerous significant decisions and actions
taken during wildfire response, recovery and mitigation in which the answer to the
question of jurisdiction was unclear or contested. These issues are flagged throughout the
report with the Tsilhqot’in flag.
This appendix addresses those jurisdictional markers that are flagged throughout the
report. It explains the core jurisdictional challenge, source of the jurisdictional ambiguity,
conflict or gap and it elaborates the specific calls to action that are identified as
jurisdictional recommendations.
That the emergency revealed a complex set of jurisdictional issues is a symptom of
the complex legal web in Tsilhqot’in territory. This web creates barriers as well as
opportunities for the exercise of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction. Preparedness for the next
emergency requires British Columbia, Canada and the Tsilhqot’in Nation to collaboratively
and meaningfully work toward addressing fundamental jurisdictional challenges with
respect to land, resources, people, and economic opportunities in Tsilhqot’in territory. This
chapter of the report is one piece of this ongoing collaborative project.
The appendix discusses jurisdictional calls to action in relation to three headings: (1)
Pre-Disaster Agreements, (2) Land Based and Economic Stabilization Measures, and (3)
Dedicated Financial Resources.

Photograph By: TNG

Prime Minister Trudeau Delivered Statement of Exoneration for Tsilhqot’in Chiefs

(Right to Left) Chief Jimmy Lulua, Chief Joe Alphonse, Prime Minister Trudeau, Chief Otis Guichon,
Chief Victor Roy Stump, Chief Francis Laceese and Chief Russell Myers Ross
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Pre-Disaster Agreements
Core Challenge:
First Nations leadership ought to be at the centre of effective and appropriate emergency
management in First Nations communities. This requires the recognition of Indigenous
emergency management laws and practices and the coordination and support of
regional, provincial and federal agencies.
Emergency management in Tsilhqot’in territory is governed by the Tsilhqot’in people’s
inherent jurisdiction over their land, resources and people. It is also governed by
delegated powers exercised under the federal Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. In Tsilhqot’in
territory, emergency management is also governed by local and provincial authorities
exercising powers under the Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111. The federal
government plays a supportive role in emergency management through Emergency
Management Act, SC 2007, c 15.
As described in the report, these overlapping authorities created conflict and confusion.
The failure on the part of regional, provincial and federal agencies to recognize
Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction and expertise left Tsilhqot’in communities and territory vulnerable
to ineffective, disrespectful and traumatic emergency management operations.
Multiple emergency management regimes must be reconciled through respectful, clear
and detailed pre-disaster agreements that honour Tsilhqot’in authority.

CALL TO ACTION 9
Advanced protocol agreements that outline an active and
collaborative leadership role for the Tsilhqot’in Nation
A fundamental step for building on the Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement
(2018) is to establish advanced protocol agreements that place Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction at
the centre of emergency response in Tsilhqot’in communities.
Protocol agreements ought to recommit the parties to a partnership of mutual respect and
understanding. It is clear that in recognizing and maintaining a respectful, collaborative
partnership in emergency management there is no place for threats to force Tsilhqot’in
leaders into decisions that are not in the best interests of their communities in which they
govern.
These advanced protocol agreements should outline how British Columbia and Canada
can play a supporting and coordinated role in Tsilhqot’in emergency management by
outlining the procedures, roles and responsibilities for critical emergency management
decisions such as the declaration of a state of emergency and evacuation orders. When
the Province and Tsilhqot’in leadership agree on evacuation, for example, established
protocols should recognize a tiered approach to relocations with room for Chief & Council
led conditions. Effective emergency management in Tsilhqot’in territory requires advanced
protocol agreements that address jurisdictional coordination at all stages of emergency
management (preparedness, response, recovery and prevention).
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Implementing these protocols will also require updating existing regional, provincial
and federal emergency response policies which currently assume passive involvement
of First Nations governments and deference to provincial decisions. For example, British
Columbia’s Evacuation Operational Guidelines (2009) and Indigenous and Northern
Affairs Canada suggest that Band Councils should have a standing, pre-signed evacuation
order in place, presumably so that it can be invoked automatically whenever a provincial
evacuation order is issued. This effectively neutralizes First Nations’ legal jurisdiction over
evacuations. This policy should be changed to address provincial emergency response
procedures when First Nations communities have assessed their emergency risk exposure
and decided not to evacuate.

Recognition of Tsilhqot’in adaptable emergency measures, orders and
culturally appropriate relocation protocols that differ in form and substance from
regional, provincial and federal actions
Recognition of Tsilhqot’in leadership entails respect for emergency measures that differ
in both form and substance from regional, provincial and federal emergency measures.
Tsilhqot’in leadership implemented innovative emergency measures during the 2017
wildfires. In Tl’etinqox, Chief and Council issued a “relocation order” rather than an
evacuation order. The relocation order directed vulnerable citizens to move to another
Tsilhqot’in community (Tl’etinqox 2017 Wildfire Report). In contrast, an evacuation order
would have required Tl’etinqox members to move to evacuation centres in larger cities.
The relocation order was designed to avoid the harmful effects of the 2009 and 2010
evacuations that were reminiscent of community members’ experiences in Residential
Schools.
In Yunesit’in, after the evacuation order had been downgraded to an alert, Chief
and Council understood that the air quality conditions were too poor for vulnerable
community members to return. In response, they worked to identify vulnerable community
members, and facilitate a staggered re-entry process into the community. This allowed
for continued support for Yunesit’in members, despite the lifting of the evacuation order.
?Esdilagh evacuated their citizens to the city of Quesnel, but only after ensuring that there
were adequate lodging available for their members. While the community evacuated
they made arrangements to ensure that key personnel were enabled entry to maintain the
existing community systems and facilities.
These orders are examples of the exercise of Tsilhqot’in emergency management practices
that can and should be recognized through protocol agreements. They present concrete
opportunities for regional, provincial and federal support in realizing Tsilhqot’in leadership
in emergency response.

Protocols for child protection during emergencies
The threats of child apprehension and preparations for removing children from Tl’esqox
were excessive and disrespectful. If acted upon, they would have undermined the exercise
of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction over emergency management. Notably, Tl’etinqox had in place
a relocation order for vulnerable citizens. This demonstrates that leadership had already
established Tsilhqot’in emergency response plans to protect children during the wildfire.
In light of Canada’s recently announced plan to transfer responsibility for child welfare
from provinces to Indigenous governments, protocols specifically addressing child
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protection during emergencies ought to be developed between the Tsilhqot’in Nation,
Ministry of Child and Family Development and Indigenous Services Canada. These
protocols should delineate the supportive role that the Ministry of Child and Family
Development can play in facilitating the development and implementation of Tsilhqot’in
emergency response measures for the protection of children. To this end, the Tsilhqot’in
Nation notes the existence of detailed yet unimplemented recommendations on improving
child protection services on reserve that provide a strong foundation for moving forward
on this issue.1

Protocols on geographic coordination of wildfire response
that reflect Tsilhqot’in fire crew knowledge of the land
As the report documents, the 2017 wildfire response contained countless missed
opportunities for integrating Tsilhqot’in knowledge of the territory. Moving forward,
protocol agreements that focus on geographic coordination of local fire crews can help
ensure that firefighting expertise is strategically deployed to reflect knowledge of the land.
Protocol agreements can incorporate a tiered approach that prioritizes Tsilhqot’in crew
work in the crews’ home communities; secondarily, elsewhere in Tsilhqot’in territory;
and finally, other locations across the province where additional fire fighting capacity is
needed. Formalized protocols will help ensure that Tsilhqot’in capacity and expertise is
harnessed in a way that protects both Tsilhqot’in communities and the province at large.
Protocols should also address opportunities for collaboration and sharing of technical
expertise on wildfire response to protect Tsilhqot’in lands. The Tsilhqot’in National
Government has significant land-based and technical expertise. The Tsilhqot’in National
Government GIS and mapping team provided detailed and dynamic information on the
fires to Tsilhqot’in communities throughout the 2017 wildfire season. Only at the end of
the 2017 wildfires was this mapping and technical expertise incorporated into wildfire
strategy to minimize or avoid impacts on important cultural sites.
Protocol agreements should immediately establish formalized community liaison
positions within regional and provincial emergency operations for Tsilhqot’in citizens
as an immediate stop-gap measure for the next emergency. This will establish a direct
community-incident commander communication channel as BC, Canada and the
Tsilhqot’in Nation move toward an emergency management model that has significant
First Nations expertise embedded in provincial agencies (see Call to Action 13).

Revision of protocols to ensure that land, resource and wildlife recovery and mitigation
decisions are based on Tsilhqot’in cumulative impacts assessment and
value-based approaches and incorporated into territorial management plans
Moving forward on wildfire recovery requires a commitment by all parties to make
informed decisions that account for cumulative impacts and are respectful of different
value-based systems with respect to land, resources and wildlife. For example, BC’s 2018
Limited Entry Hunt decisions for moose have been based largely on well-developed
studies on the impact of human threats. The Tsilhqot’in Nation opposes this approach
because it has been taken in the absence of a full cumulative impacts assessment of
1

Representative for Children and Youth, Lost in the Shadows: How a Lack of Help Meant a Loss of Hope for One First Nations
Girl (February, 2014); Special Advisor Grand Chief Ed John, Indigenous Resilience, Connectedness and Reunification – From
Root Cases to Root Solutions: A Report on Indigenous Child Welfare in British Columbia (November, 2016).
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human, habitat and non-human predation threats to the moose population. Tsilhqot’in law
accounted for these three pillars of threats identified in the Tsilhqot’in Moose Management
Plan. The Nation has also taken into account the well-established environmental principle
of precaution, which guides decision-making in the absence of full information about
environmental impacts.
The 2018 Moose Co-Management Agreement affirms a partnership between BC and
Tsilhqot’in governments in establishing a moose management framework for 2019. It
remains to be seen whether this co-management agreement will adequately incorporate
and implement Tsilhqot’in cumulative impacts assessment and values with respect to
wildfire in Tsilhqot’in territory.

Call to Action 11
Enter into Service Agency/Tsilhqot’in agreements built on
respect and recognition of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction
At a fundamental and practical level, recognition of Tsilhqot’in leadership requires
that emergency response officials — regional, provincial and federal — have a basic
understanding of Tsilhqot’in communities, including their jurisdiction and governance
structure. Agreements with service agencies must enshrine a commitment to respectful,
ongoing and collaborative working relationships with Tsilhqot’in communities. Building
these relationships is a year-round task, not limited to the fire season.
Agency-specific agreements should establish protocols for entering into the communities
and working with the communities on all matters, including emergency management.
These protocol agreements should mandate cultural awareness and sensitivity training
for all agencies providing services to the community. Training ought to include
fundamental training in Tsilhqot’in governance structures and jurisdiction in order to avoid
confrontation based in misinformation on the part of officials during the 2017 wildfires.
Core Challenges:
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Land Based and Economic Stabilization
Measures
The wildfires revealed a set of fundamental jurisdictional challenges and opportunities
in relation to land and wildlife stewardship. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
British Columbia and the Tsilhqot’in over mushroom harvesting and moose hunting
in Tsilhqot’in territory present case studies in collaboration and conflict. Long-term
rehabilitation efforts and fire mitigation measures present opportunities for collaborative
planning and decision-making throughout Tsilhqot’in territory.
The jurisdictional issues over land and stewardship arising from the 2017 wildfires
are products of the complex jurisdictional web that overlays Tsilhqot’in territory.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises inherent jurisdiction over its territory. Canadian law
recognizes and affirms Tsilhqot’in rights and title in section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. Tsilhqot’in title to a portion of Tsilhqot’in territory was recognized by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 2014. Since this decision, issues of jurisdiction with respect to the
Declared Title Area (DTA) and the rest of Tsilhqot’in territory are guided by Nenqay
Deni Accord (BC and Tsilhqot’in Nation) (NDA)2 and the Letter of Understanding (LOU)3
between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and Canada: January 27, 2017.
2
3

“Nenqay Deni Accord” February 2016, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Nenqay_Deni_Accord.pdf
“Letter of Understanding” January 27, 2017, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2017_01_27_Tsilhqotin_Canada_LOU.pdf

Call to Action 28
Strengthen and expand collaborative enforcement efforts
on Tsilhqot’in Territory to promote cultural, biocultural,
economic and ecological values as land & wildlife recover
from wildfire.
The implementation and enforcement of Tsilhqot’in laws over mushroom harvesting in
the post-fire 2018 mushroom picking season was a tremendous collaborative success. The
successful mushroom permitting scheme was the product of a supportive and collaborative
enforcement relationship between Tsilhqot’in Rangers, provincial conservation officers,
provincial natural resource officers and the RCMP. This model of enforcement cooperation
can serve as a foundation for strengthening and expanding compliance and enforcement
efforts on Tsilhqot’in territory.
The enforcement partnership developed to implement Tsilhqot’in mushroom permitting
law should be formalized and expanded to other areas of land, resource and environment
regulation, including biocultural restoration. Strengthening and enhancing collaborative
enforcement mechanisms appropriately reflect the complex jurisdictional web that
overlays Tsilhqot’in territory.
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Call to Action 23
Engage in rehabilitation and fire mitigation planning at the territorial level with
Tsilhqot’in communities playing an active leadership role.
Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction, extensive land-based knowledge and deep connection to the
land through cultural and subsistence practices all require the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the
communities to play a leading role in forest planning decisions around rehabilitation and
mitigation in the territory. Rehabilitation after the 2017 wildfires has involved opportunities
for some Tsilhqot’in forest companies to take on particular rehabilitation contracts. But the
Tsilhqot’in have not been treated as a collaborative partner in landscape-level planning
decisions taken by British Columbia in Tsilhqot’in territory.
The Nenqay Deni Accord and the Tsilhqot’in Stewardship Agreement set out guiding
principles for an active and collaborative role for Tsilhqot’in leadership in land and
stewardship decision in Tsilhqot’in territory. The Tsilhqot’in National Government calls for
recognition and recommitment to these principles to ensure the Tsilhqot’in Nation has a
key role in determining the vision, priorities and specific decisions that will be taken in its
territory.
The jurisdictional gap with respect to the DTA is acute. As the DTA is in the process
of transition back to full Tsilhqot’in management and control, British Columbia has
committed to continuing to “prepare for and respond to emergencies in around the
Title Area” in accordance with provincial laws, plans and policies under the Emergency
Program Act.4 Moreover, British Columbia has assumed all liability and risks arising from
emergencies within the DTA, as if it were provincial Crown land.5 These provisions in the
agreement speak to emergency preparedness, response and compensation.
Yet, the Emergency Response Protocol is silent on mitigation and prevention. Forests
within the DTA are a known wildfire risk in immediate need of proper forest stewardship
planning and fuel management to mitigate this risk. However, as a result of the transfer
of ownership of the DTA, the Tsilhqot’in National Government and Xeni Gwet’in have
not been able to access existing provincial programs for implementing fuel mitigation
measures. Without support, the Nation and Xeni Gwet’in lack capacity to take the
necessary steps to mitigate known fire risks.
Fire mitigation planning in Tsilhqot’in territory, and particularly in the DTA, requires a
regional planning process in collaboration with the Tsilhqot’in Nation and with Tsilhqot’in
communities playing an active leadership role.

4
5

Emergency Response Protocol (2015), s 2.
Emergency Response Protocol (2015), s 5.
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Dedicated Financial Resources
Core Challenges:
The financial risks and inadequate disaster compensation experienced by Tsilhqot’in
communities are the products of jurisdictional gaps in emergency management in
First Nations communities. From an emergency financing perspective, the Tsilhqot’in
communities were treated as equivalent to local governments – expected to cover upfront emergency response costs and seek reimbursement. Yet Tsilhqot’in communities
lack the financial capacity to operate on a reimbursement model, creating significant
financial risk and uncertainty for the communities. Moreover, disaster compensation that
simply restores Tsilhqot’in communities to their pre-fire state leaves these communities
vulnerable to future wildfire. The 2017 wildfires present a crucial opportunity to recover
communities in a way that attends to the major infrastructure gaps that create disaster
vulnerability.
Reimbursement and recovery costs for First Nations communities are ultimately sourced
by Canada. However, BC is responsible for administering the reimbursement process for
BC First Nations. This added level of jurisdictional coordination created a significant and
stressful administrative burden for Tsilhqot’in communities attempting to recover from a
disaster. Moreover, it has meant that costs have yet to be full recovered, over a year after
the wildfires ended.

Call to Action 32
Establish clear financial arrangements and compensation measures
developed together between Tsilhqot’in, regional, provincial, and
federal authorities in advance of an emergency
Recognition of First Nations as lead authorities for emergency management requires
enhancing the financial capacity of First Nations to carry out this responsibility. Funding
arrangements that enable Tsilhqot’in leadership to effectively implement emergency
management practices – prevention, preparedness, response and recovery – are required.
(See Calls to Action 13-17, which are necessary to realize this commitment.)

Proportionate compensation and restitution processes that accurately
reflect the Nation’s reliance on land-based sustenance
Disaster compensation must attend to the different ways in which disasters result in loss of
livelihood in Indigenous communities. Tsilhqot’in citizens are coping with the immediate
and long-term impacts of the wildfires on land-based practices, including traditional
sustenance and use of medicinal plants. Hunting, fishing, gathering and cultural practices
have been and will continue to be affected for decades. The Red Cross provides some
short-term relief for “cultural livelihood” funding, but there exists no known mechanism
for supporting and repairing communities which are experiencing long-term loss.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation can, with the support of provincial and federal partners play a
leadership role in monitoring and assessing long-term land-based losses and formulating
new models of disaster restitution that respond to cultural and subsistence losses.
Financial assistance agreements should provide for adequate support to monitor long-
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term losses in game, fish, medicine, berries and other cultural losses in Tsilhqot’in
territory. The Tsilhqot’in Nation calls on provincial and federal partners to develop disaster
compensation agreements that incorporate Tsilhqot’in principles of restitution and which
accurately reflect the individual and collective impacts of disaster over time.

Reserve fund for Tsilhqot’in emergency response and a commitment to
the timely advance of federal reserve funds for emergency situations
Tsilhqot’in leadership in wildfire management requires access to funding for immediate
emergency response. Establishing a reserve fund for emergency response will enable
Tsilhqot’in leadership to take urgent and needed action to address wildfire threats
without also taking the financial leap of faith that is entailed by a reimbursement
structure. Protocol agreements for accessing the reserve fund can be drafted in advance
to address, for example: necessary pre-conditions for reserve fund access (e.g. declaring
a state of emergency), and a non-exclusive itemized list of automatically authorized
expenditures (e.g. salary, sustenance and travel expenditures for fire crews). The creation
of well-understood guidelines for acceptable and pre-authorized expenses alleviates the
uncertainty of negotiating expenses piece-by-piece while also allowing communities to
respond appropriately and effectively during the emergency.

Call to Action 29
Pilot project for a one-stop, coordinated reimbursement process
for First Nations governments in BC
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recommends a reimbursement process that has a clear lead
authority which works directly with Tsilhqot’in communities to reimburse communities for
emergency response expenditures that are not covered by the reserve fund. Identifying and
empowering a single lead authority responds to the cumbersome reimbursement process
experienced by Tsilhqot’in communities in 2017-18. A single lead authority supports the
adoption and implementation of Jordan’s Principle in this context.

Reimburse communities in accordance with the principle of
building back better to mitigate future disaster risk
Canada should commit to and implement the principle of building back better in a way
that recognizes the systemic inequality experienced by First Nations communities. The
principle of building back better is identified as a key priority in international disaster best
practices.6 ‘Build back better’ recognizes that disaster recovery is a crucial opportunity to
rebuild communities in a way that better prepares communities for the next emergency.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recognizes Canada’s commitment to 15% mitigation enhancements
through the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.7 The 15% rule reflects the need
for additional funding to restore and improve damaged infrastructure after a disaster.
This rule should be extended to First Nations communities receiving compensation for
6
7

UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Priority 4.
Guidelines for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements - Interpretation Bulletin 7 (January 1, 2017).
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disaster recovery. Tsilhqot’in Nation requests a baseline commitment from Canada to 15%
mitigation enhancements to public and private infrastructure in Tsilhqot’in communities.
Moreover, the significant and well-known disparities between infrastructure on First
Nations reserves and in non-First Nations communities requires Canada and the provinces
to negotiate in good faith with First Nations communities to provide enhanced critical
infrastructure and ensure basic infrastructure standards are met. Accordingly, and in
addition to the financial baseline, the Nation requests an ongoing commitment by Canada
and British Columbia to work with communities to mitigate all future concerns.

Call to Action 33
Apply Jordan’s Principle to emergency
management on reserve
The Tsilhqot’in Nation identifies Jordan’s Principle as the appropriate basis for guiding
funding for emergency management in First Nations communities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation
recommends that British Columbia and Canada commit to extending Jordan’s Principle
to ensure that jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity do not deny or delay the provision
of essential services in First Nations communities during and after an emergency. Jordan’s
Principle is explained below.
Just as jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity exacerbates the vulnerability of First
Nations children in need of social services, jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity
operate to enhance the vulnerability of First Nations communities to threats such as
wildfire. Jurisdictional complexity interfered with the ability of Tsilhqot’in communities
to respond immediately to the perceived wildfire threat. Jurisdictional complexity
caused significant delays in reimbursement of emergency management expenses further
threatening the ability of communities to run their governments for the remainder of the
year. As noted above, dealing with multiple departments and a complex reimbursement
process placed a substantial administrative burden on small communities in the midst of
wildfire recovery.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recommends that British Columbia and Canada adopt a
community-first approach. It recommends that the governments recognize the spirit and
intention of Jordan’s Principle and extend the application of this principle to emergency
management on reserve.

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

APPENDIx C
TL’ETINQOX COMMUNITY HEALTH
REVIEW
LISA HARTWICK

108

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

109

APPENDIX C - HARTWICK

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

110

APPENDIX C - HARTWICK

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

111

APPENDIX C - HARTWICK

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

112

APPENDIX C - HARTWICK

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

113

APPENDIX C - HARTWICK

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

APPENDIx D
LIST OF ACRONYMS

114

Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires

115

APPENDIX D - LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronyms
BCR			
CAF			
CRD			
CTA			
DISC			
DSS			
DTA			
EI			
EFF			
EMBC			
EOC			
FNESS			
FNHA			
FNS			
GIS			
GPS			
INAC			
I.R.			
LEH			
LGIC			
LOU			
MCFD			
MLA			
NDA			
PREOC		
PTSD			
RCMP			
RSBC			
RSC			
S100			
S185			
SUP			
TDDE			
TEOP			
TNG			
TRU			
UBCIC		
YDE			

Band Council Resolution
Canadian Armed Forces
Cariboo Regional District
Community Tripartite Agreement
Department of Indigenous Services Canada
Denisiqi Services Society
Declared Title Area
Employment Insurance
Emergency Fire Fighter
Emergency Management British Columbia
Emergency Operations Centre
First Nations’ Emergency Services Society of British Columbia
First Nation Health Authority
First Nation Summit
Geographic Information System
Global Positioning System
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada
Indian Reserve
Limited Entry Hunt
Lieutenant Governor in Council
Letter of Understanding - Tsilhqot’in Nation & Canada, Jan. 27, 2018
Ministry of Children & Family Development
Member of Legislative Assembly
Nenqay Deni Accord - Tsilhqot’in Nation & BC, Feb. 12, 2016
Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centre
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Revised Statutes of British Columbia (Canada)
Revised Statutes of Canada
Basic Fire Suppression and Safety
Fire Entrapment Avoidance & Safety
Structural Protection Unit
Tsi Deldel Enterprises Ltd.
Tl’etinqox Emergency Operations Centre
Tsilhqot’in National Government
Thompson Rivers University
Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs
Yunesit’in Development Enterprises
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Methodology
The Tsilhqot’in Wildfire project began by seeking and building partnerships with a diversity
of experts in the field. Under the leadership of consultant Crystal Verhaeghe, a project team
was struck in April 2018, bringing together a cross-section of expertise and perspectives.
This included senior level TNG staff with experience in negotiations, health, forestry, lands
and resources, as well as external partners with expertise in disaster management, fire
ecology, and disaster law. Out of this, a strong partnership developed with two experts
from the University of British Columbia, Dr. Jocelyn Stacey (Peter Allard School of Law) and
Emma Feltes (PhD Candidate, Anthropology), who joined Crystal as research collaborators
and co-authors of the report. Dr. Stacey and Feltes additionally analyzed the complexity
of emergency management laws and the intersection of government and First Nation
jurisdiction. Dr. Stacey and Feltes developed recommendations to improve cooperation and
reduce conflict in First Nation wildfire management.
Informed by the 2018 Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement and TNG
leadership, the project team determined the scope of the project. It was unanimous that
the priority should be on thoroughly documenting the unique experiences of each of the
six Tsilhqot’in communities during the 2017 wildfires, while at the same time capturing
the collective impacts on the Tsilhqot’in nation as a whole and identifying in particular the
inter-jurisdictional issues that arose between Tsilhqot’in, federal, provincial, and third-party
entities.
To accomplish this breadth of scope, and over five months of intensive research, our
methodology included:
• Extensive qualitative research in each of the six Tsilhqot’in communities, amounting to 82
semi-structured interviews. The team interviewed Chiefs, band councillors, band staff,
forestry experts, emergency management personnel, community fire crews, Elders, and
other community members. Additionally, government and First Nations representatives
including the First Nations Summit, Aboriginal Affairs, Canadian Red Cross and
Emergency Advisory representatives were interviewed.
• Two facilitated, open Nation-wide sessions with the objective of enabling a venue for
Tsilhqot’in citizens and staff to reflect on the 2017 wildfire experience and identify best
practices, gaps, challenges and recommendations. These sessions were supported by
mental health advocates since debriefing is often a time to heal and reflect about the
traumatic experiences. One session was held in the Fall of 2017 and another in the Fall of
2018.
• A facilitated community Emergency Operations Centre session held one year after the
wildfires to assess the community health and wellbeing. The session was held to reflect on
the state of the community one year later and to identify how the recovery process was
progressing. From this session a breadth of needs were identified.
• Two Nation-level meetings with Wildfire Recovery managers to review community-level
and shared recovery needs for each community.
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• A scientific assessment by a fire ecologist to look at on-the-ground conditions and
impacts.
• Community risk vulnerability assessments with each of the six Tsilhqot’in communities
and to determine each communities’ level of threat in the event of future emergencies.
• An expert review and analysis of existing statutory and regulatory law regarding
emergency management in First Nations in British Columbia.
• An in-depth review of existing reports and emerging literature on wildfire and disaster
management on First Nations reserves.
• A Review of community wildfire recovery reports.
This wealth of collected data and expert knowledge has all come to inform the final report.
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